reflections

The So-Called Iranian Nuclear Threat

2012-01-26T16:14:00.000-05:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 16 January 2012

Therumor about Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program, which led to a reactionfrom the UN Security Council some six years ago, remains a rumor today.

Sincethen, a perpetually growing sense of panic has dramatically raised theprospects of either a massive regional conflict in the Persian Gulf, involvingboth Israel and the United States, or a regional cold war that pits Iran, Iraqand Syria against Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Sunni Arab world. Given thecouncil's overall approach in this matter, however, one is compelled toquestion if Iran's intention to build nuclear weapons, or the prevention of itfrom doing so, are really of primary concern. It seems that for those blowingthe clarion against Iran, this country's probability of having a nuclear weaponand the pervasive fear emanating from this probability are more important thanactually ensuring that it does not have, or get, one.

Followingthe resolution adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Feb.4, 2006, the Security Council issued a presidential statement in March of thesame year expressing its concern about Iran's nuclear program and asking thelatter to fully suspend its nuclear program and to allow the IAEA to verify itspeaceful nature. Subsequently, the council adopted Resolution 1696 (2006),invoking chapter VII of the UN Charter and obliging Iran to suspend itsprogram; Resolution 1737 (2006), imposing sanctions by cutting off nuclearcooperation and freezing the assets of individuals and entities linked to thenuclear program; Resolution 1747 (2007), expanding the list of sanctionedentities; Resolution 1803 (2008), further expanding the sanctions, imposing atravel ban on the sanctioned persons and banning the export of nuclear andmissile-related dual-use goods to Iran; Resolution 1835 (2008), reaffirming allthe sanctions already imposed on Iran; and finally Resolution 1929 (2010),imposing a complete arms embargo on Iran, banning it from any activitiesrelated to ballistic missiles, authorizing the inspection and seizure ofshipments violating the council's sanctions and extending the asset freeze tothe Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Islamic Republic of IranShipping Lines (IRISL). As should be remembered, both Turkey and Brazil votedagainst this resolution, believing that further sanctions on Iran would becounterproductive in trying to resolve the issue.

Resolutions that aredesigned not to resolve

The crux of theseresolutions is captured in a specific clause on which they are all predicated:“The IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materialsor activities in Iran.” Therefore, the council continues to call upon Iran tore-establish “full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related andreprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified bythe IAEA.” That is, Iran should suspend its nuclear program, even if it is infact a peaceful one, until the IAEA makes sure that there are no undeclarednuclear materials or activities anywhere in the country. In response, theIranian authorities argue that they have been cooperating with the IAEA asrequired. They also argue that they have the right to continue the enrichmentfor research and development in conformity with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty,to which Iran is a signatory and which stipulates that the signatory stateshave a right to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy forpeaceful purposes without discrimination.” In the meantime, the fear and panicabout Iran's alleged intentions to acquire nuclear weapon capabilities havegrown exponentially thanks to very well organized campaigns in the West,especially in the US.

Ifit is seeking nuclear weapons Iran is certainly violating international law,threatening to shift the regional balance of power and risking a massive armsrace and escalation of tensions among its neighbors. Hence, this potentialthreat must be dealt with before it is too late. However, the SecurityCouncil's approach to the issue is problematic. As such, the council itselfhinders the resolution of the problem.

Asthe council considers Iran “guilty until proven innocent” as opposed to“innocent until proven guilty,” this problematic approach has two dimensions,the first of which is more of a technical one. What is the reason for theIAEA's inability to fulfill its mission? Is it because of Iran's lack ofcooperation, which actually does not seem to be the case, or because of theIAEA's lack of sufficient technical capabilities? Or worse, could the reason bethe political pressure on the IAEA that precludes it from coming to aconclusion that would undermine the deliberately constructed fear and panicabout Iran's alleged nuclear program? In the context of this connection, howshould one interpret former IAEA General Director Muhammad ElBaradei'sstatement during his interview with the Austrian Press Agency (APA) in January2011, in which he said, “The threat posed by Iran's nuclear program wasexaggerated by the West”?

Inthe same interview, ElBaradei accuses the West of thwarting an agreement withIran by making “unrealistic demands” and speaks of the second dimension of thecouncil's approach, which is problematic, both conceptually and practically.How is it possible to ensure that Iran does not have an intention to pursuenuclear weapons? And how is it possible to ensure that there are no undeclarednuclear materials or activities in Iran? Trying to do either or both istantamount to trying to prove that something does not exist. However, whereasdiscovering just one single example suffices to prove that that thing exists,proving that it does not requires one to look for it in every bit of space inorder to ensure its nonexistence. Only then can one conclude that it does notexist. By this token, if the council's resolutions are to be fulfilled, theIAEA would have to search everywhere in Iran in order to ensure thenonexistence of undeclared nuclear material or activity, which is practicallyimpossible. Even if the IAEA manages to fulfill such an unrealistic mission itis always possible that the protagonists of the alleged Iranian nuclear threatcan dismiss the IAEA's conclusion by simply ridiculing it for its inability tofind evidence of Iran's nuclear weapons program, which they so strongly believeexists somewhere. It is especially likely, given that the same actors had pavedthe way to the 2003 invasion of Iraq with similar tactics, only to admit inshame years later that they were wrong about Saddam Hussein's alleged weaponsof mass destruction. In addition, the fact that Security Council members do nottake similar action against another regional state, which does not deny itspossession of nuclear weapons, further undermines the council's credibilityvis-à-vis the alleged Iranian nuclear threat.

So,it is all quite clear that the Security Council's approach to Iran's nuclearprogram is designed not to eliminate but to perpetuate the suspicions about it,with a growing sense of urgency, fear and panic. It goes without saying thatthe protagonists of the alleged Iranian nuclear threat are the same as thosewho are effectively dominant in shaping and mobilizing the council'sresolutions in this matter, namely the US, the EU3 (United Kingdom, France andGermany) and Israel.

Wars: destructive forsome, profitable for others

As the council keepspassing one resolution after another about Iran, Israel too keeps threateningto strike Iran's nuclear facilities if diplomacy fails. The US and the EU3 havedescribed Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program as a major threat tointernational security and sought to increase pressure on Iran through nationalsanctions along with the UN sanctions. In the meantime, although it does notsingle out Iran as a specific threat or target (thanks to Turkey's efforts),NATO's new strategic concept and missile defense system have been developed onthe assumption that Iran is pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Inreaction, Iranian officials have repeatedly warned that Iran would deliver acrushing response to any kind of military attack on its nuclear facilities, ina war that would have devastating implications far beyond the region. Moreover,Iran criticized the presence of US warships and aircraft carriers in thePersian Gulf. It warned against possible EU sanctions on Iranian oil exports bysuggesting that it may shut down the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20percent of the world's oil is transported. In response, the US has noted thatany attempt by Iran that would disrupt the flow of oil to the world marketswould not be tolerated.

Inthe meantime, as the only winner in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Iranhas been expanding its sphere of influence in the region, whereas its SunniArab neighbors are losing theirs as a shattering effect of the so-called ArabSpring. Iraq is now pretty much considered a Shiite state within the orbit ofIran. Syria's Alawite-dominated regime relies heavily on Tehran's support.Shiite communities all over the Arab world, including in Yemen, Bahrain andSaudi Arabia not only increase Tehran's leverage but also create a misleadingsense of “Shiite emancipation from the Sunni oppressors,” which can be easilymanipulated. In fact, before his recent visit to Tehran, Turkish ForeignMinister Ahmet Davutoğlu warned about the existence of certain partiesintending to deliberately instigate a Sunni-Shiite war in the region.

Atthis point, it would be a mistake to think that the US, the EU3 or Israel areseeking to prepare the ground for an invasion of Iran, or trying to instigate aSunni-Shiite war across the region. Yet, it would be equally, if not more,mistaken to think that there are not certain special interest groups withineach country, who would want to do either or both. One may be inclined to askwhy they would be interested in pursuing such an agenda. But the real questionone should ask is, why would they not? After all, pragmatically speaking and asseen during the course of the Iran-Iraq war as well as in the run up to thefirst Gulf War, sustained regional wars and the escalation of tension among theregional powers can be manipulated to become quite profitable, both politicallyand economically, for the United States, the European Union and, most notably,for Israel.

Nevertheless,there are strong reasons to believe that the US, the EU3 and Israel would notdirectly engage in a military conflict with Iran. First, neither the US nor theEU3 are financially stable enough to sustain a war with Iran, especially aftera decade of military engagements both in Afghanistan and Iraq. Second,throughout its history Israel has never had any conflict with Iran beyond mereexchange of threats and condemnations. Nor is there any reason for them to doso, given that they share a similar fate in the ocean of Arabs surroundingthem. Actually, in his “Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel,Iran and the United States,” Trita Parsi notes that the relationship betweenTehran and Tel Aviv continued even after the so-called Islamic revolution in1979 under the auspices of the dreaded Khomeini. Third, since the end of theCold War the fundamental tenets of US policy towards the Middle East are toensure safe and smooth access to energy resources and to protect Israel. Sinceit would be existentially detrimental to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulfcountries supplying the world energy markets, any military confrontation withIran is antithetical to the vital interests of the US. Fourth, Iran is a majorenergy supplier to both the EU and China. Although the EU is entertaining the ideaof sanctions on Iranian crude exports, it is hardly capable of sustaining thesesanctions, given that doing so would strengthen Moscow's leverage towards theEU as the only major energy supplier. Similarly, with an ever-increasing needfor energy resources, China would oppose any scheme that would disrupt itsenergy supply from Iran.

Fifth,Iran is not like Afghanistan or Iraq. It has survived for more than threedecades despite the isolation and sanctions imposed on it. In a way, thesehardships enabled Iran to develop self-sufficiency and technologicalcapabilities not only to the extent of pursuing a nuclear program but also ofbeing able to intercept and seize possession of an American drone. Mostimportantly, Iran has an ideology which glorifies martyrdom from the age ofseven to 77 and this could be quite costly for all of its perceived enemies.There is no need to mention that with its heavy influence over the Shiites inIraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, Iran is quite capable of burning the wholeregion.

Fromthe perspective of certain elements within the US, the EU3 and Israel, thedeliberate escalation of tensions and consequentially the occasionallow-intensity military conflicts between Iran, Syria, Iraq and Shiitecommunities on one side and Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries and Sunnicommunities on the other may be considered to be a lucrative opportunity tomanipulate and profit from. With the realization of this second scenario, allof the states in the region and the ethno-religious groups within each statewould turn into potential customers for all kinds of military technology, fromconventional weapons to long-range missiles and fighter jets and cyber-securitysystems. The energy suppliers on both sides would be even more willing to gettheir oil and gas to the world market, because only then would they be able tosustain their economic strength while engaging in an arms race or militaryconflict with the other side. Moreover, these countries would be much morefragile politically, economically and socially and hence easier to manipulatediplomatically. Finally, these countries would be consuming one another for aperiod with no foreseeable end. Of course, for this scenario to fullymaterialize Iran must continue to be perceived as a growing nuclear threat toregional and international security, as a major threat to the Sunni majoritywithin the Muslim world and as an existential threat to certain Arab states,like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates.

Inits final analysis, the IAEA is not suggesting that Iran is pursuing a nuclearweapons program, but that the agency is “unable to conclude that there are noundeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.” In any case, such anobjective is impossible to achieve conceptually and practically. So long asthat remains the objective of the IAEA, as well as the criterion for theSecurity Council, the perception of an "Iranian nuclear threat" willpervade and the panic is likely to increase. As a result, rather than amilitary conflict between the US, the EU3, Israel and Iran, a sustainedescalation of tensions, military confrontations and proxy wars are likely toensue between Iran, its allies and the rest of the region. In the end, it is upto Iran, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the emirates and other regional actors toallow this second scenario materialize.

The OIC's Xenophobic Publicists in the United States

2012-01-09T01:22:00.000-05:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 28 December 2011

At the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), ever since Professor Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu became secretary-general of the organization in 2005, engaging with the relevant US authorities and gaining publicity within American public opinion have continued to be priorities. After all, the OIC and the United States should be and are natural allies in dealing with a wide range of issues, which include countering inter-ethnic and intra-religious violence in both Iraq and Afghanistan as elsewhere, combating racial and religious discrimination, promoting moderation and modernization, improving mother-child health in OIC member states, encouraging the participation of women in politics, improving human rights conditions and female equality, as well as many other existing and emerging issues. The US has a vested interest in each and every single one of these areas, and the OIC is the legitimate, credible and able political body to partner with as it too shares the same interests.

Therefore, in addition to closely working with the two US presidential envoys to it, the OIC has sought the ways and means to engage with the US Senate and House, think tanks, civil society organizations and the media to introduce what it stands for and, more importantly, to understand how it can be of further help. It is unfortunate though that not many, if any, Americans are really aware of what the OIC stands for.

Ironically though, in recent months, the OIC’s publicity has skyrocketed in the US, inside the Beltway at least, thanks to xenophobic and Islamophobic pundits, as well as extreme right blogs such as PipeLineNews, Family Security Matters and the like. Their continuous defamation of the OIC has intensified recently with the US State Department’s decision to invite the OIC to take part in an expert-level meeting to discuss practical steps for the implementation of United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Resolution 16/18, which was formulated on the basis of the eight points provided by the OIC secretary-general during one of his speeches in Geneva to promote a culture of tolerance and mutual understanding. The resolution, titled, “Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence, and violence against persons based on religion or belief,” was adopted by consensus at the UNHRC in March 2011 with the participation of the United States, European Union and OIC member states as well as states from the other regional formations. The United Nations General Assembly also this week adopted by consensus of 193 nations a similar resolution derived from Res. 16/18 with the same title. The resolution simply means that the states should take the necessary precautions -- consistent with their obligations under international human rights law -- so that Jews, Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, atheists, agnostics and individuals subscribing to any thought, belief and non-belief system are not exposed to violence and/or discrimination due to their religion or belief.

‘A form of holy war’

Oddly enough, however, Pamela Geller wrote, “the Islamized State Department will be meeting with the Islamic supremacist Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to discuss strategies and develop action plans in which to impose the restriction of free speech … under the Sharia here in America.” In the same piece, she compared the US engagement with the OIC to discuss religious tolerance to having Himmler (military commander and leading member of the Nazi Party) meet with Jews to condemn Jew-hatred. Similarly, Clare Lopez of the so-called Clarion Fund speculated that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was due to host OIC Secretary-General Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu in Washington to “discuss how the United States can implement the OIC agenda to criminalize criticism of Islam.” Another example of this kind is Frank Gaffney of the Center for Security Policy, who criticized the Obama administration for facilitating the efforts of the Muslim-American organizations to “penetrate and influence the government of the United States.” Gaffney thinks that these organizations are pursuing a “civilization jihad,” which is allegedly a “stealthy form of holy war, designed to eliminate and destroy Western civilization from within.” He too speculated that the expert-level meeting hosted by the State Department to discuss religious tolerance was a part of such a stealthy form of holy war, a civilization jihad.

The two-day Istanbul Process conference hosted by the US State Department Dec. 12-14, 2011, was in fact a dramatic step forward in implementation of the consensual decision of the US, EU, OIC member states and other signatories of the resolution toward protecting individuals or communities of the individuals subscribing to any religion or belief, against discrimination and violence. Discrimination and violence against individuals who “express” their opinion is included. The critiques argue that the US should not engage with the OIC, many members of which have blasphemy laws or restrict freedom of expression in one way or another. Actually, that is the very reason why the US should engage with the OIC. A prominent human rights advocacy organization, Human Rights First (HRF), has welcomed the UN General Assembly resolution and the US State Department meeting. Joëlle Fiss of the HRF noted that the resolution encourages open debate, human rights education and interfaith and intercultural initiatives. She also argued that the Istanbul Process conference was important to demonstrate that “states have tools at their disposal to combat violence, discrimination and hatred without restricting free speech.”

The two-day conference was a follow-up to a high-level meeting, co-chaired by OIC Secretary-General İhsanoğlu and US Secretary of State Clinton in İstanbul on July 15 this year. Also participating in that high-level meeting was the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton as well as foreign ministers and high-level representatives from some 19 countries, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the African Union, the Arab League and the Vatican. In a statement issued after the meeting, they jointly “called upon all relevant stakeholders throughout the world to take seriously the call for action set forth in Resolution 16/18, which contributes to strengthening the foundations of tolerance and respect for religious diversity as well as enhancing the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms around the world.” Again at this meeting, the participants committed to “go beyond mere rhetoric and to reaffirm their commitment to freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression by urging States to take effective measures, as set forth in Resolution 16/18, consistent with their obligations under international human rights law, to address and combat intolerance, discrimination and violence based on religion or belief.”

So, does any of these look like a “stealthy form of holy war” or a “civilization jihad” waged to destroy the Western civilization? If it does, what doesn’t? One would expect that in the United States the criticism within extreme right, xenophobic and Islamophobic circles targeting the OIC would be rather more sophisticated and intellectually challenging, if not constructive. However, it fails to be anything more than mere fearmongering and speculating on the basis of false information. As a matter of fact, with its new Charter revised in 2008, the OIC clearly stresses its commitment to the universally accepted principles of the UN Charter, and consequently affirms its priorities as the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, transparency and accountability and the rule of law. More importantly, it consistently works toward realizing these priorities in its member states. In the end, the only good thing about the fierce defamation campaign waged against the OIC in the United States is its perpetrators’ success in raising the OIC’s visibility within American public opinion. Concomitantly, the only thing left to the OIC is to continue its constructive engagement with the relevant US authorities, think tanks, media, civil society organizations and other interested partners, while at the same time trying to correct the false information spread out about it.

Diplomacy between Turkey and Israel

2011-10-03T07:02:00.000-04:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 2 October 2011

“Constructive ambiguity” is probably themost useful diplomatic tool that enables the states to move forward in theirrelationships with their counterparts, no matter what kind of crisis they mayhave experienced. But it looks like it has long been kicked out of theTurkish diplomatic lexicon. Technically, the constructive ambiguity is definedas a deliberate vagueness in one's statements or position in negotiations witha view to expand the realm of maneuvering in order to advance particularpolitical objectives.

