The So-Called Iranian Nuclear Threat

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 16 January 2012

The rumor about Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program, which led to a reaction from the UN Security Council some six years ago, remains a rumor today.

Since then, a perpetually growing sense of panic has dramatically raised the prospects of either a massive regional conflict in the Persian Gulf, involving both Israel and the United States, or a regional cold war that pits Iran, Iraq and Syria against Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Sunni Arab world. Given the council's overall approach in this matter, however, one is compelled to question if Iran's intention to build nuclear weapons, or the prevention of it from doing so, are really of primary concern. It seems that for those blowing the clarion against Iran, this country's probability of having a nuclear weapon and the pervasive fear emanating from this probability are more important than actually ensuring that it does not have, or get, one.

Following the resolution adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Feb. 4, 2006, the Security Council issued a presidential statement in March of the same year expressing its concern about Iran's nuclear program and asking the latter to fully suspend its nuclear program and to allow the IAEA to verify its peaceful nature. Subsequently, the council adopted Resolution 1696 (2006), invoking chapter VII of the UN Charter and obliging Iran to suspend its program; Resolution 1737 (2006), imposing sanctions by cutting off nuclear cooperation and freezing the assets of individuals and entities linked to the nuclear program; Resolution 1747 (2007), expanding the list of sanctioned entities; Resolution 1803 (2008), further expanding the sanctions, imposing a travel ban on the sanctioned persons and banning the export of nuclear and missile-related dual-use goods to Iran; Resolution 1835 (2008), reaffirming all the sanctions already imposed on Iran; and finally Resolution 1929 (2010), imposing a complete arms embargo on Iran, banning it from any activities related to ballistic missiles, authorizing the inspection and seizure of shipments violating the council's sanctions and extending the asset freeze to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL). As should be remembered, both Turkey and Brazil voted against this resolution, believing that further sanctions on Iran would be counterproductive in trying to resolve the issue.

Resolutions that are designed not to resolve

The crux of these resolutions is captured in a specific clause on which they are all predicated: “The IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.” Therefore, the council continues to call upon Iran to re-establish “full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA.” That is, Iran should suspend its nuclear program, even if it is in fact a peaceful one, until the IAEA makes sure that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities anywhere in the country. In response, the Iranian authorities argue that they have been cooperating with the IAEA as required. They also argue that they have the right to continue the enrichment for research and development in conformity with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a signatory and which stipulates that the signatory states have a right to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.” In the meantime, the fear and panic about Iran's alleged intentions to acquire nuclear weapon capabilities have grown exponentially thanks to very well organized campaigns in the West, especially in the US. 

If it is seeking nuclear weapons Iran is certainly violating international law, threatening to shift the regional balance of power and risking a massive arms race and escalation of tensions among its neighbors. Hence, this potential threat must be dealt with before it is too late. However, the Security Council's approach to the issue is problematic. As such, the council itself hinders the resolution of the problem. 

As the council considers Iran “guilty until proven innocent” as opposed to “innocent until proven guilty,” this problematic approach has two dimensions, the first of which is more of a technical one. What is the reason for the IAEA's inability to fulfill its mission? Is it because of Iran's lack of cooperation, which actually does not seem to be the case, or because of the IAEA's lack of sufficient technical capabilities? Or worse, could the reason be the political pressure on the IAEA that precludes it from coming to a conclusion that would undermine the deliberately constructed fear and panic about Iran's alleged nuclear program? In the context of this connection, how should one interpret former IAEA General Director Muhammad ElBaradei's statement during his interview with the Austrian Press Agency (APA) in January 2011, in which he said, “The threat posed by Iran's nuclear program was exaggerated by the West”? 

In the same interview, ElBaradei accuses the West of thwarting an agreement with Iran by making “unrealistic demands” and speaks of the second dimension of the council's approach, which is problematic, both conceptually and practically. How is it possible to ensure that Iran does not have an intention to pursue nuclear weapons? And how is it possible to ensure that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran? Trying to do either or both is tantamount to trying to prove that something does not exist. However, whereas discovering just one single example suffices to prove that that thing exists, proving that it does not requires one to look for it in every bit of space in order to ensure its nonexistence. Only then can one conclude that it does not exist. By this token, if the council's resolutions are to be fulfilled, the IAEA would have to search everywhere in Iran in order to ensure the nonexistence of undeclared nuclear material or activity, which is practically impossible. Even if the IAEA manages to fulfill such an unrealistic mission it is always possible that the protagonists of the alleged Iranian nuclear threat can dismiss the IAEA's conclusion by simply ridiculing it for its inability to find evidence of Iran's nuclear weapons program, which they so strongly believe exists somewhere. It is especially likely, given that the same actors had paved the way to the 2003 invasion of Iraq with similar tactics, only to admit in shame years later that they were wrong about Saddam Hussein's alleged weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the fact that Security Council members do not take similar action against another regional state, which does not deny its possession of nuclear weapons, further undermines the council's credibility vis-à-vis the alleged Iranian nuclear threat. 

So, it is all quite clear that the Security Council's approach to Iran's nuclear program is designed not to eliminate but to perpetuate the suspicions about it, with a growing sense of urgency, fear and panic. It goes without saying that the protagonists of the alleged Iranian nuclear threat are the same as those who are effectively dominant in shaping and mobilizing the council's resolutions in this matter, namely the US, the EU3 (United Kingdom, France and Germany) and Israel.

Wars: destructive for some, profitable for others

As the council keeps passing one resolution after another about Iran, Israel too keeps threatening to strike Iran's nuclear facilities if diplomacy fails. The US and the EU3 have described Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program as a major threat to international security and sought to increase pressure on Iran through national sanctions along with the UN sanctions. In the meantime, although it does not single out Iran as a specific threat or target (thanks to Turkey's efforts), NATO's new strategic concept and missile defense system have been developed on the assumption that Iran is pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program. In reaction, Iranian officials have repeatedly warned that Iran would deliver a crushing response to any kind of military attack on its nuclear facilities, in a war that would have devastating implications far beyond the region. Moreover, Iran criticized the presence of US warships and aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf. It warned against possible EU sanctions on Iranian oil exports by suggesting that it may shut down the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20 percent of the world's oil is transported. In response, the US has noted that any attempt by Iran that would disrupt the flow of oil to the world markets would not be tolerated. 