Optimistically, the constructiveambiguity can be interpreted, as an assurance given by the parties prior orduring the crisis that they are willing to revise their respective positions inorder to overcome the crisis situation without losing face before their ownconstituencies or the international community. Both Turkish and Israeligovernments have spoken with vivid clarity, however, with respect to theirrespective positions on the Mavi Marmara incident, where Israeli soldierskilled eight Turkish citizens and one American.

Ankara has insisted that Turkish-Israelirelations would never go back to normal unless Israel apologizes from Turkey,pays compensations to the families of the victims, and lifts the unlawfulIsraeli blockade on Gaza. In response, Tel Aviv has stressed that Israel wouldnever apologize from Turkey for what Israeli soldiers did aboard the MaviMarmara. In a way, Turkey and Israel have locked themselves up into anon-solution. After all, once announcing not only to Israel, but also to thewhole world its conditions for normalization so clearly, how can the AK Partygovernment possibly seem to be settling for anything less, or compromising toadvance Turkey’s long-term interests? As for the Netanyahu government; itshould apologize, but hardly would do so, because doing so would be tantamountto the admission of guilt, and create a precedent, which would oblige Israelnot only to apologize for its countless crimes past, present and future, but alsoto meet its concomitant legal obligations. Moreover, given the addition, as athird condition, of the lifting of the Gaza blockade, which is not immediatelyrelated to the Turkish-Israeli relations, the skeptics may suggest that the AKParty government is not interested in a rapid normalization anyway.

At the end of the day, the presentstalemate in the Turkish-Israeli relations is a result of the politicaldecisions made by both the AK Party government and the Netanyahu governmentthroughout a tumultuous process, which was caused by an irresponsible act of anNGO based in İstanbul, as well as byeven more irresponsible act of the Israeli armed forces. Nor this type ofdowngrading of the two states’ relations is something abnormal. It has happenedbefore, it may happen in the future, and as such, it is something normal.

However, the ramifications of the ensuingcrisis are not confined to the diplomatic, political and economic relationsbetween the two states only. The continued hostility between the Turkish andIsraeli governments, coupled with the provocations by the zealots on bothsides, are likely to instigate the emotions even further, thereby leading toirreparable damages. Therefore, the stakeholders other than the two governmentssuch as the Turkish and Israeli peoples as well as their respective diasporas,especially in the United States, should work together to contain the potentialdamages of the crisis. In so doing, the onus is more on the shoulders of theAmerican Jewish community who prioritizes the well being of the State ofIsrael, because relatively speaking it has far greater capability, compared tothe other three, to make things much more complicated.

Spill over effect

The heat inTurkish-Israeli relations continues to increase due to the two governments’exchange of warnings and threats of sanctions. PM Erdogan announced that theTurkish warships would more frequently appear in the Eastern Mediterranean inorder to ensure the safety of navigation, which Israel interpreted as a measureagainst the Israeli naval blockade on Gaza. Israeli Foreign Minister AvigdorLieberman uttered that Israel would implement four faceted sanctions againstTurkey, which includes a comprehensive travel boycott, cooperation with theArmenian diaspora, support to the terrorist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), andportrayal of Turkey in the international fora as an oppressor of itsminorities. Not surprisingly, what two prominent American political scientists,John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt described as the Israel Lobby has rushed tomobilize each and every resource available to it within the American polity aswell with the hope of punishing Turkey for going harsh on Israel. Recently,seven US senators penned a joined letter to President Barack Obama, asking thelatter to ‘mount a diplomatic offensive’ against Turkey. Similarly, DanielPipes and the right-wing extremist pundits alike have begun to propagate thefalse image of Turkey being the most dangerous country in the Middle East alongwith Iran. In line with this reflex, the black propaganda of the Israel Lobbyagainst Turkey is likely to intensify in the months to come, especially duringthat time of the year when the US Congress is traditionally hijacked withallegations of the so-called Armenian genocide. 

However, it seems likethe anti-AK Party network in the US has recently diversified its targets, andnow attacking Fethullah Gülen and the educational-cultural initiatives he hasinspired as well. As Michael Shank of George Mason University reminds in hisHuffington Post article titled “Islamophobia Network Targets Top PerformingAmerican Schools”, the Center for American Progress (CAP)’s recently publishedan Islamophobia report that reveals the extend of such a defamationcampaign. The CAP report, which is titled “Fear Inc: The Roots of theIslamophobia Network in America”, demonstrates that the Eagle Forum, aso-called pro-family movement, and other members of the Islamophobia networkhave deliberately propagated an alleged Turkish threat to America: theso-called Muslim Gülen schools, which would allegedly "educate Americanchildren through the lens of Islam and teach them to hate Americans”. Moreover,beside many blogosphere commentaries suffering from intellectual deficit butequally adamant in trying to defame Gülen, a recent Newsweek piece titled “Erdoğan 1, Ataturk 0” referred to Gülen as“Erdogan’s friend and mentor” and to the civil society movement he has inspiredas the “AKP’s own ‘deep state’ ally, a wealthy and powerful Islamist movementdirected from luxurious self-exile in the US”.

Given suchallegations, one is compelled to infer that the anti-AK Party network in the USis targeting Gülen and the people involved with the civil society initiativeshe has inspired, probably because its members assume that Gülen is the realforce behind the AK Party government, and hence can be utilized to tone downits stance towards Israel. While such an assumption lacks credible evidence andremain as a mere speculation, it fails to recognize the fact that it was Gülenhimself who criticized the so-called Freedom Flotilla project, which lies atthe heart of the unfolding crisis between Turkey and Israel. In his interviewto the Wall Street Journal during the days following the infamous Mavi Marmaraincident, and when the entire Turkey was overwhelmed with heightened nationalisticsentiments after the Israeli murder of eightTurks and one Turkish Americancitizen, Gülen expressed his doubts about the true intentions behind theflotilla project, and remarked that the organizers should have consulted withthe authorities if the purpose was to bring humanitarian aid to Gaza. One canhardly argue that Gülen is a source of inspiration for the AK Party government,especially when it comes to foreign policy.    

Track II diplomacy 

Nevertheless, it isobvious that the current political crisis between Turkey and Israel bearsnegative implications on the non-political and totally unrelated civil societyand educational initiatives. Therefore, it may be prudent to explore ways inorder to prevent its further exacerbation, and contain its ramifications inform of creating anti-Turkish sentiments, or at least making the atmosphereconducive for the proliferation of such negative sentiments. In this context,the Track II diplomacy figures as a viable tool to compensate for the absenceof optimistically utilized-constructive ambiguity in the Turkish-Israelirelations. Defined as a kind of informal diplomacy undertaken through exchangesbetween non-officials such as scholars, public intellectuals, journalists,retired officials, public figures or social activists, the Track II diplomacyis a foreign policy tool used in order to prevent further escalation oftensions, and better yet to help the parties resolve their conflict. In thisregard, the non-official interactions between the Turks and the Israelis aswell as between their respective diasporas in the joint initiatives such asconferences, workshops, mutual delegation visits, public declarations, andsportive or art events can be useful to increase popular demand for solution,overcome the impasse and move forward in a more constructive way.

Turks should notperceive such a civic engagement with Israelis as an acceptance of defeat inthe face of the Netanyahu government’s resistance to apologize from Turkey, oras a sell out of the victims of the Israeli assault on the Mavi Marmara.Similarly, Israelis or their fellow Jews in the diaspora should not considerTurks’ willingness to engage with them despite the continuing political crisisas a concession out of despair, but as an indication of their inherentconstructivism. The opposite is to continue the business as usual. In thatcase, Turkey and Turkish-Americans would continue to be demonized. It may notbe that bad after all to be demonized by such right-wing groups andfundamentalist figures as Daniel Pipes, David Yerushalmi, Robert Spencer, FrankGaffney, Steven Emerson, Bridgette Gabriel, and Rachel Sharon-Krespin as thevast majority of Americans already know who they are, and why they do what theydo. However, the situation may not be so positive for the Jewish-Americans, ifthe demonization of the Turks is to continue. In an America, where thecriticism of Israel and the Israel Lobby reaches an unprecedented level, wherehigh-ranking officials publicly describe Israel as an ungrateful ally andstrategic liability for the US, and where according to the Anti-DefamationLeague figures the anti-Semitism is rampant, it is the Jewish-Americans whoshould be trying to avoid any action that would perpetuate or escalade thecrisis between Turkey and Israel, let alone attacking those Turks who could betheir only ally if the anti-Semitism gets out of control. 

Finally, those Turkswho do not look at the crisis between Turkey and Israel from an eschatologicalperspective, and hence are not beguiled with the dreams of righting all wrongsovernight with lofty speeches backed only by mediocre power would wish that theproblem between the two was solved without prolonging and spilling over.Similarly, looking towards future, they may wonder if Ankara’s intent to takethe issue of Israeli blockade on Gaza to the International Court of Justice(ICJ) is strategically wise one. There is no doubt that Turkey has every moralright to do so. However, there is a risk associated with this move.Technically, the ICJ can consider and rule on the case only if both Turkey andIsrael agree to refer it to the ICJ. Otherwise it can deliver a non-bindingadvisory opinion if the UN General Assembly’s simple majority votes for suchreferral. It is clear that the first condition would never materialize. In thelatter case, the advisory opinion would just add to many other UN resolutionsand reports manifesting unlawful practices of Israel, but hardly have anyenforcement effect. Even if in the ideal circumstance, the ICJ considers thecase, and convicts Israel, which is in reality unlikely to happen; then theSecurity Council’s permanent members have right to stop the enforcement of theICJ verdict. It is all too obvious which permanent member that would be. 

Besides, given theblack propaganda power of Turkey’s opponents, which does not necessarily referto the Netanyahu government and the right-wing extremist members of the IsraelLobby only, Turkey’s such a legitimate endeavor can be portrayed as an attemptto steal leadership role from those Arab countries, who have traditionallyappeared as the advocates of the Palestine cause. Worse, Turkey in general, andTurkish foreign minister in particular may be unfairly accused of embarking onyet another foreign policy objective, which is to bring Israel to justice, andleaving it unfulfilled. As such, Turkey may all of a sudden come to face thelimits of its power both soft and hard in front of the international community.As Hans Morgenthau suggested, "the prestige of a nation is its reputationfor power. That reputation, the reflection of the reality of power in the mindsof the observers, can be as important as the reality of power itself". Bythe same token, an abrupt exposure of the limits of its power can ruin a nation'sprestige. Of course, the policy makers in Ankara would know the best, butit may be better to not stretch further thinner, and instead just remember thatsome meals taste best when served cold. Turkey would be better off if itallocates its energy and resources to strengthen its democracy and economyinside, and continue to forge new partnerships outside, in line with its “zeroproblem with neighbors” policy. After all, only powerful Turkey can have zeroproblems with its neighbors, and can help the ones having problems solvetheirs.

Turkish Foreign Policy Tests Itself

2011-08-29T11:06:00.001-04:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 22 August 2011

For critics of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, both inside and outside the country, the recent tension in Turkish-Syrian relations that has sprung up over the Assad regime’s brutal repression of popular demands for democracy is apparently a welcome opportunity.

They seem determined to make use of it in every possible way in order to ridicule Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s vision of Turkey as having “zero problems with [its] neighbors” and at the same time to incite, or rather draw, the AK Party government into pursuing an ever more confrontational course of action in a way that would not only cause further deterioration of Turkey’s amicable image in the Middle East but also irreparably damage its relations with Iran and Syria, both of which are Turkey’s natural allies in its fight against Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) terrorism.

In the beginning, it looked like Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had come to believe that the situation in Syria was a domestic issue for Turkey. The rationale behind such a politically loaded definition of the situation was curious at best, as it was most likely to have negative implications, if continued, because most of Turkey’s neighbors and allies can identify with (and potentially decide to intervene in) Turkey’s domestic issues on similar grounds of ethnic-religious affinity and purely humanitarian concerns. Yet Ankara appeared resolved to go so far as to cut off its relations with Damascus, seeking an immediate end to the violence in Syria.

In the meantime, a chorus of the US and European media, including The New York Times and The Washington Post, has been running news reports encouraging Ankara to be even more critical of the Assad regime, with op-ed pieces bombastically arguing that as the most powerful man in the region, only Erdoğan can stop Bashar al-Assad’s crackdown. Similarly, Washington has continued to announce that the United States and Turkey share the same goals on Syria, which are an immediate end to violence and a democratic transition. Worse, the State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland, as if speaking on behalf of her Turkish counterpart, has remarked that Turkey’s patience with the Assad regime is coming to an end. Maybe not as a direct result of these remarks, but concurrently, Davutoğlu warned that there would be nothing to discuss anymore unless the Assad regime stopped the violence.

The international community paying lip service
Only recently, the Turkish intelligentsia and authorities began to realize that the international community is so far only paying lip service to stopping the violence in Syria, and has not even moved for a UN Security Council resolution: The best they have been able to produce is a weak presidential statement, condemning the Assad regime. While this is the case, what Turkey can do is extremely limited, when it comes to ending the crackdown in Syria.

Nevertheless, the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria, and more broadly the so-called “Arab Spring” sweeping the region, has presented probably the most daunting foreign policy challenge the AK Party government must handle as it embarks on its third term in office. How should Ankara respond to regional and international developments, given that Turkey has a number of peculiarities and contradictions, most notable among which are its need to reckon with its undemocratic past and deal with PKK terrorism, while at the same time having already achieved great economic success and vast global engagement, thanks to its expanding middle class and vibrantly active civil society.

Perhaps the best way to start would be to develop a clear understanding at all levels of the AK Party government that the status-quo, which was established in the region and has been consolidated as such over the last three or four centuries, cannot be overturned or undone in just a decade or two, or by Turkey alone. Nor can any change imposed from the outside be positively sustained, no matter how good the intentions behind it may be. That is, real change with respect to democracy and pluralism in Syria or across the Middle East cannot come about only through the revolutions organized in the streets or through public demonstrations.

A revolution is simply the replacement of those oppressing at the top with the ones oppressed at the bottom. As one Western thinker observed, the moment they come to power, the so-called revolutionaries turn into conservatives who are adamantly determined to preserve the new order. In fact, the Assad regime, which is trying to preserve its grip on the country, is the remnant of a past revolution that was waged against the perceived “defunct and corrupt” regime, which preceded it. The same fate could befall the regimes which come out of the so-called “Arab Spring,” which in fact never was, and is unlikely to be, a real revolution, unless the oppressed Arabs, using legitimate and democratic means, reign in the political and economic opportunity gaps, replace the old guard, and gradually transform their respective countries.

Would it be any different in Turkey than it has been in Syria, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, or Tunisia, if the Turks had revolted against the secular-fundamentalist elite, including the rogue army generals, who had so long dominated all of the country’s economic and political opportunities with the help of their allies in Washington and the European capitals? That it would not be any different has been proven by each of the three bloody military interventions in the past, and still with the proven plots of rogue elements in the military to “cage” the AK Party government and smash the people’s will with a “sledgehammer,” so that for another hundred years no one would dare to challenge their absolute reign over the state.

It is understandably difficult, of course, for many novices within the AK Party government to recognize this fact, since they have simply parachuted into previously inaccessible political and economic positions, after the state apparatus and the political arena had been substantially transformed and democratized as a result of gradual but consistent social change across the country. Also, since they hardly understand that the AK Party is not the cause, but only one of the effects of such transformation, it is only normal for them to so readily take uncalculated risks by presuming to use powers and capabilities, which indeed they do not have.

Not all change can be administered by Turkey

Contemporary Ankara and all the Turks mesmerized by its activism should recognize that there are certain things that Turkey can succeed in changing in its region and in the international arena, but for all the rest it can only work toward preparing the conditions conducive to a change in the future. It is not a law cast in stone that all the change must be administered by today’s Ankara or with today’s leaders. The Turks should know this best, after suffering for the last several decades from a number of “saviors,” who emerged to create a powerful Turkey, but whose personal priorities and ambitions eventually led to the hindrance of democracy in the country, which is the only source of legitimate power.

Similarly, within an international system where the status quo is enforced by states with which Turkey does not have a balance of power yet, Ankara’s confrontational approach would only alert the status quo protectionists to take necessary precautions by containing Turkey’s existing channels of influence, and also by blocking all the other possible ones that Ankara can utilize. Worse, Turkey’s worldwide engagement with other nations would also be endangered, because the global status quo protectionists, once disturbed by Ankara’s policies, would target that civil engagement by wrongfully attributing a political meaning to it.

After all, history is not at an end, and it is not up to Turkey’s AK Party government to right all the wrongs in its region and across the globe. Nor would it be held responsible for not being able to do so. However, the AK Party leaders will be held responsible for their role in Turkey’s democratization, or for their failure to address it, if that should turn out to be the case. They will also be judged by their ability or inability to handle the political, economic and security problems of Turkey, but not those of its neighbors. The only reason why the Turks voted the AK government in for the third term with an overwhelming majority was their conviction, or hope, at least, that this government will prioritize the adoption of a new constitution, the successful completion of the so-called Ergenekon investigation into the anti-democratic formations within the state, and the maintenance of the country’s high economic performance.

In the final analysis, there are many events occurring in Turkey’s region, and it is up to the AK Party government to choose to get distracted by them at the expense of the priorities it was elected to address. Ankara’s unsolicited involvement in these regional events could be quite costly for Turkey, given that the so-called Arab Spring now physically borders Turkey, that its inspirational effect is not confined only to Arabs, and that the anti-Turkey Kurdish separatist movement has already gained great momentum both inside and outside Turkey.

The rogue elements in the Turkish army, which are currently under investigation, may not have managed to “cage” the AK Party government as stipulated in their alleged “cage” coup plot. However, by so readily crossing its once close neighbors, and by damaging its relationships with allies in the fight against terrorism, the AK Party government seems to be willingly stepping inside that cage. Turkey and every other nation in its region would be better off if Ankara simply got along with its friends, reached out to potential friends, and avoided any confrontation with its foes and natural rivals, while prioritizing the country’s democratization and maintaining high economic performance. Ankara should immediately return to its “zero problems with neighbors” policy, which Foreign Minister Davutoğlu so masterfully devised and implemented.

[Big Picture] Turkey's PKK Problem and the So-Called Kurdish 'Mandela' - 2

2011-07-25T10:24:00.000-04:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 24 July 2011

Thanks to the rapid expansion of Turkish civil society in the last decade and political, socioeconomic and legal reforms introduced during the rule of the current Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, today the Kurds of Turkey are enjoying rights and freedoms that had remained simply unimaginable up until a decade ago.

The Kurdish language is freely used in the public space and TV and radio stations now broadcast in Kurdish. In Parliament, in addition to ethnic Kurdish deputies in various parties, some of whom have served in senior government positions, there are 36 others who have banded together under the banner of the so-called Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and are rallying on nothing but the ethnicity ticket.

At the same time, since 2007 a massive legal investigation has been under way into the alleged “Ergenekon” terrorist network, which is believed to have included rogue elements from the Turkish security forces as well as Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorists, who carried out terrorist acts in order to exacerbate and sustain Turkish-Kurdish tensions. Last but not least, Turkey is on the verge of overhauling its current Constitution, which was drafted under the tutelage of the military after the 1980 coup d’état, for a more inclusive, democratic and pluralistic one.

Yet, apparently no improvement in terms of the restoration of Kurds’ individual as well as communal rights and freedoms is good enough for those 36 deputies and their political allies both inside and outside Turkey. Lately, they have begun to voice their desire for Kurdish “autonomy” in the Southeast. They argue that the AK Party government must negotiate a solution with chief terrorist Abdullah Öcalan, whom they do not refrain from, but enjoy the freedom of, calling the “national leader of Kurds,” this while living on salaries provided by Turkish taxpayers.

In the meantime, Öcalan, who settled for imprisonment on İmralı Island outside İstanbul in 1999 under European guarantees against his execution, after years of enjoying a posh lifestyle in his Damascus residence under the protection of the late Hafez al-Assad while countless Kurdish youth perished in the mountains, has been trying to present himself as a legitimate counterpart of the Turkish government. He has proposed a so-called “three-phase roadmap” that stipulates the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission and the involvement of international actors such as the US, the UN, the EU and, oddly, a “Kurdish Federal Government of Iraq,” which does not exist. In media organs sympathetic to, or outright supportive of, the PKK, there seems to be a systematic effort to draw parallels between the situation in Turkey and South Africa’s apartheid regime and also to portray the baby killer as a sort of Kurdish “Mandela” who allegedly fought for the freedom of the Kurdish minority, served years in prison and eventually turned dovish in search for peace.

In general, these efforts are organized through the so-called Democratic Society Congress (DTK), which was established in 2010 in the mold of South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) and aims to bring together all Kurdish civil society initiatives. During its formation, the DTK announced that it would work to achieve a “Democratic Turkey, Autonomous Kurdistan.”

The big picture

So, what is really happening in Turkey with regards to the Kurdish issue and the PKK problem? Could they be analyzed independently of other domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey? How do they all connect to each other in the big picture? It is hard to know for sure before it actually happens. However, one viable explanation may be that they are complementary parts of a concerted effort to both impede the legal investigation of the alleged Ergenekon terrorist network nested in the state and to derail Turkey’s march to regional and international prominence by undermining and eventually getting rid of both Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AK Party government.

At a regional level, Turkey’s two immediate neighbors and critical allies in the fight against PKK terrorism are facing existential threats that are likely to diminish their ability to cooperate with Turkey. Given precedents in Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, Syria will also be paralyzed by an internal conflict and instability in a way that would prevent Damascus from functioning as an effective regional partner for Ankara in the foreseeable future.

Similarly, Iran will be unable to fully cooperate with Turkey for two reasons: First, there is a naturally or deliberately growing discord between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which started with the former’s sacking of the intelligence chief who was backed by the latter; second, Iran is highly likely to experience popular unrest in the coming years with the demise of the aging Khamenei, who is pretty much the only bulwark before the imminent popular upheaval against Iran’s revolutionary regime.

Besides, encouraged by questionable praise coming from Washington and Brussels, and increasingly critical of the regime in Syria, Ankara is diminishing its prospect of cooperation with a post-revolution establishment in this country, which would more or less remain intact with or without Bashar al-Assad. In the absence of Damascus and Tehran to cooperate with, Ankara will naturally be obliged to seek cooperation with Israel and the US in the fight against the PKK, which would of course not come for free.

On the other hand, at a national level, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the BDP have been hindering Parliament’s ability to function by creating crises over petty issues such as the taking of the parliamentary oath. DTK members are continuing to make provocative public declarations, announcing the establishment of so-called Kurdish autonomy in its alleged capital, Diyarbakır.

In the meantime, the PKK and its urban incarnation, the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK), are increasing their terrorist activities by ostensibly defying Öcalan’s call for a cease-fire. In so doing, the two are not only trying to perpetuate a sense of insecurity and chaos in the country but also beefing up Öcalan’s deliberately constructed false image in the eyes of the general public as a potential peacemaker.

The latest in that regard was the recent killing of 13 Turkish soldiers in Diyarbakir in a PKK ambush. CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was quick to blame the military’s failure to prevent the incident on the AK Party government by arguing that the morale of the Turkish army had been damaged by the ongoing Ergenekon investigation. Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leaders are publicly endorsing Erdoğan’s increasingly inflammatory rhetoric against the PKK and its extensions in Parliament, as he puts it.

So, does all this mean that some dark powers are working hard to weaken or, worse, divide Turkey and create an independent Kurdish state, which would possibly be followed later by certain concessions to the Armenians, the Assyrians and the Greeks? Maybe yes, maybe no; that is not the issue of primary concern. For some, that is not even a legitimate question, but a conspiracy theory.

What is important is to recognize that there are many groups inside and outside Turkey who view the AK Party government’s ouster as the only solution to secure their interests in Turkey as well as in the region. They are, and will be, working intensively to exploit the Kurdish issue in order to undermine the AK Party government’s ability to work, and to diminish its popularity outside Turkey.

Similarly, one should realize that Turkey has not only foes but also friends within the international community who would not necessarily favor a more powerful and more independent Turkey on the world stage. As such, they may well be cooperating with Turkey in a fight against PKK terrorism, while also working towards developing Turkey’s national issue into a much more complicated international matter that would require the involvement of many other actors as well as the United Nations, thereby making it much more difficult and costly to deal with.

At the end of the day, throughout the history of the republic and under the reign of the secular-fundamentalist elite, the Kurds of Turkey have suffered at least as much as many other vulnerable groups in Turkey, including a majority population that did not relinquish its piously Muslim identity. They seem to have also been exploited by outside actors, including the PKK, as well as rogue elements within the Turkish state as a means to interfere in Turkey’s domestic affairs, to strangle civilian governments in Ankara and to create calculated tension as needed. It is no more the old Turkey but a new one, a Turkey with a growing civil society, a strengthening economy and a liberalizing political environment. It is up to the Kurds to choose either to stand up against the over-a-century-old manipulation, or continue with business as usual.

[Big Picture] Turkey's PKK Problem and the So-Called Kurdish 'Mandela' - 1

2011-07-25T10:18:00.001-04:00

Op-ed Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 24 July 2011

The recent killing of 13 Turkish soldiers by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) ambush in Diyarbakır province has once again shaken the entire nation, adding yet another failure to the scorecard of the military and raising many questions about Turkey’s more than quarter-century-old fight against terrorism. Serious allegations are openly voiced these days about some sort of cooperation between rogue elements within the Turkish Armed Forces and PKK terrorists in order to deliberately prolong Turkey’s problem with terrorism and provide the self-proclaimed guardians of the regime (the generals) with leverage against the civilian governments in Ankara.

Moreover, a handful of Kurdish politicians and activists who claim to be representing all the Kurds of Turkey are becoming militant and provocative in their discourse and actions, thereby instigating the nationalist sentiments against the Kurds as well as against the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, which seems resolved to end PKK terrorism by introducing unprecedented political and legal reforms. In fact, today the Kurds of Turkey are enjoying the rights and freedoms which nobody could even speak about up until a decade ago. Yet, these Kurdish politicians are going as far as publicly demanding Kurdish autonomy, even though the vast majority of the Kurds do not support the idea. In addition, the so-called Kurdish movement seems to be organizing itself after the mold of South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) and tries to create a sort of “Kurdish Mandela” out of chief terrorist Abdullah Öcalan, thereby raising the suspicions about outside interference. Lastly, some naive liberal intelligentsia in the country seem to be buying the idea that the AK Party goverment's negotiation with Öcalan -- as if the latter were a legitimate counterpart -- is a must to solve Turkey's PKK problem.

So, what is really happening in Turkey? In order to have a grasp of it, one should have an understanding of the evolution of the Kurdish issue over the past century and should consider contemporary domestic developments in Turkey, bearing in mind Ankara’s increasingly assertive and unnecessarily confrontational foreign policy orientation, especially in its relations with the traditional status quo powers within the international system.

The Kurds’ misery and exploitation

Throughout the last century, the êşandın (pain) has manifested itself to Kurds in many ways in their daily lives. The Kurds of Turkey started to experience the repressive state policies during the last years of the Ottoman Empire under the leadership of the Ittihad ve Terakki (Union and Progress) government, the leadership of which consisted of non-Muslims -- the Dönme -- and the Young Turks educated in France and mired in the ethnicity-oriented nationalist ideology. The Ittihat ve Terakki’s, approach to the Kurds and later, during the republican era, the Republican People Party’s (CHP) approach to the Kurds was characterized ironically by both the denial of the Kurds’ distinct identity and the fiercely imposed assimilation from an identity that is denied to have existed at the first place.

In addition, the outside actors deliberately made the Kurds the usual suspects in the psyche of the Turkish nationalists. The Treaty of Sèvres, which the European occupiers, namely Britain, France and Italy, forced the ailing Ottoman Empire to sign on Aug. 10, 1920, aimed to create an Armenian republic in the east and an autonomous Kurdish region in the southeast of Anatolia. As Nicole and Hugh Pope remind readers in their book, “Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey,” although the treaty had never been ratified and implemented, such a reference to an autonomous Kurdish region has engendered the association of the ethnic Kurdish presence within the new republic, and as such any demand in relation to the Kurdish identity, with the greatest security threat posed to Turkey’s territorial integrity.

In a way, the Allied powers did not succeed in partitioning the Ottoman mainland but managed to portray the Kurds, the largest ethnic group in it, as unreliable elements who would readily join the European powers at any opportune moment to carve up Turkey.

In the following decades, even though they have theoretically enjoyed equal rights and status before the law regardless of their ethnic identity, the Kurds have usually been discriminated against in the public space as well as within the state’s institutions. Being a Kurd was reason enough to be ridiculed. The state’s traditional disregard for the development of the Kurdish-populated regions and the Kurds’ chronic lack of access to proper education had already created a natural selection process that kept the Kurds out of the political and economic opportunity spaces. So, in terms of the discrimination, bigotry and despise they suffered under the reign of Turkey’s secular-fundamentalist elite up until the end of the 20th century, the misery of the Kurds resembled that of the North African Muslim immigrants living in Europe in general and in France in particular. The French discrimination has been so extreme and the French security forces’ treatment of the French citizens of the North African or Muslim origin so brutal, especially under the leadership of Nicolas Sarkozy, that the brewing anger and resentment culminated in the widespread riots and violent clashes in the banlieues of Paris in October 2005.

Similarly, during Turkey’s fight against PKK terrorism, the treatment of suspects and criminals of Kurdish origin looked more like it was designed to consistently provoke public opinion on both the Turkish and Kurdish sides in a manner that would reinforce the legitimacy of the fight for both sides. Just like many distinct Muslim individuals of different nationalities were abducted to secret interrogation places as well as to the infamous Guantanamo prison during the course of the so-called US war on terror, the Kurds of Turkey, too, were exposed to the extrajudicial killings, renditions and torture, fashionably called “enhanced interrogation techniques.” In fact, long-time Turkey correspondents and observers Nicole and Hugh Pope suggested as early as in 1997, “[s]ummary executions and torture of Kurdish nationalists or leftist militants are carried out today by unknown assailants believed to be linked to the security forces.”

However, it was not just the Kurds who were oppressed by the secular-fundamentalist elite throughout republican history. Muslims, whose rights to practice their religion in the public space and whose access to political and economic opportunity spaces were restricted, suffered a similar fate, as did the Christian minorities such as Armenians, Assyrians and Greeks, whose legal minority rights were circumscribed; the rightists and leftists, whose rights to assembly and freedom of expression were banished; and many more unknown individuals who have been left to rot in the prisons without ever receiving a fair trial.

Besides, despite all the difficulties, the Kurds in Turkey have never experienced what the African Americans in America have. For instance, the Kurds have never been enslaved; there have never been segregated transportation and other public services; and the Kurds have never been humiliated with the public displays like “Dogs and Blacks not allowed!” Nor have they ever suffered from the hate crimes similar to those Muslims in general and Turks in particular are suffering in Germany. In July 2009, a German nationalist who was openly hostile to his victim’s religious identity murdered a pregnant Muslim woman in a German courtroom before the eyes of the security forces. Similarly, in the last decade only, neo-Nazi groups set the immigrant Turks’ houses on fire several times, causing many deaths and injuries. Who knows how many times it happened before but has gone unreported.

Ankara's Syrian Venture and the Insidious 'Kurdish Spring'

2011-07-13T13:00:00.002-04:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 1 July 2011

Nowadays, Turkey, Syria and Iran seem to be undertaking measures that only adversaries would in the face of imminent threats from each another. While busy picking on each other, they are unable to recognize the looming threat, which has the potential to dwarf the so-called “Arab Spring". Whether all three genuinely like or hate each other, and if the latter is the case, whether they pose a threat to one another can only be a secondary concern when compared to the imminent threat they commonly face. It is the likely “Kurdish Spring,” which started in Turkey, will rapidly spread to the other two. They will be inadvertently assisting it in becoming a reality unless they keep their direct channels of communication open at all times, and fully cooperate, in order not to suppress the Kurds’ political, cultural and socioeconomic rights, but to fight terrorism perpetrated in the name of defending those rights.

What has changed in relations all of a sudden? First, Ankara has turned increasingly critical of the Baath regime in Damascus due to the ongoing violence perpetrated against its own civilians. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan denounced the regime’s repression of civilian protests as “savagery.” Moreover, President Abdullah Gül stated that the reforms announced by President Bashar al-Assad recently during his long-awaited public address were not enough. In response, Damascus rebuked Ankara’s critical stance, and warned the latter to reconsider its position for the sake of maintaining friendly relations between the two. In addition, Syria has positioned its armed forces near the country’s northern border in order to control the exodus of refugees into Turkey. The Turkish military has also reinforced its troops on the Turkish side of the border. In the meantime, alarmed by the possibility of losing its only Arab ally with the possible fall of the Assad regime and hence in show of solidarity with it, Tehran has reportedly alleged that Turkey has been instigating the civilian protests, and has also reportedly armed supporters of the Baath regime.

After all, only a year ago, despite harsh criticisms from its Western allies, Turkey put itself on the frontline in order to prevent, in cooperation with Brazil, any possible military action against Iran, due to the latter’s so-called civilian nuclear program. Accordingly, Tehran announced that it would continue its nuclear negotiations with the Vienna Group (US, Russia, France and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]) in İstanbul, as well as swap its low-enriched uranium for nuclear fuel rods only in Turkey. Similarly, until very recently, Syrian leadership used to proclaim that Damascus would engage in any rapprochement with Israel through the mediation of Ankara. At this point, it is questionable whether any of these pledges will materialize, yet at the same time it would be premature to conclude that relations between Turkey and Syria-Iran are irreversibly damaged.

Also, one should note that a number of obscure news reports were instrumental. According to a columnist writing for the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, during a recent meeting where the Syrian president voiced his concern over the critical stance Ankara has adopted, Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned that Iran would bomb NATO and US bases in Turkey if the latter were cooperative in any NATO action against Syria. Similarly, a Kuwaiti newspaper alleged that “Turkish officials have told Western countries that Turkey might launch a military operation in Syria’s north to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.” Both Iranian and Turkish authorities have denied the allegations though. Even if they had not, these reports already looked like fabrications aimed at harming the trio’s relations. They may well have been planted in the media as part of psychological warfare aimed at undermining the trio’s relations. Nor can any of the three governments be sure that their respective authorities are not compromised by officials who would cooperate with third parties to the detriment of the governments they are supposed to represent.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that there is a tension and that the trio’s relations are still brittle. The tension has resulted largely from the way Ankara positioned itself vis-à-vis the unfolding humanitarian tragedy in Syria. Primarily concerned with the security implications that a possible civil war or foreign military intervention in Syria could create for Turkey, Ankara urged President Assad to undertake reforms that would enable a peaceful democratic transition. However, those reforms are understandably difficult to implement immediately, given the intricacies of Syria’s Baath regime, and apparently President Assad is far from controlling all elements of that regime, such as the intelligence service. Yet, Ankara’s criticism has steadily increased. Two factors may have played a role in this: First, Prime Minister Erdoğan may have not wanted to once again remain silent about human rights violations in Syria, as was initially the case during Muammar Gaddafi’s violent suppression of civilian protestors in Libya. Second, the excessive and somewhat sentimentally charged coverage of Syrian protests in Turkish media, as well as the bombastic portrayal of Prime Minister Erdoğan as the new leader of the region may have, mistakenly, led Ankara to overreact and to forget that for any democratic transition in Syria, the survival of Assad’s presidency and his continuous contact with Ankara are vital.

Considering its own domestic peculiarities, however, Turkey should be extra sensitive to not ruin or even sour its relations with either Syria or Iran. These peculiarities include: first, the still alive terrorist, Abdullah Öcalan; second, the so-called Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which is resolved to coerce the Turkish state into negotiating with terrorists over Turkey’s sovereignty in its southeast region; third, the dormant but not yet dead Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terror network; and finally 15-20 million ethnic Kurds, who may be more or less manipulated like any other ethnic group. Under these circumstances, its inability to counter increasing PKK terrorism in the Southeast, and possibly across the country, may force the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government to embark on a self-destructive course with regard to the Kurdish issue.

That is, if PKK terror surges, and the government appears unable to prevent it, which will be the case if Turkey cannot cooperate with both Iran and Syria, then the very same Erdoğan who recently stated that the government would have hung Öcalan if he had been in office may be forced to seek the chief terrorist’s help in appeasing the PKK’s endless demands it posed as a prerequisite to ending the violence.