In the meantime, as the only winner in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran has been expanding its sphere of influence in the region, whereas its Sunni Arab neighbors are losing theirs as a shattering effect of the so-called Arab Spring. Iraq is now pretty much considered a Shiite state within the orbit of Iran. Syria's Alawite-dominated regime relies heavily on Tehran's support. Shiite communities all over the Arab world, including in Yemen, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia not only increase Tehran's leverage but also create a misleading sense of “Shiite emancipation from the Sunni oppressors,” which can be easily manipulated. In fact, before his recent visit to Tehran, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu warned about the existence of certain parties intending to deliberately instigate a Sunni-Shiite war in the region. 

At this point, it would be a mistake to think that the US, the EU3 or Israel are seeking to prepare the ground for an invasion of Iran, or trying to instigate a Sunni-Shiite war across the region. Yet, it would be equally, if not more, mistaken to think that there are not certain special interest groups within each country, who would want to do either or both. One may be inclined to ask why they would be interested in pursuing such an agenda. But the real question one should ask is, why would they not? After all, pragmatically speaking and as seen during the course of the Iran-Iraq war as well as in the run up to the first Gulf War, sustained regional wars and the escalation of tension among the regional powers can be manipulated to become quite profitable, both politically and economically, for the United States, the European Union and, most notably, for Israel. 

Nevertheless, there are strong reasons to believe that the US, the EU3 and Israel would not directly engage in a military conflict with Iran. First, neither the US nor the EU3 are financially stable enough to sustain a war with Iran, especially after a decade of military engagements both in Afghanistan and Iraq. Second, throughout its history Israel has never had any conflict with Iran beyond mere exchange of threats and condemnations. Nor is there any reason for them to do so, given that they share a similar fate in the ocean of Arabs surrounding them. Actually, in his “Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the United States,” Trita Parsi notes that the relationship between Tehran and Tel Aviv continued even after the so-called Islamic revolution in 1979 under the auspices of the dreaded Khomeini. Third, since the end of the Cold War the fundamental tenets of US policy towards the Middle East are to ensure safe and smooth access to energy resources and to protect Israel. Since it would be existentially detrimental to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries supplying the world energy markets, any military confrontation with Iran is antithetical to the vital interests of the US. Fourth, Iran is a major energy supplier to both the EU and China. Although the EU is entertaining the idea of sanctions on Iranian crude exports, it is hardly capable of sustaining these sanctions, given that doing so would strengthen Moscow's leverage towards the EU as the only major energy supplier. Similarly, with an ever-increasing need for energy resources, China would oppose any scheme that would disrupt its energy supply from Iran. 

Fifth, Iran is not like Afghanistan or Iraq. It has survived for more than three decades despite the isolation and sanctions imposed on it. In a way, these hardships enabled Iran to develop self-sufficiency and technological capabilities not only to the extent of pursuing a nuclear program but also of being able to intercept and seize possession of an American drone. Most importantly, Iran has an ideology which glorifies martyrdom from the age of seven to 77 and this could be quite costly for all of its perceived enemies. There is no need to mention that with its heavy influence over the Shiites in Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, Iran is quite capable of burning the whole region. 

From the perspective of certain elements within the US, the EU3 and Israel, the deliberate escalation of tensions and consequentially the occasional low-intensity military conflicts between Iran, Syria, Iraq and Shiite communities on one side and Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries and Sunni communities on the other may be considered to be a lucrative opportunity to manipulate and profit from. With the realization of this second scenario, all of the states in the region and the ethno-religious groups within each state would turn into potential customers for all kinds of military technology, from conventional weapons to long-range missiles and fighter jets and cyber-security systems. The energy suppliers on both sides would be even more willing to get their oil and gas to the world market, because only then would they be able to sustain their economic strength while engaging in an arms race or military conflict with the other side. Moreover, these countries would be much more fragile politically, economically and socially and hence easier to manipulate diplomatically. Finally, these countries would be consuming one another for a period with no foreseeable end. Of course, for this scenario to fully materialize Iran must continue to be perceived as a growing nuclear threat to regional and international security, as a major threat to the Sunni majority within the Muslim world and as an existential threat to certain Arab states, like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates. 

In its final analysis, the IAEA is not suggesting that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program, but that the agency is “unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.” In any case, such an objective is impossible to achieve conceptually and practically. So long as that remains the objective of the IAEA, as well as the criterion for the Security Council, the perception of an "Iranian nuclear threat" will pervade and the panic is likely to increase. As a result, rather than a military conflict between the US, the EU3, Israel and Iran, a sustained escalation of tensions, military confrontations and proxy wars are likely to ensue between Iran, its allies and the rest of the region. In the end, it is up to Iran, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the emirates and other regional actors to allow this second scenario materialize.

The OIC's Xenophobic Publicists in the United States

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 28 December 2011

At the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), ever since Professor Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu became secretary-general of the organization in 2005, engaging with the relevant US authorities and gaining publicity within American public opinion have continued to be priorities. After all, the OIC and the United States should be and are natural allies in dealing with a wide range of issues, which include countering inter-ethnic and intra-religious violence in both Iraq and Afghanistan as elsewhere, combating racial and religious discrimination, promoting moderation and modernization, improving mother-child health in OIC member states, encouraging the participation of women in politics, improving human rights conditions and female equality, as well as many other existing and emerging issues. The US has a vested interest in each and every single one of these areas, and the OIC is the legitimate, credible and able political body to partner with as it too shares the same interests. 

Therefore, in addition to closely working with the two US presidential envoys to it, the OIC has sought the ways and means to engage with the US Senate and House, think tanks, civil society organizations and the media to introduce what it stands for and, more importantly, to understand how it can be of further help. It is unfortunate though that not many, if any, Americans are really aware of what the OIC stands for. 

Ironically though, in recent months, the OIC’s publicity has skyrocketed in the US, inside the Beltway at least, thanks to xenophobic and Islamophobic pundits, as well as extreme right blogs such as PipeLineNews, Family Security Matters and the like. Their continuous defamation of the OIC has intensified recently with the US State Department’s decision to invite the OIC to take part in an expert-level meeting to discuss practical steps for the implementation of United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Resolution 16/18, which was formulated on the basis of the eight points provided by the OIC secretary-general during one of his speeches in Geneva to promote a culture of tolerance and mutual understanding. The resolution, titled, “Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence, and violence against persons based on religion or belief,” was adopted by consensus at the UNHRC in March 2011 with the participation of the United States, European Union and OIC member states as well as states from the other regional formations. The United Nations General Assembly also this week adopted by consensus of 193 nations a similar resolution derived from Res. 16/18 with the same title. The resolution simply means that the states should take the necessary precautions -- consistent with their obligations under international human rights law -- so that Jews, Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, atheists, agnostics and individuals subscribing to any thought, belief and non-belief system are not exposed to violence and/or discrimination due to their religion or belief. 

‘A form of holy war’

Oddly enough, however, Pamela Geller wrote, “the Islamized State Department will be meeting with the Islamic supremacist Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to discuss strategies and develop action plans in which to impose the restriction of free speech … under the Sharia here in America.” In the same piece, she compared the US engagement with the OIC to discuss religious tolerance to having Himmler (military commander and leading member of the Nazi Party) meet with Jews to condemn Jew-hatred. Similarly, Clare Lopez of the so-called Clarion Fund speculated that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was due to host OIC Secretary-General Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu in Washington to “discuss how the United States can implement the OIC agenda to criminalize criticism of Islam.” Another example of this kind is Frank Gaffney of the Center for Security Policy, who criticized the Obama administration for facilitating the efforts of the Muslim-American organizations to “penetrate and influence the government of the United States.” Gaffney thinks that these organizations are pursuing a “civilization jihad,” which is allegedly a “stealthy form of holy war, designed to eliminate and destroy Western civilization from within.” He too speculated that the expert-level meeting hosted by the State Department to discuss religious tolerance was a part of such a stealthy form of holy war, a civilization jihad. 

The two-day Istanbul Process conference hosted by the US State Department Dec. 12-14, 2011, was in fact a dramatic step forward in implementation of the consensual decision of the US, EU, OIC member states and other signatories of the resolution toward protecting individuals or communities of the individuals subscribing to any religion or belief, against discrimination and violence. Discrimination and violence against individuals who “express” their opinion is included. The critiques argue that the US should not engage with the OIC, many members of which have blasphemy laws or restrict freedom of expression in one way or another. Actually, that is the very reason why the US should engage with the OIC. A prominent human rights advocacy organization, Human Rights First (HRF), has welcomed the UN General Assembly resolution and the US State Department meeting. Joëlle Fiss of the HRF noted that the resolution encourages open debate, human rights education and interfaith and intercultural initiatives. She also argued that the Istanbul Process conference was important to demonstrate that “states have tools at their disposal to combat violence, discrimination and hatred without restricting free speech.” 

The two-day conference was a follow-up to a high-level meeting, co-chaired by OIC Secretary-General İhsanoğlu and US Secretary of State Clinton in İstanbul on July 15 this year. Also participating in that high-level meeting was the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton as well as foreign ministers and high-level representatives from some 19 countries, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the African Union, the Arab League and the Vatican. In a statement issued after the meeting, they jointly “called upon all relevant stakeholders throughout the world to take seriously the call for action set forth in Resolution 16/18, which contributes to strengthening the foundations of tolerance and respect for religious diversity as well as enhancing the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms around the world.” Again at this meeting, the participants committed to “go beyond mere rhetoric and to reaffirm their commitment to freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression by urging States to take effective measures, as set forth in Resolution 16/18, consistent with their obligations under international human rights law, to address and combat intolerance, discrimination and violence based on religion or belief.” 

So, does any of these look like a “stealthy form of holy war” or a “civilization jihad” waged to destroy the Western civilization? If it does, what doesn’t? One would expect that in the United States the criticism within extreme right, xenophobic and Islamophobic circles targeting the OIC would be rather more sophisticated and intellectually challenging, if not constructive. However, it fails to be anything more than mere fearmongering and speculating on the basis of false information. As a matter of fact, with its new Charter revised in 2008, the OIC clearly stresses its commitment to the universally accepted principles of the UN Charter, and consequently affirms its priorities as the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, transparency and accountability and the rule of law. More importantly, it consistently works toward realizing these priorities in its member states. In the end, the only good thing about the fierce defamation campaign waged against the OIC in the United States is its perpetrators’ success in raising the OIC’s visibility within American public opinion. Concomitantly, the only thing left to the OIC is to continue its constructive engagement with the relevant US authorities, think tanks, media, civil society organizations and other interested partners, while at the same time trying to correct the false information spread out about it.

Diplomacy between Turkey and Israel

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 2 October 2011

“Constructive ambiguity” is probably the most useful diplomatic tool that enables the states to move forward in their relationships with their counterparts, no matter what kind of crisis they may have experienced. But it looks like it has long been kicked out of the Turkish diplomatic lexicon. Technically, the constructive ambiguity is defined as a deliberate vagueness in one's statements or position in negotiations with a view to expand the realm of maneuvering in order to advance particular political objectives.

Optimistically, the constructive ambiguity can be interpreted, as an assurance given by the parties prior or during the crisis that they are willing to revise their respective positions in order to overcome the crisis situation without losing face before their own constituencies or the international community. Both Turkish and Israeli governments have spoken with vivid clarity, however, with respect to their respective positions on the Mavi Marmara incident, where Israeli soldiers killed eight Turkish citizens and one American. 