Could this happen really? Actually, some so-called liberal journalists/columnists in Turkey have already started to suggest that the state (practically the military) has been negotiating with Öcalan all along, therefore, so should the government in order to find a comprehensive solution to Turkey’s Kurdish question. Some have even suggested a road map through which Öcalan’s sentence would be turned into a five-year house arrest sentence, after which he would be a free man -- if he cooperates with the government. Whether these touchy and liberal-sounding ideas can bring about an end to Turkey’s more than century-old Kurdish question is questionable at best, and whether it would be prudent to release a chief terrorist is a legal and moral matter to be dealt with. However, it is for sure that no government, and probably no prime minister, can survive in a country like Turkey if Öcalan is freed during the period of rule of that government. Then, of course, how odd it would be to keep generals and other army officers, who fought Öcalan and other PKK terrorists. So, forced to follow such a course in the face of an uncontrollable PKK terror, Prime Minister Erdoğan would bring about the end not only of his government, but of himself. Given the impotency of the opposition in Turkey, which is true for Erdoğan’s opponents both inside and outside the country, this may have seemed like a comprehensive solution to get rid of him and his government.

The bottom line is how Ankara positions itself in the face of tragic developments in Syria today and ones likely to occur in Iran in the future will have immediate implications for domestic Turkish politics, as Turkey’s ability to cooperate with both countries has a direct effect on its ability to deal with PKK terrorism. For some capitals, it may not be risky to bash the Assad regime, but Ankara is not one of them. As it appears, there are two dimensions of Ankara’s response to unraveling developments in Syria: one is practical, which is the humanitarian assistance provided to Syrian refugees escaping the violence perpetrated in their country, and the other is positional, which is characterized by increasing criticism of President Assad and the Baath regime. The best Turkey can and should do under these circumstances is to continue its constructive political engagement with President Assad and help him transform his country, while providing humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees as they flee to the north.

Who is to Blame for the Turkish-Israeli Deadlock?

2011-07-13T12:23:00.000-04:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 17 June 2011

The foreign policy implications of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s landslide electoral victory are yet to be seen. However, for the time being it would be safe to conclude that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government is likely to interpret the steady increase in its popular support as massive approval of its overall foreign policy orientation. In fact, during his victory speech, Prime Minister Erdoğan alluded to how deep those implications may be by suggesting that in this election, not only Ankara, but also Ramallah, Gaza, Jenin, Nablus and Jerusalem were winners and that Turkey would continue to be an advocate for the righteous and the weak in its region and beyond.

As such, it is not hard to predict that Turkish-Israeli relations are unlikely to smoothen out in the near future, unless the Benjamin Netanyahu government compromises on two closely interrelated issues: first, Ankara’s demand for an apology and compensations for the families of the victims of the Israeli attack on the Mavi Marmara; and second, Washington’s proposal that would enable the settlement of the so-called Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a two-state solution on the basis of the pre-1967 borders.

However, under normal circumstances, Tel Aviv is unlikely to do so, not because Prime Minister Netanyahu is interested in perpetuating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (or maybe he is), but because he has a tendency to see everything from the perspective of Israel’s survival. Similarly, the way he understands peace is a recipe for perpetual conflict. Therefore, these may be the very reasons why Netanyahu should not be blamed for turning down President Barack Obama’s proposal, as well as for creating the conditions that have caused the Turkish-Israeli deadlock.

Deciphering Benjamin

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s recent visit to Washington was remarkable in that it made two points crystal clear. First, pretty much the entire world, including the Americans, the Arabs and the non-Arab nations represented within the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), is willing to accept the existence of the State of Israel as a (peaceful and law-abiding) member of the international community (within its internationally agreed and recognized borders). Second, Rae Abileah, who was reportedly attacked by American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) members and hospitalized as a result and later arrested after she protested the Israeli occupation and war crimes during Netanyahu’s address to the joint session of the US Congress, is a Jew, and hence condemnation of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians is not due to anti-Semitism.

Similar examples of many Jews so bravely opposing successive Israeli governments’ illegal practices against Palestinians are a testament to that fact as well. It is obvious, based on these two recent reassertions of the widely accepted truth, that the State of Israel has, and will always have, a place among the nations.

What is not so obvious, and in fact is quite controversial, is whether the Israeli prime minister is capable of making peace at all with the Palestinians and Arabs. When Netanyahu humiliated President Obama in front of his own fellow Americans and the world by categorically rejecting what his host had proposed on the basis of the pre-1967 borders, the first question that probably entered every frustrated American taxpayer’s mind was “What else can the United States do for Israel?” After all, President Obama’s proposal would not create a fully independent Palestine that has sovereign control over its landmass and air space, but an archipelago of tiny territories that are existentially dependent on Israel anyway. The issue of Palestinians’ return to their homes, which have remained within the territories steadily occupied by Israel since 1967, was not even mentioned in that proposal. Nor was the militarization of the new Palestinian state.

Some explain Netanyahu’s blunt defiance of President Obama as “power-intoxication.” That is, Netanyahu may be thinking that there is absolutely no reason for him to be forthcoming -- given the leverage he thinks he has against the president. In fact, Netanyahu has generated a kind of excitement among the current members of the US Congress which no other head of state, including President Obama, ever did. Members of Congress gave 29 standing ovations to the Israeli prime minister during his address, while they only gave 25 to President Obama during his State of the Union address. It is also clear that as he prepares to run for re-election in 2012, President Obama will have to secure the support of certain American voters that happen to heed the recommendations of Israeli leaders. So, under these circumstances, Netanyahu may be excused for not being able to recognize the historic opportunity offered to him by President Obama’s proposal.

Netanyahu’s ‘durable peace’: a recipe for conflict

However, there seems to be something more to it. According to Netanyahu, as he writes in his book “A Durable Peace: Israel and Its Place Among Nations,” the peace between Israelis and Arabs is not possible on the basis of territorial swaps because the Arabs, he believes, would use those territories for future assaults to destroy Israel. “The ceding of strategic territory to the Arabs might trigger [a] destructive process by convincing the Arab world that Israel has become vulnerable enough to attack,” he argues. Moreover, he believes that the only kind of peace that would endure between the Arabs/Palestinians and the Jews is the “peace of deterrence,” which is based on Israel’s absolute military superiority over its immediate and distant neighbors.

Netanyahu does not believe in the international guarantees for Israel’s security. He thinks that “by the time they come to save Israel, there won’t be an Israel.” Therefore, he argues, Israel’s defense must be entrusted to its own military capabilities and forces that are willing and able to act in real time against any imminent attack or invasion. As such, Netanyahu himself explains in a way why Israel is so vigilant against the possibility of Iran’s developing military nuclear capabilities. Similarly, since he considers every threat as potentially aimed at destroying Israel, it is quite normal that he does not accept President Obama’s proposal. It also explains the disproportional use of violence by Israeli forces used against the civilians on the Mavi Marmara last year. In fact, last month Netanyahu defended the Israeli forces’ killing of 13 pro-Palestinian demonstrators on Nakba Day by suggesting that those demonstrators were bent on destroying Israel.

In explaining Netanyahu’s overall behavior, his electorate may think that he is adamantly protecting the State of Israel, while many others may argue that he is suffering from a chronic condition in which a person has delusions, hears things that are not real and hence loses touch with reality, and as a result occasionally resorts to suicidal actions. If the latter is the case, which Mayo Clinic calls paranoid schizophrenia, Prime Minister Netanyahu certainly cannot be blamed for obstructing any peace efforts aimed at settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nor could he be blamed for the Israeli assault on the Mavi Marmara, which led to the contemporary deadlock in Turkish-Israeli relations. However, the Israeli electorate may be blamed for making the mistake of putting him in office as such, and thereby paving the way for that deadlock.

Misrepresentation of Fethullah Gulen in English-language Media

2011-05-17T01:21:00.000-04:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 15 May 2011

For an average American and European reader, the name Fethullah Gülen may not necessarily be a familiar one. That Gülen is a scholar who has inspired millions of volunteers across the world to engage in educational and intercultural initiatives, that he publically denounced Osama bin Laden for the shame that the latter brought upon Islam, and that he advocated Turkey’s full membership in the European Union at time when his counterparts opposed it by simply viewing the EU as a Christian club with Zionist touches, are not something that the average reader would know, either. Recently, it seems, the English-language media, and particularly American and European media, are increasingly covering Gülen and the worldwide civil society initiatives he has inspired.

However, the language in general and the way certain politically significant words are used in some of this media coverage are somewhat problematic in the sense that they fail to present the full picture about Gülen, if not deliberately create doubts and prejudices about him. A recent Financial Times report titled “Turkey: Inspiring or insidious” by Delphine Strauss as well as reports by two Turkey-based correspondents, Amberin Zaman of The Economist and Claire Berlinski of the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, are quite indicative of such a tendency. In so doing, they appear to appeal to a basic human instinct of fearing what one cannot comprehend, contain or control, and as a result developing a hostile attitude toward it. These reports also consistently belittle Turkey’s efforts to reckon with its antidemocratic past through the Ergenekon investigation on the alleged involvements of active duty and retired army and police officers, journalists, bureaucrats and others in coup plots, thereby raising doubts about their journalistic objectivity and neutrality on either subject.

Financial Times’ insidious coverage

“But in Turkey, opinion is sharply divided between those who see Mr. Gülen as a force for social mobility and tolerance, and those who suspect he is insidiously undermining the country’s secular foundations,” writes Strauss. First of all, it is hard to say that opinion in Turkey is sharply divided with regard to Gülen. As of today, there has been no poll carried out by Turkish researchers or authorities to determine public opinion about him. However, according to a poll conducted by Professor Akbar Ahmed of American University, for his book, “Journey into Islam: The Crisis of Globalization,” 84 percent of Turks have a favorable opinion of Gülen and the initiatives he has inspired. In addition, a poll carried out by the magazines Foreign Policy of the United States and Prospect of the United Kingdom demonstrated that Gülen is the world’s top public intellectual. In the aftermath of this poll, some apparently unpleased with the result claimed that the “followers” of Gülen had rigged the poll. One wonders what the difference is between simply voting for someone and rigging a poll. Would one of the candidates not eventually come first in the poll? If it another candidate was voted the world’s top public intellectual, then would his or her supporters not have “rigged” but “voted” for that candidate? At the end of the day, any poll can be misleading depending on how one designs it. Perhaps, it is about time to carry out multiple polls in Turkey by various pollsters in order to assess whether opinion about Gülen is “sharply divided” or if it is just a small marginal group that opposes him and the initiatives he has inspired.

Strauss further suggests, “His followers have been described as ‘Islamic Jesuits’ -- and as Turkey’s equivalent of Opus Dei.” Again, this is another simplistic method increasingly utilized in order to reduce Gülen to just another charismatic religious leader, and his admirers as blind followers of that leader. It is also a somewhat derogatory description of them, which aims to inject into the reader’s mind doubt about their true intentions. The word “follower” has quite a loaded meaning and can be easily exploited. What does it mean to follow? Follow to achieve what, or get to where? Who is more of a “follower” -- the young college graduate who foregoes job offers with lucrative salaries and volunteers to go to a country which he or she cannot even point out on the map, in order to help that country’s children receive a modern education; the woman who donates everything, including her wedding ring, to support the start-up of a school, which she is most unlikely to visit in her lifetime; the Assyrian Christian priest who is thankful for and supports Gülen’s interfaith dialogue efforts; the Jewish businessman who vouches for the apolitical nature of a Gülen-inspired Turkish school in a foreign country; an atheist writer who participates in the activities of the Journalists and Writers Foundation (GYV), which is associated with Gülen; the Turkish diplomat who is proud to see a Gülen-inspired school in a country where even the Turkish state does not have official representation; or, one who follows Gülen’s twitter account? So, who is a “follower” of Gülen? What does it take to become a so-called “Gülen follower”?

How many unsubstantiated allegations make one credible premise?

Moreover, what does it mean “... have been described as Islamic Jesuits?” Who is it that makes such a description? It may well be one of those currently detained because of alleged involvement in alleged coup plots, or someone who is unhappy with the ongoing Ergenekon investigation on the alleged outlawed network nested in the army, police, bureaucracy and other parts of the state apparatus. Why would the Financial Times use such an unsubstantiated allegation? Does such a statement have any credibility without a reference to its source? As it stands, it is hardly different from mere defamation of Gülen and his admirers under the disguise of “neutral” reporting. This defamation is further deepened by likening what is called the Gülen movement to Opus Dei, which is known to Westerners as a secretive, powerful and controversial formation within the Catholic Church.

After all, how credible would it be if a newspaper report read, “It is widely believed that the Financial Times and the other media outlets owned by Jewish media moguls like Rupert Murdock are intentionally misrepresenting Fethullah Gülen and his admirers, whom they think are the driving force behind Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party [AK Party] government, which they adamantly want to get rid of due to Israel’s growing uneasiness with Turkey under that government.” Just like the Financial Times’ quote of unsubstantiated allegations about Gülen by unreferenced sources, this quotation would not have any credibility, either.

Perhaps the answer as to why the Financial Times is using such language is in the report itself: “Yet there is little doubt that the movement [Gülen] inspires is now an important force shaping Turkish society, part of a broader evolution in which leaders emerging from a religious, business-minded middle class are gradually eclipsing older, fiercely secular, elites.” Objective observers of Turkey would rather say, “Older, fiercely secular, elites, who have traditionally dominated the economic and political spaces as well as the state apparatus, who did not refrain from resorting to anti-democratic and criminal practices from targeted killings and massacres of civilians to military coups ousting democratically elected governments, and some of whom as a result of recent democratic reforms and transformations in state institutions are being investigated for their alleged involvement in these criminal acts.”

Moreover, Strauss argues, with regard to the Gülen-inspired schools, “Though officials from the traditionally secularist foreign ministry have tended to keep their distance from Gülen-inspired projects, ministers appear to view them as a useful extension of Turkey’s soft power.” Here too, the report seems like it is aiming to instill two misleading perceptions about these schools: One is that the Turkish diplomatic corps is generally not sympathetic to the contributions these schools are making to the emergence of a positive image of Turkey abroad; and the other is that they are instruments of a new Turkish foreign policy orientation that is associated with the AK Party government. First of all, it is increasingly evident that in most of the countries where these schools operate, Turkish diplomats, regardless of them being conservative (if there are any) or secular, seem to publicly appreciate these schools or other Gülen-inspired initiatives. Unless Strauss knows of something more than meets the eye, then the Financial Times reporter’s allegation is wrong at best, if not intentionally misleading. Secondly, when the first Gülen-inspired school was established outside Turkey, those with whom the new Turkish foreign policy orientation is associated today were still either students at college or junior professionals in bureaucracy and academia. So, unless they miraculously initiated these schools some 20 years ago in order to lay the groundwork for the foreign policy orientation that Turkey pursues today, the view that these schools are “extensions” of Turkey’s soft power, which the Financial Times report attributes to AK Party government ministers, is as well misleading, if not purposefully trying to give these apolitical civil society initiatives a political meaning. Last but not least, how can something that precedes something serve as an extension anyway?

Observing Turkey through blinkers

An attitude similar to that of the Financial Times’ Strauss in terms of taking unsubstantiated allegations of unreferenced sources as a credible, as well as a “necessary and sufficient” premise for a conclusion about the contemporary situation in Turkey, is visible in the reporting of Zaman of the Economist and Berlinski, who writes for City Journal magazine.

In an analysis on Turkey for The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Zaman argues that there are three sources of pressure on media freedom in Turkey: first, Turkey’s anti-terror laws; second, its prime minister, Erdoğan; and third, “Turkey’s largest and most powerful Islamic fraternity led by Fethullah Gülen.” What is her premise for such a dogma-like conclusion? She writes: “The so-called Gülenists are said to have infiltrated the bureaucracy, especially the police force. They are widely believed to be behind the arrest of Ahmet Şık and Nedim Şener.” As such, she either makes the same mistake that Strauss does or pursues the same insidious method to obscure the facts and lead readers to make erroneous conclusions.

Who is it that says and believes so? And, why is it that an ordinary Turkish citizen with a favorable opinion of Gülen is said to have infiltrated the bureaucracy when he or she enters the civil service through legal and legitimate procedures available to any other Turkish citizen? While she does not provide any answer to this, neither does she mention that the same judiciary prosecuting Şık and Şener for their alleged involvement in alleged coup plots also opened some 400 lawsuits against journalists and reporters working for the Zaman newspaper for issues related to their reporting.

Finally, in her article “Prisoner of Conspiracy,” Berlinski argues: “So the [Ergenekon] investigation cannot possibly lead to what its supporters say it will: the triumph of the rule of law in Turkey, a sustainable national consensus, and a verdict widely accepted as legitimate. It can only lead to more division, suspicion, and paranoia.” She further argues, “Almost every Turkish citizen now deeply believes either that Ergenekon is real or that Gülen is running their country—and is truly terrified of one or the other.” Does she not sound more like someone with a stake in the Ergenekon investigation than a correspondent? Or, why could she possibly be following this particular pattern in her reporting? The answer seems to be in her proposal, “The only solution I can imagine would lie in a South African-style Truth and Reconciliation Committee -- an entirely public and transparent reckoning aiming not at punishment or vengeance but at reconciliation.” Just like Strauss and Zaman, Berlinski too tries to spread the false perception that Gülen is running the show in Turkey and the Ergenekon investigation is leading to an uncertainty. Perhaps, they or those who sign their paychecks think that if they can portray Gülen as poorly and as frighteningly as possible, then the Ergenekon investigation may be brought to a halt.

Why do they lie about Fethullah Gulen?

2011-04-25T17:20:00.000-04:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 19 April 2011

For many of those who have admired the ideas of the scholar Fethullah Gülen and at varying levels took part in fulfilling those ideas for the service of humanity, it has been a lamentable fact that the international community does not know as much as it should about either Gülen or the worldwide Hizmet (Service) Movement he has inspired.