Ankara has insisted that Turkish-Israeli relations would never go back to normal unless Israel apologizes from Turkey, pays compensations to the families of the victims, and lifts the unlawful Israeli blockade on Gaza. In response, Tel Aviv has stressed that Israel would never apologize from Turkey for what Israeli soldiers did aboard the Mavi Marmara. In a way, Turkey and Israel have locked themselves up into a non-solution. After all, once announcing not only to Israel, but also to the whole world its conditions for normalization so clearly, how can the AK Party government possibly seem to be settling for anything less, or compromising to advance Turkey’s long-term interests? As for the Netanyahu government; it should apologize, but hardly would do so, because doing so would be tantamount to the admission of guilt, and create a precedent, which would oblige Israel not only to apologize for its countless crimes past, present and future, but also to meet its concomitant legal obligations. Moreover, given the addition, as a third condition, of the lifting of the Gaza blockade, which is not immediately related to the Turkish-Israeli relations, the skeptics may suggest that the AK Party government is not interested in a rapid normalization anyway. 

At the end of the day, the present stalemate in the Turkish-Israeli relations is a result of the political decisions made by both the AK Party government and the Netanyahu government throughout a tumultuous process, which was caused by an irresponsible act of an NGO based in İstanbul, as well as by even more irresponsible act of the Israeli armed forces. Nor this type of downgrading of the two states’ relations is something abnormal. It has happened before, it may happen in the future, and as such, it is something normal. 

However, the ramifications of the ensuing crisis are not confined to the diplomatic, political and economic relations between the two states only. The continued hostility between the Turkish and Israeli governments, coupled with the provocations by the zealots on both sides, are likely to instigate the emotions even further, thereby leading to irreparable damages. Therefore, the stakeholders other than the two governments such as the Turkish and Israeli peoples as well as their respective diasporas, especially in the United States, should work together to contain the potential damages of the crisis. In so doing, the onus is more on the shoulders of the American Jewish community who prioritizes the well being of the State of Israel, because relatively speaking it has far greater capability, compared to the other three, to make things much more complicated.

Spill over effect

The heat in Turkish-Israeli relations continues to increase due to the two governments’ exchange of warnings and threats of sanctions. PM Erdogan announced that the Turkish warships would more frequently appear in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to ensure the safety of navigation, which Israel interpreted as a measure against the Israeli naval blockade on Gaza. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman uttered that Israel would implement four faceted sanctions against Turkey, which includes a comprehensive travel boycott, cooperation with the Armenian diaspora, support to the terrorist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), and portrayal of Turkey in the international fora as an oppressor of its minorities. Not surprisingly, what two prominent American political scientists, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt described as the Israel Lobby has rushed to mobilize each and every resource available to it within the American polity as well with the hope of punishing Turkey for going harsh on Israel. Recently, seven US senators penned a joined letter to President Barack Obama, asking the latter to ‘mount a diplomatic offensive’ against Turkey. Similarly, Daniel Pipes and the right-wing extremist pundits alike have begun to propagate the false image of Turkey being the most dangerous country in the Middle East along with Iran. In line with this reflex, the black propaganda of the Israel Lobby against Turkey is likely to intensify in the months to come, especially during that time of the year when the US Congress is traditionally hijacked with allegations of the so-called Armenian genocide.


However, it seems like the anti-AK Party network in the US has recently diversified its targets, and now attacking Fethullah Gülen and the educational-cultural initiatives he has inspired as well. As Michael Shank of George Mason University reminds in his Huffington Post article titled “Islamophobia Network Targets Top Performing American Schools”, the Center for American Progress (CAP)’s recently published an Islamophobia report that reveals the extend of such a defamation campaign.  The CAP report, which is titled “Fear Inc: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America”, demonstrates that the Eagle Forum, a so-called pro-family movement, and other members of the Islamophobia network have deliberately propagated an alleged Turkish threat to America: the so-called Muslim Gülen schools, which would allegedly "educate American children through the lens of Islam and teach them to hate Americans”. Moreover, beside many blogosphere commentaries suffering from intellectual deficit but equally adamant in trying to defame Gülen, a recent Newsweek piece titled “Erdoğan 1, Ataturk 0” referred to Gülen as “Erdogan’s friend and mentor” and to the civil society movement he has inspired as the “AKP’s own ‘deep state’ ally, a wealthy and powerful Islamist movement directed from luxurious self-exile in the US”.

Given such allegations, one is compelled to infer that the anti-AK Party network in the US is targeting Gülen and the people involved with the civil society initiatives he has inspired, probably because its members assume that Gülen is the real force behind the AK Party government, and hence can be utilized to tone down its stance towards Israel. While such an assumption lacks credible evidence and remain as a mere speculation, it fails to recognize the fact that it was Gülen himself who criticized the so-called Freedom Flotilla project, which lies at the heart of the unfolding crisis between Turkey and Israel. In his interview to the Wall Street Journal during the days following the infamous Mavi Marmara incident, and when the entire Turkey was overwhelmed with heightened nationalistic sentiments after the Israeli murder of eightTurks and one Turkish American citizen, Gülen expressed his doubts about the true intentions behind the flotilla project, and remarked that the organizers should have consulted with the authorities if the purpose was to bring humanitarian aid to Gaza. One can hardly argue that Gülen is a source of inspiration for the AK Party government, especially when it comes to foreign policy. 




Track II diplomacy


Nevertheless, it is obvious that the current political crisis between Turkey and Israel bears negative implications on the non-political and totally unrelated civil society and educational initiatives. Therefore, it may be prudent to explore ways in order to prevent its further exacerbation, and contain its ramifications in form of creating anti-Turkish sentiments, or at least making the atmosphere conducive for the proliferation of such negative sentiments. In this context, the Track II diplomacy figures as a viable tool to compensate for the absence of optimistically utilized-constructive ambiguity in the Turkish-Israeli relations. Defined as a kind of informal diplomacy undertaken through exchanges between non-officials such as scholars, public intellectuals, journalists, retired officials, public figures or social activists, the Track II diplomacy is a foreign policy tool used in order to prevent further escalation of tensions, and better yet to help the parties resolve their conflict. In this regard, the non-official interactions between the Turks and the Israelis as well as between their respective diasporas in the joint initiatives such as conferences, workshops, mutual delegation visits, public declarations, and sportive or art events can be useful to increase popular demand for solution, overcome the impasse and move forward in a more constructive way.

Turks should not perceive such a civic engagement with Israelis as an acceptance of defeat in the face of the Netanyahu government’s resistance to apologize from Turkey, or as a sell out of the victims of the Israeli assault on the Mavi Marmara. Similarly, Israelis or their fellow Jews in the diaspora should not consider Turks’ willingness to engage with them despite the continuing political crisis as a concession out of despair, but as an indication of their inherent constructivism. The opposite is to continue the business as usual. In that case, Turkey and Turkish-Americans would continue to be demonized. It may not be that bad after all to be demonized by such right-wing groups and fundamentalist figures as Daniel Pipes, David Yerushalmi, Robert Spencer, Frank Gaffney, Steven Emerson, Bridgette Gabriel, and Rachel Sharon-Krespin as the vast majority of Americans already know who they are, and why they do what they do. However, the situation may not be so positive for the Jewish-Americans, if the demonization of the Turks is to continue. In an America, where the criticism of Israel and the Israel Lobby reaches an unprecedented level, where high-ranking officials publicly describe Israel as an ungrateful ally and strategic liability for the US, and where according to the Anti-Defamation League figures the anti-Semitism is rampant, it is the Jewish-Americans who should be trying to avoid any action that would perpetuate or escalade the crisis between Turkey and Israel, let alone attacking those Turks who could be their only ally if the anti-Semitism gets out of control.


Finally, those Turks who do not look at the crisis between Turkey and Israel from an eschatological perspective, and hence are not beguiled with the dreams of righting all wrongs overnight with lofty speeches backed only by mediocre power would wish that the problem between the two was solved without prolonging and spilling over. Similarly, looking towards future, they may wonder if Ankara’s intent to take the issue of Israeli blockade on Gaza to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is strategically wise one. There is no doubt that Turkey has every moral right to do so. However, there is a risk associated with this move. Technically, the ICJ can consider and rule on the case only if both Turkey and Israel agree to refer it to the ICJ. Otherwise it can deliver a non-binding advisory opinion if the UN General Assembly’s simple majority votes for such referral. It is clear that the first condition would never materialize. In the latter case, the advisory opinion would just add to many other UN resolutions and reports manifesting unlawful practices of Israel, but hardly have any enforcement effect. Even if in the ideal circumstance, the ICJ considers the case, and convicts Israel, which is in reality unlikely to happen; then the Security Council’s permanent members have right to stop the enforcement of the ICJ verdict. It is all too obvious which permanent member that would be.


Besides, given the black propaganda power of Turkey’s opponents, which does not necessarily refer to the Netanyahu government and the right-wing extremist members of the Israel Lobby only, Turkey’s such a legitimate endeavor can be portrayed as an attempt to steal leadership role from those Arab countries, who have traditionally appeared as the advocates of the Palestine cause. Worse, Turkey in general, and Turkish foreign minister in particular may be unfairly accused of embarking on yet another foreign policy objective, which is to bring Israel to justice, and leaving it unfulfilled. As such, Turkey may all of a sudden come to face the limits of its power both soft and hard in front of the international community. As Hans Morgenthau suggested, "the prestige of a nation is its reputation for power. That reputation, the reflection of the reality of power in the minds of the observers, can be as important as the reality of power itself". By the same token, an abrupt exposure of the limits of its power can ruin a nation's prestige.  Of course, the policy makers in Ankara would know the best, but it may be better to not stretch further thinner, and instead just remember that some meals taste best when served cold. Turkey would be better off if it allocates its energy and resources to strengthen its democracy and economy inside, and continue to forge new partnerships outside, in line with its “zero problem with neighbors” policy. After all, only powerful Turkey can have zero problems with its neighbors, and can help the ones having problems solve theirs.

Turkish Foreign Policy Tests Itself

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 22 August 2011

For critics of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, both inside and outside the country, the recent tension in Turkish-Syrian relations that has sprung up over the Assad regime’s brutal repression of popular demands for democracy is apparently a welcome opportunity.

They seem determined to make use of it in every possible way in order to ridicule Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s vision of Turkey as having “zero problems with [its] neighbors” and at the same time to incite, or rather draw, the AK Party government into pursuing an ever more confrontational course of action in a way that would not only cause further deterioration of Turkey’s amicable image in the Middle East but also irreparably damage its relations with Iran and Syria, both of which are Turkey’s natural allies in its fight against Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) terrorism. 

In the beginning, it looked like Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had come to believe that the situation in Syria was a domestic issue for Turkey. The rationale behind such a politically loaded definition of the situation was curious at best, as it was most likely to have negative implications, if continued, because most of Turkey’s neighbors and allies can identify with (and potentially decide to intervene in) Turkey’s domestic issues on similar grounds of ethnic-religious affinity and purely humanitarian concerns. Yet Ankara appeared resolved to go so far as to cut off its relations with Damascus, seeking an immediate end to the violence in Syria. 

In the meantime, a chorus of the US and European media, including The New York Times and The Washington Post, has been running news reports encouraging Ankara to be even more critical of the Assad regime, with op-ed pieces bombastically arguing that as the most powerful man in the region, only Erdoğan can stop Bashar al-Assad’s crackdown. Similarly, Washington has continued to announce that the United States and Turkey share the same goals on Syria, which are an immediate end to violence and a democratic transition. Worse, the State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland, as if speaking on behalf of her Turkish counterpart, has remarked that Turkey’s patience with the Assad regime is coming to an end. Maybe not as a direct result of these remarks, but concurrently, Davutoğlu warned that there would be nothing to discuss anymore unless the Assad regime stopped the violence. 

The international community paying lip service
Only recently, the Turkish intelligentsia and authorities began to realize that the international community is so far only paying lip service to stopping the violence in Syria, and has not even moved for a UN Security Council resolution: The best they have been able to produce is a weak presidential statement, condemning the Assad regime. While this is the case, what Turkey can do is extremely limited, when it comes to ending the crackdown in Syria. 

Nevertheless, the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria, and more broadly the so-called “Arab Spring” sweeping the region, has presented probably the most daunting foreign policy challenge the AK Party government must handle as it embarks on its third term in office. How should Ankara respond to regional and international developments, given that Turkey has a number of peculiarities and contradictions, most notable among which are its need to reckon with its undemocratic past and deal with PKK terrorism, while at the same time having already achieved great economic success and vast global engagement, thanks to its expanding middle class and vibrantly active civil society. 