From a causality perspective, it was he who masterminded the idea of teaching the children of all nationalities, races, creeds and religions a common language of peace, love and harmony, so that as responsible adults of tomorrow they could build a better and more peaceful world. It was this idea and his selfless efforts that have led to the mobilization of millions of volunteers across the world to found modern and secular schools and intercultural dialogue centers as well as humanitarian aid organizations in more than 140 countries, including in impoverished and conflict-stricken places such as Haiti, Darfur and Afghanistan. Gülen was the first Muslim scholar to publicly denounce the Sept. 11 attacks as an act of terrorism, and going even further challenged its perpetrators on Islamic grounds by saying, “A terrorist cannot be a Muslim, nor can a true Muslim be a terrorist.” All in all, given the magnitude of his service to humanity, many believed that Gülen should have long ago been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Yet, his strict principle of not promoting himself, accepting any credit for the good works attributed to him, and actually giving the credit to the volunteers of those works, has so far kept him away from the attention of the international community. In fact, many have been decorated with such awards for merely dreaming and speaking about global peace, while over the past several decades Gülen has been patiently laying the foundations for such peace to actually come about.

Apparently, this will no longer be the case thanks to his opponents, who have been systematically flooding the Internet and print media with wild allegations about him and the movement. After all, who in his or her sane mind would hear such a wild allegation as Gülen being the “most dangerous Islamist on Earth,” and not bother to do a Google search for “Fethullah Gülen”? Then, what he or she will find, in addition to some more of those allegations, is rather scholarly research on Gülen’s thoughts and practice, some of which include Jill Carroll’s “A Dialogue of Civilizations: Gülen’s Islamic Ideals and Humanistic Discourse,” Helen Rose Ebaugh’s “The Gülen Movement: A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam,” Muhammed Cetin’s “The Gülen Movement: Civic Service Without Borders,” and John Esposito and Ihsan Yilmaz’s “Islam and Peacebuilding: Gülen Movement Initiatives.” More importantly one would find Gülen’s very own writings and statements as well as the actual works produced by volunteers inspired by his ideals. So, bringing him to the attention of those who would otherwise not know anything about Gülen and the global civic movement he has inspired, Gülen’s adversaries are inadvertently making him ever more popular and well-known worldwide through their systematic defamation campaign. In this regard, one should expect Gülen soon to be recognized by the international community for his contributions to world peace. Then, one should also expect his adversaries to allege in self-denial that Gülen himself had designed this defamation campaign in order to attract global public attention.

But the question is, why do they make such wild allegations about Gülen and the Hizmet Movement, which based on all available and credible evidence seem to be unsubstantiated and untrue beyond any reasonable doubt? Subsequently, in what ways do they carry out their defamation of Gülen as an individual and the millions of people from different nationalities, races, creeds and religions, whose voluntary service makes up what is called the Hizmet Movement? At this point, one should note that as Kerim Balcı of Today’s Zaman rightly puts it, those allegations take different, and often self-contradicting, forms depending on the perceived fears of the target audience. For instance, if the target audience is Russian, then Gülen and his initiatives are accused of being the US’s and more specifically the CIA’s designs. If the audience is Americans and Christians, then he is accused of being an Islamist terrorist aspiring to establish a global Islamic empire. If it is the audience is Jewish, then he is portrayed as being anti-Semitic. If it is anti-democratic Arab leaders, then he is argued to be not only a Turkish nationalist bent on reviving the Ottoman Empire, but also an agent of the Greater Middle East Project by the US, that foresees the overthrow of those leaders. In terms of methodology, just like John Mearsheimer describes the different forms of public lies, these allegations too vary from outright false statements to the true facts spun in a way that would lead the target audience to make erroneous conclusions about Gülen and the Hizmet Movement.

In the American context, they lie about Gülen and his work, because the latter stands as living examples that repudiate the deliberately produced stereotypes of Islam being inherently violent and hostile, and of Muslims being a potential threat to the so-called “Judeo-Christian” nature of American society. This in turn threatens the socio-economic and political interests of those who have not only consistently injected such stereotypes into the American conscience, but also cashed in heavily on the fears fed by these stereotypes by manipulating America’s domestic and foreign policies accordingly.

Defamation of Islam and demonization of Muslims in the American conscience

As Edward Said puts it in his “Covering Islam,” for Americans, Islam and Muslims have been no more than mere elements within and of political and security concerns by the US; not because they are indifferent to learning about Islam and Muslims, but because the news coverage and the so-called expert analyses of the incidents taking place within Muslim communities had often engendered too simplistic and rather negative views of Islam and Muslims in the minds of Americans. According the prevailing discourse, Islam was, and according to a considerable number of Americans still is, a heretical religion/cult predominant across regions where the US has massive political and economic interests. It was the system that oppressed women, restricted freedom of thought and religion and encouraged its adherents to fight Jews and Christians. Academics like Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis, as well as commentators such as Daniel Pipes, built up such a skewed image of Islam inch by inch over the last several decades.

When Lewis argued in “Islam and the West” that history was simply a struggle between Christians and Muslims for world domination and in “What Went Wrong?: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East” that Muslims are enraged by the West in general and the US in particular because Islam lacks the cluster of “Western” values such as democracy, human rights and freedoms, he was basically producing pseudo-academic arguments for the disposal of the like-minded academics, policy makers, journalists and opinion leaders. Along similar lines, in his book, “The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order,” Huntington coined the concept of “the bloody borders of Islam,” suggesting that at any given time most of the conflicts across the globe either involved, or took place within “Muslim” communities, because Islam was inherently violent and not open to pluralism. Following this line, Pipes and many other like-minded pundits/columnists in prominent American newspapers and analysts at influential think tanks have frequently written rather short “opinion” pieces as well as “policy” papers propagating the same argument. Consequently, the American public has to a great extent digested this false image of Islam and Muslims. In his recent opinion piece titled “Ambitious Turkey,” Pipes’ use of heavily loaded and defamatory descriptions such as “the tyrannical, Islamist, and conspiracist mentality generally dominating Muslim peoples,” well illustrates the case in point.

So, for Americans, who have so long been bombarded with the violent images and perceptions of Muslims, Gülen and the work he inspires is an unexpected but most welcome surprise. However, for those who have for decades portrayed Islam as anything and everything that the so-called “Judeo-Christian” nature of American society is not, Gülen, his ideas, the people who are inspired by his ideas and the humanitarian-educational work that they have produced are understandably posing a threat. Such a threat exists not because of the very nature of the work that they produce, but because it defies the deliberately constructed and established image of the “Muslim” as a savage from the Middle Ages who is inherently against the Western way of life and eager to wage a “jihad” against Americans.

Consider the following cases: (1) Following protests and Quran burning in the United States hundreds of “Muslims” in Afghanistan resort to violence, killing seven UN workers; and (2) “Muslim” civil society and humanitarian aid organizations, including both men and women, were among the first to reach “non-Muslim” Haitians immediately after the devastating earthquake, serving 40,000 Haitians hot meals and constructing a hospital in Port-au-Prince to meet the medical needs of impoverished Haitians. Or, (1) An “Islamic” leader vows to wipe Israel off the map (possibly by nuking it), as well as destroying its main sponsor, which he calls the Great Satan; and (2) An “Islamic” scholar publicly suggesting that any humanitarian assistance to Palestinians should be delivered through coordination with Israeli authorities and without breaching international law. Or, (1) “Muslim” children in Hezbollah camps in southern Lebanon are indoctrinated with fundamentalist “Islamic” ideology and receiving armed training with AK-47s in their hands; and (2) “Muslim” students in cooperation with their non-Muslim counterparts from around the world compete in the international science competitions and undertake research in such vital fields as curing cancer, eradicating poverty, preventing environmental pollution and overcoming global energy shortages. The latter example in each pairing is what Gülen and the movement engenders. Quite understandably, in a country like the United States, where the news is more of an instrument manufactured to manipulate public opinion to accept certain socio-economic and political practices, any development that challenges the established “negative” image of Islam and Muslims would be unwelcome by those who have a vested interest in the perpetuation of such a negative image.

How they try to defame Gülen

In this regard, there are two major allegations that are currently employed in the United States by Gülen opponents in order to discredit and cause fear mongering about him: One that the charter schools opened in various states by Turkish-Americans are connected to Gülen, and that they are spreading “Islamic fundamentalism;” and the other that Gülen is behind the ongoing Ergenekon investigation in Turkey, which has led to the detainment of many active duty and retired army officers as well as journalists. The first allegation begs the following question: Would the US authorities that have authorized and overseen these schools, not be aware of any such wrongdoing, if any? The second allegation is a mere distortion of the facts on the ground. Currently there are 26 journalists being detained in relation to the Ergenekon investigation, and none of them are being held because they exercised their freedom of expression, but rather because of their suspected involvement in verified coup plans that aimed to overthrow Turkey’s democratically elected government. In fact, it is similar to the case of The New York Times’ Judith Miller, who was sentenced to 18 months in jail in 2005 due to her involvement in the leaking of an active CIA officer’s identity. One wonders if anybody then opposed the court decision by arguing that she was exercising her freedom of expression as a journalist. Similarly, was a Hutu radio host exercising his freedom of expression when he incited his fellow Hutus to massacre Tutsis ahead of what eventually amounted to the Rwanda genocide? Furthermore, even if a prosecutor or a police officer who happens to admire Gülen and is involved in the Ergenekon investigation went rogue and broke the law, what does it have to do with Gülen himself or the millions of others who admire his ideals?

In the final analysis, the real threat perceived by accomplices of Gülen opponents, in major capitals including Washington, D.C., actually seems to be the possibility of Turkey’s Ergenekon investigation inspiring and encouraging peoples of other countries, as well as investigating deep state arrangements that have long been running in the veins of their own societies. For them, the threat is clear and imminent: Apparently, Turkey is no longer the old Turkey, where it was easy to deal with the “real” owners of the regime, meaning corrupt military generals, bureaucrats and politicians; but with its growing civil society and strengthening economy, it is no longer easy or possible to manipulate Turkey. What if the same happens in other countries that have long been in the orbit of special interest groups within these major capitals? More importantly, what if their own masses mobilize to break the glass ceilings and claim their rightful share of political and economic resources that have traditionally remained under the monopoly of these special interest groups? Speaking of a so-called “Islamist” threat in the United States, the real questions that disturb the adversaries of Gülen are the following: What if Muslim Americans want to serve as judges on the US Supreme Court, and as senators and representatives in Congress? What if they want to command the US armies as generals? What if they want to manage giant American corporations? And, what if, one day, one of them were to become the president of the United States? What is at stake with the democratization of Turkey is quite high and critical for those whose interests have depended on it remaining an anti-democratic satellite state. It is only normal then that in all their despair, hopelessness and panic, adversaries of Gülen both inside and outside Turkey are trying to demonize him, for he and the millions inspired by him are in fact behind the democratization of their country.

The Real and Opportunity Costs of the Late Turkish Foreign Policy

2011-04-01T10:18:00.000-04:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu
Today's Zaman, 30 March 2011

There are less than 90 days left before Turkey’s upcoming parliamentary elections on June 12, and it is almost certain that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government will easily proceed to its third term in office, provided that the elections take place freely, fairly and in a secure environment.

So, an important matter of curiosity for voters is not whether the incumbent AK Party government will make it to another term, but whether it will be able to increase its electoral support from the 47 percent of all votes it received during the last general elections. Similarly of interest is whether the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) will be able to secure any seat at all in Parliament given its rapidly shrinking support base, and whether the accidental leader of the main opposition party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), will be able to remain at the helm of his party after another electoral defeat. Nevertheless, all three of these issues are becoming more or less predictable as election day draws closer.

However, what is and has always been in Turkish politics the real matter of curiosity is how the prime minister forms his or her new Cabinet. In this case, which ministers will Prime Minister Erdoğan retain? Which new figures will he bring on board to replace those who are to willingly or unwillingly give up their respective posts? Even though it may be argued that this practice has resulted in cronyism in Turkish politics, as it would in any other democracy, it gives the prime minister a chance to recalculate the real costs and opportunity costs incurred by his earlier Cabinet appointments. Therefore, with a view to improving Turkey’s overall foreign policy performance in his third term, maximizing the fulfillment of certain ministers’ potential and minimizing the avoidable irritation caused by Ankara’s heightened diplomatic dynamism, Prime Minister Erdoğan may want to reconsider certain appointment decisions.

The AK Party government’s second term in office has been starkly different from its first term in terms of European Union accession and in terms of the intensity of negotiations in that direction. According to a recent poll by the Turkish-German Foundation for Education and Scientific Research (TAVAK), 60 percent of Turks are opposed to Turkey’s EU membership. While the credibility of such a poll can always be questioned, it is obvious today that many Turks seem to lack any enthusiasm for EU membership. It is partly because of the EU’s erratic attitude toward Turkey; the consistent opposition by the current governments in France and Germany; the AK Party government’s domestic preoccupations, ranging from questionable closure cases against it to coup attempts by rogue elements within the army; and burning regional and international problems such as the question of nuclear Iran, a matter in which Ankara adopted a position that was contrary to that of its European counterparts. Under these circumstances, it would be unfair to expect the AK Party government to have been as dynamic in its second term in its pursuit of EU accession as it was in its first term.

The role of the chief EU negotiator

However, there has never been a real discussion about the performance of Turkey’s chief EU negotiator in discharging his responsibilities and duties and keeping public enthusiasm on the subject high. Oddly enough, according to a report in the Hürriyet daily, the chief negotiator has recently reacted to the military operations led by the EU countries such as France, United Kingdom and Italy against the Gaddafi regime in Libya by suggesting, “We would not leave our Libyan brethren to the European Gaddafis.” It is yet to be seen whether Turks will debate this specific element of Turkey’s EU accession efforts in the coming weeks and months. Also yet to be seen is how Prime Minister Erdoğan will act in his third term in order to boost Turkey’s negotiations with the EU.

Even more critical is the opportunity cost borne by Turkish foreign policy due to the appointment of Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu as foreign minister, and consequently by Ankara’s preference to actively pursue a visible political engagement with its immediate neighbors. As economist John Stuart Mill, who developed the concept, put it: the opportunity cost is the next-best choice that one foregoes while picking among several mutually exclusive choices. In this case, the next best choice that Prime Minister Erdoğan has foregone was to keep Professor Davutoğlu as his and the president’s chief foreign policy adviser with extended oversight and mandate. Consequently, the next best choice that Ankara has foregone was to focus exclusively on its socio-economic and cultural engagement with its immediate neighbors while pursuing a “behind-the-scenes” political engagement with them.

Davutoğlu’s role

These two next best choices, if taken, could have provided Turkey with a number of advantages. First of all, Professor Davutoğlu would not have been exposed to widespread and unfair criticism as the man behind Turkey’s alleged shift of axis from the West to the (Middle) East. Secondly, he would be able to deepen Turkey’s political engagement with its neighbors through silent (behind the scenes) diplomacy, which he had already proven effective when he spearheaded the secret talks between Syria and Israel. Thirdly, as an independent thinker, he would have enjoyed a wider freedom to make mistakes, since his every action and statement would not be under public scrutiny, while the opposite is the case as long as he is the foreign minister. In addition, free from the day-to-day and bureaucratic duties of a foreign minister, Davutoğlu would be in a better position to oversee not just the foreign ministry, but all elements of the state apparatus, improving Turkey’s foreign policy, both regionally and further afield. Moreover, mainly through civil society initiatives and people-to-people interactions, Ankara would have continued to pursue more socio-economic, cultural and humanitarian engagement with its immediate neighbors as well as its distant counterparts, while continuing its political engagement with them behind the scenes.

However, since Professor Davutoğlu became a foreign minister in 2009, not only has he brought the regional political engagements he was involved in to the fore, but also he has been exposed as a clear target for those looking for a scapegoat for every foreign policy move by Ankara that they find irritating. Furthermore, as a foreign minister, he came into a position where he has become both the mastermind and the chief executive of Turkey’s foreign policies; as a result, Turkey has started to rather more readily venture into certain political issues from which it would or could otherwise stay away. Similarly, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s sudden emergence on the international scene as an unusually passionate leader and his growing popularity in the Middle East as such may have led Prime Minister Erdoğan to feel obliged to weigh in on foreign policy issues more than he used to and more than he would do otherwise, thereby paving the way for a confrontational and emotional foreign policy approach. Plus, some leaders’ tendency for a selective reading of their history and nationalist myths that surround it may have led contemporary Ankara to aspire beyond what it can realistically achieve under the current circumstances and in the foreseeable future.

In the final analysis, as Prime Minister Erdoğan proceeds towards his third term in the office, there are a number of challenges that his government will be facing, probably the most formidable of which will be maintaining its popularity and credibility as a progressive democratic government as well as a reliable international and regional partner. Politically unrivaled and seasoned thanks to the past two terms, the AK Party government may naturally be tempted to be more assertive and unyielding. Moreover, in the face of consistent resistance from such EU capitals as Berlin and Paris to Turkey’s EU membership, the AK Party government may further disengage from Turkey’s quest for full membership. Similarly, Ankara’s interest in taking a publicly active role in the resolution of political turmoil in its neighborhood, such as a mediatory role between the Gaddafi regime and its opponents, may get Turkey unnecessarily bogged down in prolonged conflicts in which the real parties whose interests need to be reconciled are not actually the ones that are fighting. In light of these challenges, the upcoming parliamentary elections and his almost certain electoral victory provides Prime Minister Erdoğan with a unique opportunity compensate for the real and opportunity costs incurred by recent Turkish foreign policy during his second term in office.

[What is in it for the Americans?] A UN Resolution as a US Public Diplomacy Nullifier

2011-03-16T12:49:00.000-04:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 6 March 2011

Rumor has it that when Canadians travel abroad, especially in the Middle East and increasingly in Western Europe after the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq, they tend to wear something authentic to the distant corners of their country to recognize each other as true Canadians in foreign lands. The reason is that American tourists also wear outfits or accessories featuring the traditional Canadian maple leaf when traveling abroad to pose as Canadians and spare themselves from harsh reactions from locals or at least from unfriendly stares in countries where they travel.

On Feb. 18, when US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice raised her hand with a grin on her face to block the adoption of the Security Council resolution that condemned the illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, she created yet another reason for American tourists abroad to prefer outfits with the Canadian maple leaf. The resolution, which 127 countries co-sponsored and 14 members of the Security Council supported, was rejected only because the United States opposed it.