Perhaps the best way to start would be to develop a clear understanding at all levels of the AK Party government that the status-quo, which was established in the region and has been consolidated as such over the last three or four centuries, cannot be overturned or undone in just a decade or two, or by Turkey alone. Nor can any change imposed from the outside be positively sustained, no matter how good the intentions behind it may be. That is, real change with respect to democracy and pluralism in Syria or across the Middle East cannot come about only through the revolutions organized in the streets or through public demonstrations. 

A revolution is simply the replacement of those oppressing at the top with the ones oppressed at the bottom. As one Western thinker observed, the moment they come to power, the so-called revolutionaries turn into conservatives who are adamantly determined to preserve the new order. In fact, the Assad regime, which is trying to preserve its grip on the country, is the remnant of a past revolution that was waged against the perceived “defunct and corrupt” regime, which preceded it. The same fate could befall the regimes which come out of the so-called “Arab Spring,” which in fact never was, and is unlikely to be, a real revolution, unless the oppressed Arabs, using legitimate and democratic means, reign in the political and economic opportunity gaps, replace the old guard, and gradually transform their respective countries. 

Would it be any different in Turkey than it has been in Syria, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, or Tunisia, if the Turks had revolted against the secular-fundamentalist elite, including the rogue army generals, who had so long dominated all of the country’s economic and political opportunities with the help of their allies in Washington and the European capitals? That it would not be any different has been proven by each of the three bloody military interventions in the past, and still with the proven plots of rogue elements in the military to “cage” the AK Party government and smash the people’s will with a “sledgehammer,” so that for another hundred years no one would dare to challenge their absolute reign over the state. 

It is understandably difficult, of course, for many novices within the AK Party government to recognize this fact, since they have simply parachuted into previously inaccessible political and economic positions, after the state apparatus and the political arena had been substantially transformed and democratized as a result of gradual but consistent social change across the country. Also, since they hardly understand that the AK Party is not the cause, but only one of the effects of such transformation, it is only normal for them to so readily take uncalculated risks by presuming to use powers and capabilities, which indeed they do not have. 

Not all change can be administered by Turkey

Contemporary Ankara and all the Turks mesmerized by its activism should recognize that there are certain things that Turkey can succeed in changing in its region and in the international arena, but for all the rest it can only work toward preparing the conditions conducive to a change in the future. It is not a law cast in stone that all the change must be administered by today’s Ankara or with today’s leaders. The Turks should know this best, after suffering for the last several decades from a number of “saviors,” who emerged to create a powerful Turkey, but whose personal priorities and ambitions eventually led to the hindrance of democracy in the country, which is the only source of legitimate power. 

Similarly, within an international system where the status quo is enforced by states with which Turkey does not have a balance of power yet, Ankara’s confrontational approach would only alert the status quo protectionists to take necessary precautions by containing Turkey’s existing channels of influence, and also by blocking all the other possible ones that Ankara can utilize. Worse, Turkey’s worldwide engagement with other nations would also be endangered, because the global status quo protectionists, once disturbed by Ankara’s policies, would target that civil engagement by wrongfully attributing a political meaning to it. 

After all, history is not at an end, and it is not up to Turkey’s AK Party government to right all the wrongs in its region and across the globe. Nor would it be held responsible for not being able to do so. However, the AK Party leaders will be held responsible for their role in Turkey’s democratization, or for their failure to address it, if that should turn out to be the case. They will also be judged by their ability or inability to handle the political, economic and security problems of Turkey, but not those of its neighbors. The only reason why the Turks voted the AK government in for the third term with an overwhelming majority was their conviction, or hope, at least, that this government will prioritize the adoption of a new constitution, the successful completion of the so-called Ergenekon investigation into the anti-democratic formations within the state, and the maintenance of the country’s high economic performance. 

In the final analysis, there are many events occurring in Turkey’s region, and it is up to the AK Party government to choose to get distracted by them at the expense of the priorities it was elected to address. Ankara’s unsolicited involvement in these regional events could be quite costly for Turkey, given that the so-called Arab Spring now physically borders Turkey, that its inspirational effect is not confined only to Arabs, and that the anti-Turkey Kurdish separatist movement has already gained great momentum both inside and outside Turkey. 

The rogue elements in the Turkish army, which are currently under investigation, may not have managed to “cage” the AK Party government as stipulated in their alleged “cage” coup plot. However, by so readily crossing its once close neighbors, and by damaging its relationships with allies in the fight against terrorism, the AK Party government seems to be willingly stepping inside that cage. Turkey and every other nation in its region would be better off if Ankara simply got along with its friends, reached out to potential friends, and avoided any confrontation with its foes and natural rivals, while prioritizing the country’s democratization and maintaining high economic performance. Ankara should immediately return to its “zero problems with neighbors” policy, which Foreign Minister Davutoğlu so masterfully devised and implemented.

[Big Picture] Turkey's PKK Problem and the So-Called Kurdish 'Mandela' - 2

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 24 July 2011

Thanks to the rapid expansion of Turkish civil society in the last decade and political, socioeconomic and legal reforms introduced during the rule of the current Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, today the Kurds of Turkey are enjoying rights and freedoms that had remained simply unimaginable up until a decade ago.

The Kurdish language is freely used in the public space and TV and radio stations now broadcast in Kurdish. In Parliament, in addition to ethnic Kurdish deputies in various parties, some of whom have served in senior government positions, there are 36 others who have banded together under the banner of the so-called Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and are rallying on nothing but the ethnicity ticket.

At the same time, since 2007 a massive legal investigation has been under way into the alleged “Ergenekon” terrorist network, which is believed to have included rogue elements from the Turkish security forces as well as Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorists, who carried out terrorist acts in order to exacerbate and sustain Turkish-Kurdish tensions. Last but not least, Turkey is on the verge of overhauling its current Constitution, which was drafted under the tutelage of the military after the 1980 coup d’état, for a more inclusive, democratic and pluralistic one.

Yet, apparently no improvement in terms of the restoration of Kurds’ individual as well as communal rights and freedoms is good enough for those 36 deputies and their political allies both inside and outside Turkey. Lately, they have begun to voice their desire for Kurdish “autonomy” in the Southeast. They argue that the AK Party government must negotiate a solution with chief terrorist Abdullah Öcalan, whom they do not refrain from, but enjoy the freedom of, calling the “national leader of Kurds,” this while living on salaries provided by Turkish taxpayers.

In the meantime, Öcalan, who settled for imprisonment on İmralı Island outside İstanbul in 1999 under European guarantees against his execution, after years of enjoying a posh lifestyle in his Damascus residence under the protection of the late Hafez al-Assad while countless Kurdish youth perished in the mountains, has been trying to present himself as a legitimate counterpart of the Turkish government. He has proposed a so-called “three-phase roadmap” that stipulates the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission and the involvement of international actors such as the US, the UN, the EU and, oddly, a “Kurdish Federal Government of Iraq,” which does not exist. In media organs sympathetic to, or outright supportive of, the PKK, there seems to be a systematic effort to draw parallels between the situation in Turkey and South Africa’s apartheid regime and also to portray the baby killer as a sort of Kurdish “Mandela” who allegedly fought for the freedom of the Kurdish minority, served years in prison and eventually turned dovish in search for peace.

In general, these efforts are organized through the so-called Democratic Society Congress (DTK), which was established in 2010 in the mold of South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) and aims to bring together all Kurdish civil society initiatives. During its formation, the DTK announced that it would work to achieve a “Democratic Turkey, Autonomous Kurdistan.”

The big picture

So, what is really happening in Turkey with regards to the Kurdish issue and the PKK problem? Could they be analyzed independently of other domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey? How do they all connect to each other in the big picture? It is hard to know for sure before it actually happens. However, one viable explanation may be that they are complementary parts of a concerted effort to both impede the legal investigation of the alleged Ergenekon terrorist network nested in the state and to derail Turkey’s march to regional and international prominence by undermining and eventually getting rid of both Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AK Party government.

At a regional level, Turkey’s two immediate neighbors and critical allies in the fight against PKK terrorism are facing existential threats that are likely to diminish their ability to cooperate with Turkey. Given precedents in Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, Syria will also be paralyzed by an internal conflict and instability in a way that would prevent Damascus from functioning as an effective regional partner for Ankara in the foreseeable future.

Similarly, Iran will be unable to fully cooperate with Turkey for two reasons: First, there is a naturally or deliberately growing discord between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which started with the former’s sacking of the intelligence chief who was backed by the latter; second, Iran is highly likely to experience popular unrest in the coming years with the demise of the aging Khamenei, who is pretty much the only bulwark before the imminent popular upheaval against Iran’s revolutionary regime.

Besides, encouraged by questionable praise coming from Washington and Brussels, and increasingly critical of the regime in Syria, Ankara is diminishing its prospect of cooperation with a post-revolution establishment in this country, which would more or less remain intact with or without Bashar al-Assad. In the absence of Damascus and Tehran to cooperate with, Ankara will naturally be obliged to seek cooperation with Israel and the US in the fight against the PKK, which would of course not come for free.

On the other hand, at a national level, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the BDP have been hindering Parliament’s ability to function by creating crises over petty issues such as the taking of the parliamentary oath. DTK members are continuing to make provocative public declarations, announcing the establishment of so-called Kurdish autonomy in its alleged capital, Diyarbakır.

In the meantime, the PKK and its urban incarnation, the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK), are increasing their terrorist activities by ostensibly defying Öcalan’s call for a cease-fire. In so doing, the two are not only trying to perpetuate a sense of insecurity and chaos in the country but also beefing up Öcalan’s deliberately constructed false image in the eyes of the general public as a potential peacemaker.

The latest in that regard was the recent killing of 13 Turkish soldiers in Diyarbakir in a PKK ambush. CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was quick to blame the military’s failure to prevent the incident on the AK Party government by arguing that the morale of the Turkish army had been damaged by the ongoing Ergenekon investigation. Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leaders are publicly endorsing Erdoğan’s increasingly inflammatory rhetoric against the PKK and its extensions in Parliament, as he puts it.

So, does all this mean that some dark powers are working hard to weaken or, worse, divide Turkey and create an independent Kurdish state, which would possibly be followed later by certain concessions to the Armenians, the Assyrians and the Greeks? Maybe yes, maybe no; that is not the issue of primary concern. For some, that is not even a legitimate question, but a conspiracy theory.

What is important is to recognize that there are many groups inside and outside Turkey who view the AK Party government’s ouster as the only solution to secure their interests in Turkey as well as in the region. They are, and will be, working intensively to exploit the Kurdish issue in order to undermine the AK Party government’s ability to work, and to diminish its popularity outside Turkey.

Similarly, one should realize that Turkey has not only foes but also friends within the international community who would not necessarily favor a more powerful and more independent Turkey on the world stage. As such, they may well be cooperating with Turkey in a fight against PKK terrorism, while also working towards developing Turkey’s national issue into a much more complicated international matter that would require the involvement of many other actors as well as the United Nations, thereby making it much more difficult and costly to deal with.

At the end of the day, throughout the history of the republic and under the reign of the secular-fundamentalist elite, the Kurds of Turkey have suffered at least as much as many other vulnerable groups in Turkey, including a majority population that did not relinquish its piously Muslim identity. They seem to have also been exploited by outside actors, including the PKK, as well as rogue elements within the Turkish state as a means to interfere in Turkey’s domestic affairs, to strangle civilian governments in Ankara and to create calculated tension as needed. It is no more the old Turkey but a new one, a Turkey with a growing civil society, a strengthening economy and a liberalizing political environment. It is up to the Kurds to choose either to stand up against the over-a-century-old manipulation, or continue with business as usual.