This result affects the United States in a much more negative way than it does Israel. From Casablanca to Jakarta, every single Muslim detests the United States for unconditionally, unfairly and shamelessly supporting Israel to the detriment of the Palestinians under any circumstances. At the same time, some of those very same people might even be admiring Israel for its ability to manipulate the US, a gigantic super power, to fulfill Israel’s each and every wish. In the end, it is not Israel but the US that gets the blame for the failure of every attempt to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The US government’s unconditional support for Israel

So, what is in it for the Americans? What benefit do they get from their government’s unconditional support for Israel? These questions have long occupied the minds of many Americans, including Jewish Americans. There is no point, however, in asking these questions, as it is a futile exercise given the emotional, religious and racial attachment of many US legislators and policy makers to the State of Israel. Whether such an attachment is good or not is one thing, but it is a reality that anyone has to take into account before expecting a favor from a sitting US government on any issue pertaining to Israel, or the Palestinian territories, for that matter. A Jewish American, Ami Kaufman of The Jerusalem Post, charges President Obama with keeping the “good old” paradigm of “Israel + US = everlasting occupation,” despite his promise of change. As is the case with the +972 Israeli online magazine, some go even further describing the situation rather harshly, as the Israeli occupation of the US Congress. By this token, so long as this occupation continues, so will the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. Similarly, some argue that even the Israeli Knesset is more critical of the Israeli government’s practices than the US Congress is, while others argue that certain legislators in the US Congress are more Israeli than American. Under these circumstances, it would be a pipe dream to expect President Obama to overhaul the traditional US position on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

Nevertheless, the decision to abstain on, if not support, the resolution in the Security Council was more of a strategic one. What did the American people earn when the US blocked the adoption of the Security Council resolution condemning illegal Israeli settlement activities? In fact, the US could have simply abstained and let the resolution pass, thereby adding only one more to many UN resolutions that have so far condemned illegal Israeli activities, and which Israel has apparently not cared a bit about. By so doing, the US could keep alive not only the hope that the Israel-Palestinian negotiations may eventually result in a sustainable peace, but also the hope for change, which President Obama promised to bring about.

One legitimate question may be whether the content of the resolution was something that the US was diametrically opposed to. The resolution reaffirmed that the “Israeli settlements established in the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, are illegal and constitute a major obstacle to the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace”; reiterated the “demand that Israel, the occupying power, immediately and completely ceases all settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and that it fully respect all of its legal obligations in this regard”; and urged the “intensification of international and regional diplomatic efforts to support and invigorate the peace process towards the achievement of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.” As such, the resolution, which was supported by the United Kingdom, France and Germany as well, did not seem to contradict the previously adopted UN resolutions.

Nor did Ambassador Rice criticize the content of the resolution when she explained the US opposition to it after the vote. Instead, she said that the US thought this resolution risked hardening the positions of the Israelis and the Palestinians, thereby encouraging them to stay away from direct negotiations. In this regard, it is important to note that while 129 states, the EU, the US and the International Court of Justice along with many Jewish Americans and Israelis call the Israeli settlements illegal, the official US statements call these settlements “illegitimate -- not authorized by law” as opposed to “illegal -- contrary to law, or forbidden by law.” Although she meticulously used the words and spoke delicately, what the entire world and all Arabs and Palestinians so bluntly saw was that the resolution failed only because the US vetoed it.

So, there remains only one possible explanation as to why the US is going to such an extent to humiliate itself before the international community when it comes to Israeli settlement activities, completely diminishing the hope for a new beginning between the US and Muslim communities around the world, which President Obama himself promised in his historic Cairo speech. In addition, when he stated during his address to the UN General Assembly in September 2010 that he wished to welcome Palestine as a sovereign state to the next opening of the General Assembly one year later, President Obama, the so-called “leader of the free world,” thrilled the Arabs. Yet, the recent US veto sent one clear message: No matter who the US president is and no matter what he or she says, it is Israel whom the US will side with. It is so, even if it is the Israel of the racist governments such as that of Benjamin Netanyahu and Avigdor Lieberman. That message multiplies any US public diplomacy effort by zero.

Finally, one should realize that what is sweeping the entire Arab world today is not a Facebook or Twitter revolution, but the Arab youth’s revolution, which they carry out through the use of Facebook, Twitter and all other sorts of technologies. It appears there is absolutely no reason to believe that this youth cannot and would not use the same frustration, anger, dynamism and skills to undermine US interests regionally and internationally, if they happen to believe that Washington will never, ever care about their concerns vis-à-vis Israel’s actions. So, what is in it for the Americans, when their government is made to look like it supports Israel blindly and unconditionally? A lot is there in quite a negative way.

[In the aftermath of the Third Arab Revolt] What can Turkey do for the Middle East's freedom-seeking peoples

2011-02-14T16:30:00.000-05:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, 14 February 2011

About a century ago, Arabs revolted against the Ottoman Empire in a campaign masterminded and guided by the Europeans in order to allegedly liberate themselves from the Turks. About half a century ago, Arabs revolted against the Europeans in a campaign led by nationalist Arab leaders in order to liberate themselves from their European colonizers.

Today, Arabs are revolting against their leaders in a campaign led by ordinary citizens in order to liberate themselves from leaders that have long been backed by the Europeans and the US -- and they have just deposed one in Egypt who had long seemed to be the most invincible. What is odd, if the foregoing is not, is that today Europeans are suggesting that Arabs should take Turkey as a model for development and democratization. A recent Financial Times editorial has suggested that the European governments help the Arab countries to evolve into free societies following the example of Turkey. Perhaps, it is better just to leave the Arabs alone, and let them figure out the best way forward for their countries.

However, the frequent references to the so-called Turkish model in the aftermath of the third Arab revolt have brought to the fore once again Turkey’s potential role in the democratic transformation of that region by presenting a model of success which has combined Islam and democracy. Can Turkey really serve as a model for the Arab countries in the Middle East?

Various commentators have readily suggested that the Egyptian generals follow the example of their Turkish counterparts without questioning whether it should be the army generals leading Egypt’s transition in the post-revolution period. Without implicitly condoning the meddling of the Turkish army, or of the Egyptian army for that matter, with politics, the United Kingdom’s former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David Miliband and Newsweek’s Fareed Zakaria suggested that the Egyptian generals emulate their Turkish counterparts in terms of stepping back into their barracks after their intervention in country’s political process. Similarly, Soner Çağaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy praised the Turkish military for serving as an effective restraint on the civilian governments.

As Steven Cook of the Council on Foreign Relations rightly put it, however, modernization and democratization in Turkey have developed not by the grace and leadership of the army, but despite the rogue elements within the army, which has traditionally dominated politics. Three-and-a-half different military coups, one of which led to the execution of a democratically elected prime minister and two ministers of his government on the charges of treason, speak well to that fact. So obviously, it is certain that with its historical attitude toward civilian governments, the Turkish military cannot set a commendable example for the armies in any of the Arab nations seeking democracy and freedom. Yet, it may certainly do so if it acknowledges its rightful place subordinate to the democratically elected civilian government, and acts accordingly. Thankfully, it seems to gradually be becoming the case in Turkey.

A model of success?

And how about the civilian governments of Turkey, and specifically the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government? Do they provide a model of success for the Arab governments? Is the AK Party government in a position to advise its Arab counterparts on the way forward toward creating democratic and free societies? It goes without saying that the civilian governments that ruled before the AK Party came to power and under the heavy control of the rogue elements within the Turkish military can present only bad examples for their counterparts in the region. After all, it was the complacency of these civilian governments that enabled those rogue elements to roll time back for Turkish democracy. Yet, the case seems somewhat different with regard to the AK Party government’s ability to present a model of success.

According to Robert Fisk of The Independent, Turkey, with the AK Party government at the helm, presents the ultimate success model where Islam and democracy coexist. Similarly, Joshua Walker of Brandeis University thinks that its unprecedented economic success and hyperactive diplomatic dynamism has brought Turkey back to the region, from which it has long remained detached, as “kingmaker.”

Probably, such optimistic views of the Turkish model have led Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to join President Barack Obama in calling upon Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to listen to the demands of the Egyptian people, do the right thing and step down. Perceiving it as interference in Egypt’s internal affairs, Cairo was quick to react to the prime minister’s advisory comment.

Whether such a call amounts to interference in another country’s internal affairs is open to interpretation. After all, as foreseen by the UN agreements, the protection and promotion of human rights transcend the national boundaries as the lack or violation of fundamental human rights constitute the core cause of extremism and violence, which consequently pose threats to regional and global security. However, such a reaction to the prime minister’s remarks clarifies one thing, and it is that the contemporary political structures of the Middle Eastern states do not tolerate any sort of political engagement with them that defies the regional and national status quos, which were established during the Cold War and are of either a patrimonial, nationalist or so-called Islamist nature. Nor will it be any different so long as the same political elites rule, even if the leader is no longer in control.

Under the current circumstances, the best Turkey can do for the freedom-seeking peoples of the Middle East is not to advise them on the way forward, but to re-energize its own political and economic reform process, which would ensure individual freedoms and respect for human rights, as well as respect for multiculturalism and minority rights to an extent that would dwarf even those available in the European countries. Doing so, Turkey will not only get the Arabs to question how Turkey has transformed itself in a period as short as a decade, but also inspire them to build their own types of democracy in a similar fashion. Today it is more obvious than ever that the Arabs who revolutionized their countries need, not advice, but inspiration, and they realize that they may suffer from the same problem a century from now unless they seize control of their countries today.

[Organization of the Islamic Conference] A Quest for Reform across the Muslim World

2011-02-11T17:02:00.000-05:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu
Today's Zaman, 24 January 2011

The despicable assassination in Pakistan of Punjab's provincial governor, allegedly due to his disparaging views on Islam, has once again prompted many to question what century they are living in. The heinous attack on the Coptic Christian Church in Egypt’s Alexandria by terrorists who either claim or are claimed to have done it in the name of Islam shows that multi-religious communities are not immune to incitements of violence. Similarly, in Tunisia the recent popular uprising because of socio-economic and political deprivation has led to the deaths of many civilians. These and many other unfortunate incidents taking place across what is dubbed the Muslim world make it ever more necessary for Muslims to proactively revisit their problems and come up with their own sustainable solutions. In this process, the onus is on reformist leaders, institutions and intergovernmental organizations, the most overarching one of which is the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, secretary-general of the OIC, has recently authored a book titled “The Islamic World in the New Century: The Organisation of the Islamic Conference.” It has been published respectively by Hurst & Company of London in Europe, and by the Columbia University Press in the United States. The book explains the historical formation of the organization, which prides itself on being the sole intergovernmental representative of the world’s Muslim population, and the process of transformation that this organization has gone through in terms of both its structure and vision. Since taking office in 2005, the OIC’s first elected secretary-general, İhsanoğlu, has led this organization through major changes such as the revision of its charter and the adoption of a Ten-Year Programme of Action. Yet the single most daunting challenge for him remains to be convincing its some 57 member states to transform their lofty pledges into actual and sustainable action when it comes to countering extremism, injecting higher doses of moderation into the fabric of societies, ensuring respect for freedom of expression, human rights, rights of religious minorities and gender equality and attaining democratic governance, rule of law and accountability. Beside the unprecedented reforms he has introduced, the extent of the pressure that he puts on OIC member states to deliver on those pledges will define İhsanoğlu’s legacy as the ninth secretary-general of the OIC.

Criticisms aimed at the OIC

Headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the OIC has long been criticized for being insignificant, if not incapable, in defending the interests of Muslims around the world, which it claims to be representing, as well as in resolving regional conflicts and in influencing the international decision-making process on regional or global matters. Naturally the harshest critics of the organization originate from societies who have high expectations of it. As İhsanoğlu acknowledges in the book, the OIC used to be heavy on rhetoric but less so on implementation. For the most of its history, it hardly remained relevant to the international system that it was supposed to be an active part of, and ideally influence. This failure resulted from a number of reasons, which included but were not limited to divergence among the member states politically, socio-economically, culturally and ideologically; cronyism in filling key administrative positions; lack of organizational vision commensurate with the changing international environment and globalization; and an underlying sense of reactive existence.

Ironically though, in recent years, the OIC has gained publicity and visibility in the Western media, especially in the United States, albeit increasingly negatively. It stems largely from the common tendency of normally distinct groups to demonize the OIC over their own concerns about the OIC-sponsored resolution titled “Combating Defamation of Religions.” Civil rights groups accuse the OIC of trying to restrict freedom of expression by criminalizing any derogatory comment on religions and their revered figures and personalities. Freedom House suggests that the OIC initiative is an attempt to reshape international human rights instruments by linking “insult on religion” with “incitement to hatred” against the adherents of that religion, and as such to criminalize opinion. It is also concerned that the revision of law in that direction at the international level would legitimize blasphemy laws at the national level, thereby leaving freedom of expression at the mercy of the national authorities in any given country.

Beside civil rights groups, anti-Islamist groups and individual Islamophobes have spared no effort to spread their phobia by the way of demonizing the OIC, its secretary-general and its member states on the basis of that resolution. Critics of the resolution, going beyond the scope of the resolution, referred to honor killings, wife beating and female genital mutilation, among other inhumane practices stemming from local tribal cultures, as Islamic practices. The OIC has become an easy target to demonize Islam through, and the most convenient scapegoat for every “misbehavior” committed around the world by Muslims, whether in the name of Islam or not. The fact that the OIC has been at the forefront during contentions, from the cartoon crisis in Denmark to the minaret ban in Switzerland, makes it an even easier target to attack.

Transformation at the hands of Ihsanoglu

Amid these tensions, Secretary-General İhsanoğlu’s structural and substantial overhaul of the OIC has gone mostly unnoticed both in the member and non-member states, if not deliberately ignored. Probably, his most important contribution was the shift of a paradigm that defines the very existence of the OIC. He has transformed the OIC’s institutional purpose of existence from the one that is defined by the past grievances of its member states and that aims to reactively guard against the repetitions as such, to the one that is future oriented and that aims to proactively make the Muslim world a constructive and integral part of the international community. Accordingly, under İhsanoğlu, the OIC has prioritized the improvement of the socio-economic, legal and political environment in OIC member states. He argues that the future of the Muslim world depends on the development of principles of good governance, together with the establishment of a tradition of pluralistic democratic practices, respect for human rights, empowerment of women, rule of law, transparency and accountability of the administrative authority. With the adoption of a new OIC Charter in 2008, these values and concepts have officially entered into the lexicon of OIC member states.

Observers and OIC officials acknowledge that Secretary-General İhsanoğlu was influential in the preparation of the new charter by providing guidance. The OIC General Secretariat sources cite the inclusion of an independent and permanent human rights commission as an OIC organ in the new charter as an example of the many innovations that would not have been possible without his leadership and persistence. Under the current circumstances, Secretary-General İhsanoğlu cannot be expected to pick on any OIC member state for its misconduct that paves the way for violations of human rights or an increase of religious extremism, just like the UN secretary-general is expected not to interfere in the domestic or foreign policies of UN member states. Understandably, he has to be aware of various sensitivities. However, at the same time he has to be vocally critical of such misconduct, even if doing so may make him less popular in the eyes of conservative elements of some OIC member states. There are a plethora of contentious issues from blasphemy laws to the treatment of homosexuals in which misconduct has so far not only tainted the image of OIC member states, but more importantly resulted in wider defamation of Islam. It is inconceivable that Islam does not provide solutions for these kinds of contentious issues, while it is the religion that enabled former slaves to lead nations some 1,400 years ago, whereas so-called beacons of democracy of our time have not received that level of inclusiveness and democracy even today. The OIC can greatly contribute to elucidating the true Islamic approach to any contemporary issue by revitalizing its subsidiary organ, the International Islamic Fiqh (Jurisprudence) Academy as an independent and scholarly institution, whose rulings are to be heeded by the entire Muslim world. It is quite promising that, as he indicates in the book, Secretary-General İhsanoğlu prioritizes the revitalization of the Fiqh Academy as an essential part of OIC reform.

The need for an Islamic Jurisprudence Authority

Current challenges faced by Muslim-majority countries, radicalization among Muslim youth in the West and the concurrent trend of Islamophobia, existence of radical elements to incite Muslim-Christian strife from the Philippines and Pakistan to Iraq, Egypt and all the way to West Africa necessitate the existence of a resourceful, proactive and moderate Islamic jurisprudence authority. In order to prove itself as a credible international organization, the OIC should assume wider and proactive roles in dealing with challenges and crises affecting the Muslim world. Secretary-General İhsanoğlu is said to have a strong conviction about the OIC’s responsibilities in this regard. He has been pushing the limits of existing mechanisms to encourage the OIC membership to devise comprehensive approaches, particularly for Somalia and Afghanistan, by taking into account the OIC’s comparative advantages.

In conclusion, the OIC symbolizes a colossal intergovernmental organization that has existed for more than 40 years, but only recently started to figure in international relations thanks to its reformist leadership. It has the potential to lead democratic change across the Muslim world and contribute to international peace and security. However, for that to happen, Secretary-General İhsanoğlu needs to be more of a general when it comes to convincing member states to deliver on their respective pledges to support the new reformist vision of the organization.

Otherwise, not only does the OIC run the risk of regressing back to oblivion once this reformist and visionary man completes his tenure, but the world community will also lose a formidable partner.

Turkey's Abdullah Gul should run for the UN Secretary General

2010-11-03T10:19:00.001-04:00

Op-Ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu,
Foreign Policy Magazine - 20 October 2010

The last month has clearly demonstrated how far Turkish diplomacy has come. The New York Times recently reported that no country was as outspoken as Turkey in terms of projecting a new image during the opening of the 65th U.N. General Assembly. But the Times was not applauding. Contrasting Turkish President Abdullah Gul's meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his unavailability to meet with Israeli President Shimon Peres, the paper portrayed Turkey as indifferent to U.S. efforts to reach peace in the Middle East and tackle the growing nuclear threat posed by Iran. On the other hand, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, with his head-spinning bilateral and multilateral meeting traffic, contributed to Turkey's assertive image as the new power broker in town.

Davutoglu has clearly been identified as the author of the new Turkish foreign policy orientation and subsequently his popularity has increased exponentially inside and outside Turkey. But if Turkey's new diplomatic clout is to be institutionalized, it will have to develop beyond the person of Davutoglu. Mobilizing the entire country for a commonly-appealing specific goal, such as the election of President Gul as U.N. secretary-general in 2016, will simultaneously institutionalize Turkish foreign policy while also moderating it.