[Big Picture] Turkey's PKK Problem and the So-Called Kurdish 'Mandela' - 1

Op-ed Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 24 July 2011

The recent killing of 13 Turkish soldiers by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) ambush in Diyarbakır province has once again shaken the entire nation, adding yet another failure to the scorecard of the military and raising many questions about Turkey’s more than quarter-century-old fight against terrorism. Serious allegations are openly voiced these days about some sort of cooperation between rogue elements within the Turkish Armed Forces and PKK terrorists in order to deliberately prolong Turkey’s problem with terrorism and provide the self-proclaimed guardians of the regime (the generals) with leverage against the civilian governments in Ankara.

Moreover, a handful of Kurdish politicians and activists who claim to be representing all the Kurds of Turkey are becoming militant and provocative in their discourse and actions, thereby instigating the nationalist sentiments against the Kurds as well as against the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, which seems resolved to end PKK terrorism by introducing unprecedented political and legal reforms. In fact, today the Kurds of Turkey are enjoying the rights and freedoms which nobody could even speak about up until a decade ago. Yet, these Kurdish politicians are going as far as publicly demanding Kurdish autonomy, even though the vast majority of the Kurds do not support the idea. In addition, the so-called Kurdish movement seems to be organizing itself after the mold of South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) and tries to create a sort of “Kurdish Mandela” out of chief terrorist Abdullah Öcalan, thereby raising the suspicions about outside interference. Lastly, some naive liberal intelligentsia in the country seem to be buying the idea that the AK Party goverment's negotiation with Öcalan -- as if the latter were a legitimate counterpart -- is a must to solve Turkey's PKK problem.

So, what is really happening in Turkey? In order to have a grasp of it, one should have an understanding of the evolution of the Kurdish issue over the past century and should consider contemporary domestic developments in Turkey, bearing in mind Ankara’s increasingly assertive and unnecessarily confrontational foreign policy orientation, especially in its relations with the traditional status quo powers within the international system.

The Kurds’ misery and exploitation

Throughout the last century, the êşandın (pain) has manifested itself to Kurds in many ways in their daily lives. The Kurds of Turkey started to experience the repressive state policies during the last years of the Ottoman Empire under the leadership of the Ittihad ve Terakki (Union and Progress) government, the leadership of which consisted of non-Muslims -- the Dönme -- and the Young Turks educated in France and mired in the ethnicity-oriented nationalist ideology. The Ittihat ve Terakki’s, approach to the Kurds and later, during the republican era, the Republican People Party’s (CHP) approach to the Kurds was characterized ironically by both the denial of the Kurds’ distinct identity and the fiercely imposed assimilation from an identity that is denied to have existed at the first place.

In addition, the outside actors deliberately made the Kurds the usual suspects in the psyche of the Turkish nationalists. The Treaty of Sèvres, which the European occupiers, namely Britain, France and Italy, forced the ailing Ottoman Empire to sign on Aug. 10, 1920, aimed to create an Armenian republic in the east and an autonomous Kurdish region in the southeast of Anatolia. As Nicole and Hugh Pope remind readers in their book, “Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey,” although the treaty had never been ratified and implemented, such a reference to an autonomous Kurdish region has engendered the association of the ethnic Kurdish presence within the new republic, and as such any demand in relation to the Kurdish identity, with the greatest security threat posed to Turkey’s territorial integrity.

In a way, the Allied powers did not succeed in partitioning the Ottoman mainland but managed to portray the Kurds, the largest ethnic group in it, as unreliable elements who would readily join the European powers at any opportune moment to carve up Turkey.

In the following decades, even though they have theoretically enjoyed equal rights and status before the law regardless of their ethnic identity, the Kurds have usually been discriminated against in the public space as well as within the state’s institutions. Being a Kurd was reason enough to be ridiculed. The state’s traditional disregard for the development of the Kurdish-populated regions and the Kurds’ chronic lack of access to proper education had already created a natural selection process that kept the Kurds out of the political and economic opportunity spaces. So, in terms of the discrimination, bigotry and despise they suffered under the reign of Turkey’s secular-fundamentalist elite up until the end of the 20th century, the misery of the Kurds resembled that of the North African Muslim immigrants living in Europe in general and in France in particular. The French discrimination has been so extreme and the French security forces’ treatment of the French citizens of the North African or Muslim origin so brutal, especially under the leadership of Nicolas Sarkozy, that the brewing anger and resentment culminated in the widespread riots and violent clashes in the banlieues of Paris in October 2005.

Similarly, during Turkey’s fight against PKK terrorism, the treatment of suspects and criminals of Kurdish origin looked more like it was designed to consistently provoke public opinion on both the Turkish and Kurdish sides in a manner that would reinforce the legitimacy of the fight for both sides. Just like many distinct Muslim individuals of different nationalities were abducted to secret interrogation places as well as to the infamous Guantanamo prison during the course of the so-called US war on terror, the Kurds of Turkey, too, were exposed to the extrajudicial killings, renditions and torture, fashionably called “enhanced interrogation techniques.” In fact, long-time Turkey correspondents and observers Nicole and Hugh Pope suggested as early as in 1997, “[s]ummary executions and torture of Kurdish nationalists or leftist militants are carried out today by unknown assailants believed to be linked to the security forces.”

However, it was not just the Kurds who were oppressed by the secular-fundamentalist elite throughout republican history. Muslims, whose rights to practice their religion in the public space and whose access to political and economic opportunity spaces were restricted, suffered a similar fate, as did the Christian minorities such as Armenians, Assyrians and Greeks, whose legal minority rights were circumscribed; the rightists and leftists, whose rights to assembly and freedom of expression were banished; and many more unknown individuals who have been left to rot in the prisons without ever receiving a fair trial. 

Besides, despite all the difficulties, the Kurds in Turkey have never experienced what the African Americans in America have. For instance, the Kurds have never been enslaved; there have never been segregated transportation and other public services; and the Kurds have never been humiliated with the public displays like “Dogs and Blacks not allowed!” Nor have they ever suffered from the hate crimes similar to those Muslims in general and Turks in particular are suffering in Germany. In July 2009, a German nationalist who was openly hostile to his victim’s religious identity murdered a pregnant Muslim woman in a German courtroom before the eyes of the security forces. Similarly, in the last decade only, neo-Nazi groups set the immigrant Turks’ houses on fire several times, causing many deaths and injuries. Who knows how many times it happened before but has gone unreported.