Gul would make an excellent U.N. secretary-general, as he served as foreign minister, prime minister and president of a country which shares almost the entire U.N. agenda from promoting development in Africa to countering terrorism and incitement to hatred on the basis of religion and race. For the candidacy in 2016, Ankara would be required to pursue an intensive lobbying campaign not only at the U.N., but also in every capital represented at the U.N. This effort would temper Ankara's foreign policy as it should feel obliged not to disagree with the permanent members of the Security Council on issues that are sensitive to them. For instance, had such a campaign already been underway, Ankara would probably have avoided calling Beijing's handling of the riots in the East Turkistan genocide even if it had been the case. Ankara might have reacted in a less strident manner to the Israeli assault on the Mavi Marmara and the killing of Turkish civilians.

Such a role for a Turkish diplomat could also help Turkey cement it multifaceted policy in the foreign ministry bureaucracy as well. The current multidimensional foreign policy orientation or at least its current pace is unlikely to survive without the AK Party at the helm. In his article on theRadikal daily ("Davutoglu's ‘Self' Conception," 15 June 2010), Akif Beki, former adviser to PM Erdogan, argued that Davutoglu's policies were driven not by Turkey's national interests, but by an obsession with self-promotion. In fact, Turks should be thankful to Davutoglu, as the idea of a multidimensional Turkish foreign policy is certainly unprecedented. Yet, it is peculiar for this to have been exclusively associated with the current AK Party government and the foreign minister. Its sustainability and applicability have not yet been tested by a possible replacement of the current government. Besides, all three of the Republican Peoples Party (CHP), the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which are represented in the Turkish parliament, have their own ideological limitations that would bar them from embracing such a foreign policy orientation.

Gul's campaign for U.N. secretary-general would promote Turkey's ability to be a power broker while simultaneously forcing Ankara to rationalize its policies and avoid sentimentalism when dealing with sensitive issues. This would strengthen its legitimacy, increase its viability and help spare the popular Davutoglu from unfair allegations of self-promotion. In any event, even if Gul were not elected as the U.N. secretary-general, Turkey would benefit from the process in multiple ways.

[Deterrence] The Missing Dimension of Turkey's Multidimensional Foreign Policy

2010-10-14T15:15:00.000-04:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

The Washington Review, September 2010

The General Debate of the 65^thsession of the United Nations General Assembly next week is likely to be a milestone for Turkish diplomacy. In its capacity as the Chair, Turkey will be convening the Security Council at the heads of states and governments level to assess the UN’s role in maintaining international peace and security on September 23, and at the ministerial level to discuss global counterterrorism measures on September 27. Certainly, these are all the results of Turkey’s increased prominence, which is both cause and effect of Turkey’s burgeoning soft power. Ankara has never seemed as active and influential as it is today within the international community. But what does it really mean for Turkey? How independent is Ankara in terms of charting its own path within the realm of international diplomacy? Is its freedom in that regard at the mercy of the usual global and emerging regional powers?

“No country can warn Turkey or Turkish prime minister”, remarked recently Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu in order to stress that Turkey is as independent as it can be in terms of formulating and implementing its own foreign policies. Three days earlier, the British daily Financial Times (FT) had reported, “President Barack Obama personally warned Turkey’s prime minister that unless Ankara shifts its position on Israel and Iran, it stands little chance of obtaining the US weapons it wants to buy” referring to Turkey’s interest in purchasing American drone aircraft to fight the terrorist PKK (Kurdish Workers Party)”. The incident has already been forgotten, without creating any tension, once the White House spokesperson denied the FT report, and stated that no ultimatum was given to Turkey. Yet, it raises a number of questions regarding Turkey’s capabilities. Can Turkey sustain the growth of its soft power without attaining formidable hard power? Does it have sufficient deterrence capability to eliminate threats to such growth? Is soft power only sufficient vis-à-vis a potential foe with formidable hard power? Is Turkey really a country, as it currently stands, that no other country can warn, or impose its will onto, on the negotiation table? For instance, would the course of developments be the same in the aftermath of the infamous Israeli attack on the “Freedom Flotilla”?

Sources of Strength in Diplomacy

Technically, there are two sources strength for a country on the negotiation table: one, its ability to benefit; and the other, its ability to harm the other party. Accordingly, both kinds of abilities derive from that country’s hard and soft power. Given its destructive potential in the short and long term, a county should be primarily concerned with its counterpart’s ability to harm derived from its hard power meaning military/warfare capabilities. Similarly, given the high cost and risks associated with state-to-state military confrontation through the means of conventional warfare, a country like Turkey should be concerned by a potential foe’s unconventional (nuclear, chemical, biological, and cyber) warfare capabilities. Not less important is a potential foe’s psychological warfare capability deployed through the means of the media, lobbies, think tanks, and academia. Having these capabilities does not automatically make a country threat to Turkey. However, whether or not Turkey is equipped to counter any threat posed to it through such capabilities determines whether or not Turkey is a country that “can be warned”.

Nuclear weapons capability is not something that a nuclear power would openly threaten to use against a non-behaving counterpart. However, the non-behaving state with no nuclear weapons capability would always know its due boundaries vis-à-vis a nuclear power. The historical experience has demonstrated that nuclear powers have never attacked, and tend not to attack another nuclear power; but they have attacked, and are apparently prone to attacking non-nuclear powers even if they are signatories to all kinds of international treaties banning the use and possession of nuclear weapons. Currently, there are only a handful of nuclear powers and a nuclear “almost-there”, which include the United States, Russian Federation, China, United Kingdom, France, India, North Korea, Pakistan, Israel and Iran. Apparently, Turkey is not one of them.

Chemical and biological weapons are not unfortunately as symbolic as nuclear weapons. They do get to be used by either states or non-state actors such as terrorist networks, which might well be acting as proxies of those very states within the enemy states. Although these type of weapons are not frequently used by military units, even possibility of using them against civilian populations suffice to spread fear and sense of constant insecurity in the enemy state, especially in its metropolitan cities. Chemical and biological attacks can be used in order to terrorize a nation, and thereby disorient and destabilize its political process by diminishing public trust in the incumbent government’s ability to provide security and to govern.

Chemical and biological attacks do not have to be carried out against the civilian population in order to be fearsome. In most cases, they are carried out against the targeted nation’s agriculture and livestock in order to demoralize and impoverish people by rendering its vast lands inhabitable and non-arable. One infamous example of this tactic was the use of herbicides and defoliants by the US military with the tacit approval of then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Vietnam and Cambodia in 1960s. The purpose was to defoliate rural and forested lands, and hence deprive the guerillas of both food and cover. The impact, however, has gone far beyond the intent. Even today, half a century later, babies in these affected regions are born physically disoriented, missing their body parts, or with body parts misplaced. Today, in addition to the nuclear weapons states, even countries like Albania, Bulgaria, Israel, Poland, Netherlands, and Ukraine possess chemical and biological weapons, but Turkey does not.

Finally, for certain countries that have it, cyberwarfare capability has increasingly become the most formidable source of strength in their practice of diplomacy. Cyberwarfare is basically the act of a state or non-state actor to penetrate another state’s digital networks for multiple reasons, which include, but are not limited to, control, disruption, sabotage, manipulation, and espionage. In this regard, the primary points of attack in the targeted country would be telecommunication networks, electric grids, banking infrastructure, automated supply chains, government and military intelligence, Internet service providers, energy distribution lines, databases of major public and private companies etc. At the individual level, the cyberwarfare also include gathering intelligence about the private lives of the target country’s political and military leaders, which in turn becomes quite instrumental in manipulating those leaders and waging a systematic psychological warfare across the country.

Is Turkey Strong Enough Yet to Sustain Its Influence?

So, where does Turkey stand with respect to its ability to counter evolving security threats posed by unconventional warfare capabilities of other states? It is actually hard to know, but not so hard to predict whether Turkey is equipped to ably counter such threats. The website of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), where apparently two of the TAF priorities are respectively to count the number of both Turkish and foreign nationals visiting the Anitkabir (Ataturk’s mausoleum) and to teach proper use of Turkish language grammar, does not provide useful information to assess whether Turkey has sufficient defense capabilities in that regard. However, the scandals after scandals revealed in the recent months about the high-ranking army generals as well as the illegal networks nested within the army suggest that the Turkish Armed Forces is far from standing against any credible threat of nuclear, chemical-biological, cyber or psychological warfare.

These scandals include, but are not limited to, respectively the Daglica, Aktutun, and Hantepe incidents, during which the PKK terrorists raided the Turkish military outposts, slain in total 35 soldiers, kidnapped 12, and the Armed Forces failed to aid its ambushed soldiers. It has been later on revealed that the army failed to do so, despite the fact that not only the army had been provided with the relevant intelligence about the coming raids days before, but also during the Hantepe raid, 30 different military bases were streamlined real time video from the UAVs of the terrorist attacks which lasted for hours. Asked about the army’s failure to respond, while its fighter jets and helicopters could have reached the attacked post in only 7 minutes, and simply blow up the entire terrorist unit, the Chief of Army General Staff sufficed to state in a press release that the jets and helicopters did not took off to aid, “because the weather was cloudy and there was dust in the air”. The statement also noted that had they arrived at the point of attack, the helicopters would be under the risk of being shot down by the PKK’s heavy weapons.

Such a mind-boggling excuse actually makes it futile and embarrassing even to ask if Ankara is capable of countering possible nuclear, chemical-biological, or cyber attack posed against Turkey. Yet, one keeps wondering what Ankara’s options are, if any, under such circumstances. What would Ankara do for instance if a hostile capital threatened to use its nuclear arsenal in a final showdown with Turkey; if a biochemical agent such as anthrax or sarin gas was released to a crowded shopping mall in one of the metropolitan cities, and caused the death of hundreds; if such an attack was deliberately blamed on the PKK in an attempt to portray every Kurd as a potential terrorist and a security threat; and finally if the country’s telecommunication networks, electric grids, online banking infrastructure, automated supply chains, government and military intelligence, Internet service providers, energy distribution lines, databases of major public and private companies were all compromised. Under the current circumstances, Ankara does not seem to have many options.

Therefore, it is not really quite reasonable to assume that no other country can impose its will on Turkey, or admonish its leaders. Instead, a wiser course of action for a state with certain vulnerabilities such as Turkey would be to remain discrete about whatever it is not capable of doing, try doing whatever it is capable of, and seek ways to attain a deterrence capability commensurate with its aspirations. For that, reforming the Turkish armed forces with its all aspects would be a good point to start.

[Finding a Middle Way] Is an Islamic Center Necessary at Ground Zero?

2010-08-17T16:37:00.000-04:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, August 11, 2010

The controversy over the proposed construction of an Islamic center at Ground Zero, where once stood the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan, is growing with full speed.

It all started when the Cordoba Initiative, headed by American Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, applied to the New York City Council for a license to build an Islamic center and mosque only 180 meters from where, according to most of its opponents, the “Islamists” struck the hardest blow to America. The planned Islamic center is intended to function more like a community center which includes, in addition to a Muslim prayer room, a 500-seat auditorium, a theater, a performing arts center, a fitness center, a swimming pool and a food court serving halal dishes. The construction of this center, reportedly, is also aimed at eradicating the feelings of ill will generated by the memory of the 9/11 attacks, and promoting interfaith understanding.

Although the project has lofty intentions behind it, the way it has been perceived and portrayed not only signals more harm than good for interfaith understanding, but also raises suspicions as to whether it is yet another stage in the whole setup to increase interfaith discord, to the contrary of the naïve intentions of its proponents.

The reactions to the Ground Zero mosque vary greatly. The opponents have primarily argued that building a mosque where some 3,000 people died due to an act of “Islamist” terrorism would and does offend the loved ones of the dead. This feeling was obvious in some of the protest posters that read “A mosque at ground zero spits on the graves of 9/11 victims!” Giving political meaning to the project, some took it even further: “Building a mosque at Ground Zero is like building a memorial to Hitler at Auschwitz,” “You can build a mosque at Ground Zero when we can build a synagogue in Mecca,” “Mosques in NYC=200+, Synagogues, Churches in Mecca=0” and “Build Churches in Saudi Arabia!” Apparently, hoping to benefit from an already electrified atmosphere, some sought to serve a rather more nuanced agenda as well, carrying “Boycott Turkish goods and products.”

The source of funding for the project has also caused controversy. Opponents point to the fact that according to NBC and the New York Post Imam Feisal told a London-based Arabic language newspaper that he would seek funding from Muslim nations, whereas he earlier told American authorities that he would raise money from the local Muslim community. Recently, a Jewish organization, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), has joined the debate with a public announcement in which it argued that the proposed construction was neither an issue of rights, nor the right thing to do because it would cause more pain to the loved ones of those who perished in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Although the ADL president later on declared that they would not fight against the proposed mosque, he urged authorities to scrutinize the foreign sources of the funding.

On the other hand, the proponents of the mosque and those who condone its construction argue for the legitimacy of the project on the basis that just like Christians and Jews, Muslims living in New York are entitled to the right to build their places of worship so long as they do not violate the law. Among them, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg welcomed the mosque as an expression of freedom of religion exercised in the United States. Many others, including Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick, supported the construction, arguing that it would help dissociate Islam and peaceful Muslims from those terrorists who act in the name of Islam. Similarly, Rabbi Arthur Waskow of the Shalom Center said the mosque would stand as a living example that Islam is not a tradition of violence, but peace.

Nevertheless, the controversy is gradually turning into a national debate across the United States, attracting the reaction of opponents rather faster than that of supporters. In Florida, a priest and his followers protested outside a Florida mosque and started a Facebook page titled “International Burn a Koran Day.” The group is planning and inviting all to “burn the Koran on the property of Dove World Outreach Center in Gainesville, Florida, in remembrance of the fallen victims of 9/11 and to stand against the evil of Islam.”

So, what should one make of the brewing controversy over this proposed Islamic Center at Ground Zero in lower Manhattan? Is all what it seems to be? Or, could it yet be another move in a bigger design in the making to further damage relations between the West and the Muslim world?

It looks like the more of the same

Throughout the last decade the relationship between the West and the Muslim world has been tested and strained so many times over so many issues, both critical and trivial, that one cannot help but suspect the existence of a group of masterminds manipulating the masses on both sides, playing with them like mice in a lab and feeling overwhelming ecstasy every time those masses tear each other apart.

First, came the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on Sept. 11, allegedly by “Islamic” terrorists who cannot stand the “Western way of life,” and cannot tolerate “liberal democracy and freedom.” Then, came the “normal reaction” of the two military invasions: one of Afghanistan, which reportedly aimed to pre-empt another terrorist attack on American soil, and the other of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which aimed to eliminate an existential threat to the “free world” posed by weapons of mass destruction that had in fact never existed. Once the general framework is set up, the rest has only to follow.

On the one hand, the increased sense of insecurity in the West, particularly in the United States, has occasionally turned into paranoia and fed racist and xenophobic sentiments against Muslims. On the other hand, the skyrocketing number of Afghan and Iraqi casualties, which was never even seriously counted, fanned the growing hatred across the “Muslim world” against the United States and its accomplice, the United Kingdom. The Abu-Ghraib and Guantanamo tortures were followed by the London and Madrid bombings. In the meantime, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continued like business as usual. Ariel Sharon’s Israel fought with Hezbullah of Lebanon in 2006 when the latter fired rockets into Israeli border towns and snatched two Israeli soldiers. Ehud Olmert’s Israel invaded Gaza in the last days of 2008 in response to the rockets fired into Israeli border towns from Gaza and in order to rescue the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. The invasion left some 1,400 Palestinians dead under the watch of the US, thereby further inflaming the hatred against the latter.

On the intellectual front of the “West-Muslim world” battle, the situation has not been much different. In the Netherlands of the “free world,” the director Theo van Gogh was assassinated in 2004 by an “Islamist” because he produced the film “Submission,” which was critical of the treatment of women in Islam. In Denmark of the “free world,” the cartoonist Kurt Westergaard barely survived an axe attack in 2005 by another “Islamist” because he had earlier drawn 12 insulting cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. In 2008, Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders sparked another wave of reaction from the “Islamists” that do not belong to the “free world” when he released “Fitna,” a short film arguing that Islam encourages acts of terrorism and violence against women. Lately, France of the “free world” is likely to take the lead in sparking violent extremism among the “Islamists” as it bans Islamic headscarves in public spaces and continues to set an undemocratic example for other European states of the “free world” that are likely to follow suit.

So, given this sequence of unfortunate events that has strained relations between the West and the Muslim world in the last decade, how should one interpret the latest controversy over the proposed mosque at Ground Zero? One thing is certain: When such a mosque is eventually built as planned, it should not be a surprise to anyone if Christian and Jewish groups living in majority Muslim countries claim their rights to build places of worship and similar religious centers for their communities. While they have every right to do so, it is also obvious that almost none of those Muslim majority countries are prepared and open enough to reciprocate the gesture, unless they undertake dramatic reforms in the realm of freedom of expression and freedom of religion. For that matter, it should not be surprise, either, if “an extremist Christian American who could no longer bear the haunting burden of his loss on 9/11” bombs the Islamic center only to incite further violence from the so-called Muslim world. At the end of the day, the eventual construction of the mosque at Ground Zero is likely to spark further tension between the so-called West and the Muslim world under the current circumstances.

How about an interfaith center instead of an Islamic one?
Yet, the question persists: Is it necessary to build an Islamic center or a mosque at Ground Zero? Not really. In fact, it may be even counterproductive to do so given the bitter controversy it has already sparked.

However, what is urgently necessary is to build proper venues for Muslims to perform their daily prayers as well as the weekly Friday prayer. According to a New York Daily News report, today more than half a million Muslims live in New York City, including 10 percent of all public school children and more than 1,000 Muslim officers in the New York Police Department. One should also add to this the number of Muslim immigrant workers and visitors. As their number grow, it becomes harder and harder for the Muslims of New York City to perform their daily or Friday prayers in warehouses, building basements, or outside on the sidewalks. Muslims have been part and parcel of New York City ever since 1840 when the first Muslim immigration to the US started with the Yemenites and Arabs of the Ottoman Empire. As they continue to be part of and contribute to the prosperity of American society, Muslim-Americans in cooperation with the authorities should establish proper worship places all around New York City instead of symbolic mosques in symbolic locations. As for the proposed Islamic center at Ground Zero, it would be much better if it was turned into an “interfaith center” with the exact same amenities plus Christian, Jewish, Hindu and Buddhist worship places.

[Freedom to Make Mistakes] Is Turkey's Ahmet Davutoglu Infallible?

2010-08-02T00:57:00.002-04:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, July 20, 2010

Turkey's foreign policy achievements in the last eight years have mesmerized most Turks and some outside admirers so successfully and raised their expectations so high that it has consequently and unfortunately diminished Ankara's and, most notably, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's, freedom to fail, or freedom to make mistakes in either formulation or implementation of the country's foreign policy.

Now it is harder for the government to step back from certain foreign policy moves, even if it becomes apparent that they are not helpful. This development is an unhealthy and destructive one for the fate of Turkey's foreign relations, and for both its regional and global image. It misleadingly portrays the country not only as a regional hegemonic aspirant seeking to revive its imperial heritage, but also as a whimsical and irrational actor that is willing to readily risk its long established diplomatic relations with its partners. In addition, such excessive admiration, without due criticism, of the AK Party government's foreign policy not only pushes its leadership to have a relatively higher opinion of itself, but also makes it vulnerable to both internal and external manipulation.

Turkish foreign policy in recent years has been marked by souring Turkish-Israeli relations, which followed Israel's invasion of Gaza in January 2009, continued with the infamous Davos incident and reached its apex when Israeli soldiers killed eight Turkish citizens and one Turkish-American in international waters on May 31, 2010. The changing nature of Turkish-Israeli relations and the way Ankara handles this change provide a unique case to assess the AK Party government's performance in managing Turkey's foreign relations, and to predict its future.

Who's Ahmet Davutoğlu? What's extraordinary about him, if anything?

Any attempt to make such an assessment, however, should follow a clear understanding of who the Turkish foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, is, because of his central role in both the formulation and implementation of Turkey's response to Israel.

Turkey's foreign minister is most widely known both inside and outside the country as the man who has been trying to restructure Turkish foreign policy according to the so-called "zero problem with neighbors" principle. Theoretically, this is not a groundbreaking idea that would suffice to distinguish him, because that principle had already been enshrined the famous quote of Atatürk, the first president of the Turkish Republic, "Peace at home, peace abroad." Oddly enough, however, the republican elite that hastily isolated Atatürk in his last years and took absolute control over state affairs immediately after his death used the very same quote in order to rein in Turkish diplomacy. This elite created a paranoid foreign relations approach that perceived every state (except Israel after 1948) as an existential threat to Turkey. With his multidimensional foreign policy approach viewing every state as a potential ally, unless proven otherwise, Davutoğlu seems to be undoing this paranoid perception by reaching out not only to the West, but also to the East, not only to the Bosnian Muslims, but also to the Serbian Orthodox Christians. In that regard, he may be considered as the one who is for the first time endeavoring to fulfill Atatürk's vision for Turkish foreign policy.

Simply speaking, Davutoğlu is just an ordinary academic and a relatively observant Muslim, turned into a politician. There are and will be many people like this as Turkey progresses into this century. One has to admit, though, that this is quite a strange practice for Turkey, while it has been a long-established tradition in democratic countries. Throughout the history of the republic, one had to be a high-ranking army general, or at least a civilian of the secular-fundamentalist breed, in order to somehow influence the country's foreign policy. Although Davutoğlu is first of his kind, he is still ordinary in the sense of what he has been doing.

However, what is extraordinary about Davutoğlu, compared to either his Turkish predecessors or foreign counterparts, is his apparent passion for actively involving himself in all dimensions of international politics, and to restructure it by redefining the fundamental theories of international relations. He seems to be attempting a mental transformation of states from a purely “selfish national interest" conception to one of "altruistic national interest" as the fundamental driving force of foreign policy decision-making. In his rhetoric and practice, the notions of the collective interests of states and justice outweigh the notion of selfish national interest.

That is, if there are two options for a state to pursue -- one, a higher gain which may harm the wellbeing of another nation, and the other, a relatively lower gain which may benefit another nation, or at least not harm it -- then that state actor should pursue the second option. This way of thinking may be the reason why Davutoğlu is trying to integrate Armenia into the economic structure of the Caucasus, instead of further weakening Armenia's already impoverished economy by exclusively cooperating with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Again, this may be why he encourages cooperation between Bosnia and Serbia, instead of boosting relations exclusively with Muslim Bosnians and isolating the Serbs, who a little more than a decade ago perpetrated the Bosnian genocide under the watch of EU heavy weights like France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. So, given the pattern of his preferences, Davutoğlu seems to be a rational man who thinks Turkey's national interests are truly secured only if its neighbors' interests are also secured, and who seeks to build partnerships instead of pursing old animosities.

Then, what is the problem with Israel? Why did Davutoğlu suggest that Turkey would cut off its diplomatic relations with Israel unless the latter officially apologizes for the deliberate killing of eight Turkish citizens and one Turkish-American by Israeli soldiers? Was it a mistake to do so?

Ankara's reaction to Israel's aggression: What else would it be?

In his address to the United Nations Security Council, Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu appealed to the UN secretary-general to set up an international committee to investigate the attack. In addition, Davutoğlu urged Israel to immediately release all the civilians who survived the Israeli attack, return the Mavi Marmara to Turkey, pay compensation for those killed and officially apologize to Turkey. For the time being, the Netanyahu government has met none of these demands, except for releasing the survivors upon Washington's unofficial ultimatum. As time passes without any concrete progress with regard to the international investigation, Davutoğlu may have wanted to imply that the Israeli leaders would not be able to get away easily with Turkish blood on their hands.

However, it was a major mistake to announce that Turkey would ever cut off its diplomatic relations with Israel. While any democratically elected government in Ankara holds a legitimate right to cut off those relations, whether it can freely exercise that right depends on a number of domestic and international factors. Aside from that, Israel is actually way too important of a regional neighbor for Turkey to cut off relations with, because it currently controls areas even more important than itself.

Therefore, instead of cutting off its relations with Tel Aviv, Ankara may want to consider promoting a "balanced" and "mutually beneficial" Turkish-Israeli relationship. There are a number of areas where Turkey can do so. Traditionally, Turkey has been the second most preferred tourism destination for Israelis after the United States, averaging about 300,000 Israeli tourists per year. Davutoğlu should insist that Tel Aviv eliminate visa requirements for Turks visiting Israel, and accordingly encourage Turks to visit Israel, especially Jerusalem, every year to balance the Israeli tourist inflow to Turkey. Just like the Israelis visiting Turkey, the Turks visiting Israel too should be able to obtain a visa at the airport without any obstacles or questions. Similarly, he should insist on regulations that would ease the establishment of Turkish NGOs and businesses in both East and West Jerusalem or elsewhere in Israel.

In addition, Ankara should minimize its military relationship with Israel as much as possible, be it arms purchases, military equipment overhaul contracts or joint military maneuvers. Under the current circumstances, Turkey lacks the technological expertise to balance its military purchases with similar military sales to Israel. Nor would it be appropriate to do so even if it could, given continuous Israeli offensives against Turkey's Arab allies in the region. Hence, such an imbalanced military relationship negatively affects Turkey's neutrality towards Israel and its Arab neighbors, thereby eliminating its ability to be an impartial mediator between the two.

While promoting a “balanced” and “mutually beneficial” Turkish-Israeli relationship, Ankara should engage with the Israeli President Shimon Peres instead of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Minister of Industry, Trade and Labour Binyamin Ben-Eliezer instead of Minister of Foreign Affairs Avigdor Lieberman, since both Netanyahu and Lieberman are apparently either indifferent or incapable of developing friendly relations with Turkey. In the meantime, the Turks should give their foreign minister the freedom to make mistakes and a chance to correct them with a completely different, and at times opposite, course of action if necessary. Otherwise, not only his reputation as the architect of Turkey's multidimensional foreign policy vision, but also his and his successors' ability to pursue such a vision will be dramatically diminished by domestic and international factors.

[Rethinking Turkish Politics] Has Turkey gone too far over Gaza?

2010-08-02T00:51:00.005-04:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, June 13, 2010

In diplomacy, there is a fine line between credibility and incredibility, between the serious and the ridiculous. Recently, over the tragic fate of Gaza, Turkey was made to walk that fine line, when the genuine but unwise and untimely humanitarian mission triggered an inhumane action by Israeli forces. The ensuing popular reactions to the killing of nine Turkish citizens by Israeli commandos, and the tendency of some groups, both inside and outside Turkey, to exploit these reactions to bolster an Islamist rhetoric, anti-Semitism and a false image of Turkish guardianship over the Middle East have marred Turkey's genuine diplomatic efforts in the aftermath of those killings.

The question is: Why did Turkey do what it did? And, has Turkish foreign policy already lost its credibility?

What was Ankara outraged about?

Ankara was naturally outraged by Israel's brutal reaction to the humanitarian aid mission to Gaza. The Israeli commandos' killing of Turkish citizens demanded Ankara's immediate attention to the matter. In his address to the UN Security Council, which convened that day in emergency session, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu did not defend the aid activists' right to break Israel's unlawful blockade on Gaza, nor did he advocate the legitimacy of the Humanitarian Aid Foundation (İHH)-organized flotilla, but condemned Israel's killing and injuring of civilians in international waters with total and shameless disregard for international law.

Davutoğlu underlined that “the Israeli Defense Forces [IDF] stormed a multinational, civilian endeavor carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza in international waters -- 72 nautical miles off the coast to be exact -- killing and wounding many civilians. This action was uncalled for. [The] Israeli actions constitute a grave breach of international law.” He further condemned the Israeli government's banditry and piracy: “It is murder conducted by a state. It has no excuses, no justification whatsoever. A nation-state that follows this path has lost its legitimacy as a respectful member of the international community.” He also deplored Israel's inappropriate and disproportionate use of force against civilians. Israel's action is also a violation of international law as well as of international humanitarian law, which ensures the protection of civilians even during wartime.

So, in response to Israel's criminal act, Ankara did not seek military action to punish Israel but urged the international community and the United Nations to take appropriate action immediately. In this regard, Turkey was not the sole country, but one of many states within the international community, doing just that. Davutoğlu stressed that: (1) An urgent inquiry must be undertaken; (2) Appropriate international legal action must immediately be taken against the perpetrators of and authorities responsible for this aggression; (3) A strong sense of disappointment and warning must be issued by the United Nations. Israel must be urged to abide by international law and basic human rights; (4) The countries concerned must be allowed to retrieve their deceased and wounded immediately; (5) The ships must be expressly released and allowed to deliver the humanitarian assistance to its destination; (6) The families of the deceased, wounded, NGOs and shipping companies concerned must be compensated to the full extent; (7) The blockade of Gaza must be ended immediately and all humanitarian assistance must be allowed in; and, finally, (8) Gaza must be made an example by swiftly developing it, to make it a region of peace. So, Ankara only sought to exercise its legitimate rights under international law to protect its citizens as well as the citizens of other nationalities harmed by Israel's criminal act.

Ankara should also have been outraged by the fact that out of all six aid ships only the one carrying Turks was raided by Israeli commandos and that the soldiers reportedly killed the Turkish activists while uttering derisive “One minute! One minute!” slogans in mockery of Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan's outburst at Israeli President Shimon Peres at the infamous Davos forum.

So Ankara had already had enough reason to be outraged and to do what it did. However, just as the anti-Semites sought to exploit this crisis to incite hatred against Jews and Israel, some inside and outside Israel rushed to exploit Ankara's reaction in order to demonize the current Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government in Turkey. In his article titled “Erdoğan and the Decline of the Turks,” Robert Pollock of The Wall Street Journal alleges that the flotilla could not have been organized without the approval of Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan, who, Pollock says, cannot “bring himself to condemn a fictional blood libel [that the organs of the dead Iraqis were being shipped to Israel].” At the expense of embarrassing himself, Pollock argues in the same article that Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu calls on Turkey to loosen ties with the West, including with the US, NATO and the European Union. In his article titled “Flotilla raid offers Israel a learning opportunity,” David Ignatius of The Washington Post suggests that Turkey is “a more dangerous foe than Hamas” for Israel, and that Prime Minister Erdoğan is “a Muslim populist with a charismatic message” and “a genuinely tough if erratic rival” whereas Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is “often a buffoon.” In his interview with Pat Robertson on CBN News, Daniel Pipes of the Middle East Forum said, “Turkey is no longer ‘our' [the United States'] ally, but an opponent of the United States.”

Nevertheless, the very fact that many Jews both inside and outside Turkey as well as in the United States joined others to protest the Israeli attack on the humanitarian aid flotilla justifies Ankara's reaction in the aftermath of Israel's terrorist attack in international waters. Yet, understanding the true reasons behind Ankara's reaction is only one part of the assessment as to whether Turkey has gone too far over Gaza, and the answer to this part of the question is that Ankara has not gone too far but only carried out its natural duty to pursue justice and hold Israel accountable for its crime.

What has the flotilla accomplished?

The second part of the assessment is about the original idea of organizing a humanitarian aid flotilla to break the unlawful Israeli blockade of Gaza. The question is whether it was the right thing to do in the first place in order to bring aid to Gaza, or to lift the blockade altogether, for that matter. How reasonable was it for an NGO or for a group of NGOs to defy the authority of a sovereign state, whether or not this is a legitimate authority? What would it accomplish in favor of the Palestinians in Gaza? Would it better highlight the plight of the Palestinians suffering under the Israeli blockade to the world? Or, would it demonstrate how brutal and unlawful Israeli practices were?

There is nothing justifiable about the heinous Israeli attack on the peace activists. The Israeli commandos raiding the Mavi Marmara and did not hesitate to shoot a 19-year-old US citizen of Turkish origin in the head five times. The Israeli commandos did not hesitate to shoot an Indonesian doctor treating one of those commandos injured during the raid four times in the stomach. Nor did they refrain from taking hostage a 1-year-old baby and using him as a means to psychologically torture his parents. Nor did Israel's so-called defense forces refrain from using cluster bombs of phosphorus to burn and kill Palestinian children during Israel's December 2008-January 2009 invasion of Gaza.

No matter how brutal Israel is to the Palestinians, the best way to help the Palestinians in either the West Bank or in Gaza is to work through legitimate means, even if one has to engage with an illegitimate authority to do that. The İHH president stressed that they could not trust the Israeli authorities to distribute the aid in Gaza. They did not have to. They could have delivered the aid to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for distribution or worked it out with the Red Crescent. Similarly, they could have worked with the Egyptian authorities, if not the Israelis, to find ways to deliver the aid to Gaza. It was not necessary to try to break the unlawful Israeli blockade to deliver the aid. If, however, the only goal was to break the blockade, the flotilla would not do that, either.

The way forward

According to the Lebanese newspaper al-Mustaqbal, the Turkish prime minister has been “weighing the possibility of travelling to the Gaza Strip in order to break the Israeli blockade on Gaza, and even informed the US of his intention to ask the Turkish Navy to accompany another aid flotilla to Gaza.” Though such a plan has not been confirmed by the prime minister, and this could be just another piece of disinformation spread about his government, realizing such a plan would not only be disastrous for stability in the region and for prospects of proximity talks between the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority but also political suicide for Prime Minister Erdoğan and his AK Party government. It would eliminate Turkey's prospects for EU membership -- at least with the AK Party government in office. Turkey has not gone too far over Gaza, but if it attempts to fulfill such a wild plan, it will really have gone too far. There is no need to even mention its possible impact on US-Turkish relations because there would be none in existence.

[Rethinking Israeli Politics] Does Israel Need a Foreign Minister?

2010-08-02T00:40:00.003-04:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, June 05, 2010

The never-ending row between Turkey and Israel’s Likud government under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has escalated to a whole new level since Israeli commandos raided the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish humanitarian aid ship headed to Gaza, in international waters, killing nine Turkish citizens and injuring 38 others.

Immediately after the unfortunate incident Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu convened the United Nations Security Council for an emergency meeting to discuss the matter. Similarly, at the Turkish foreign minister’s initiative, the NATO council gathered and, along with its condemnation, urged Israel to release all the participants in the Freedom Flotilla captured during the raid. Moreover, the Organization of the Islamic Conference’s (OIC) executive council convened to formulate the 57 member states’ common response to Israel’s aggression. Concurrently, the Arab League member states also convened to condemn the Israeli attack on the humanitarian aid ships headed to the Gaza Strip, which has long suffered under the Israeli blockade. All major international and regional organizations unequivocally condemned Israel, demanded the immediate release of the captured and insisting on a thorough investigation into the raid.

The Israeli foreign minister, on the other hand, remained rather silent on the day of the raid. The next day, in a phone call to the UN secretary-general, Avigdor Lieberman complained about the international community’s reaction. “The hypocrisy and double standards taking root in the international community regarding Israel is to be regretted,” he lamented. “In the past month alone 500 people were killed in various incidents in Thailand, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and India, while the international community remained silent and passive and generally ignored the occurrences, while Israel is condemned for unmistakably defensive actions,” he continued. “The subject of yesterday’s incident was the basic right of Israeli soldiers to defend themselves against an attack by a gang of thugs and terror supporters who had prepared clubs, metal crowbars and knives in advance of the confrontation.”

This time, even the US administration was unable to defend the Israeli government’s actions. The State Department announced that contrary to what was argued by the Israeli officials, there was no tie between the Humanitarian Aid Foundation (İHH) and al-Qaeda. Similarly, the Obama administration said the Israeli blockade on Gaza was no longer sustainable and that the Israeli government had to develop another approach regarding Gaza.

All in all, the way the Israeli government managed -- or, more accurately, mismanaged -- this international crisis has raised questions not only about the viability and legitimacy of the Israeli blockade on Gaza, but also about the utility of the Israeli foreign minister. After all, whatever Israel does directly impacts the non-Israeli Jews around the world as well as the Israeli Jews, and the Israeli foreign minister is the primary person who is supposed to be capable of determining the nature of that impact.

Non-Israeli Jews between a rock and a hard place

Aside from the Palestinians themselves, the group most affected by Israel’s unrelenting aggression is Jews who do not condone Israel’s hawkish policies. On the one hand, both liberal and Orthodox Jews around the world and especially in the United States have raised their opposition to the brutal policies of consecutive Israeli governments toward the Palestinians living either in the West Bank or in Gaza. When Israeli troops invaded Gaza in the first days of 2009 and killed some 1,400 civilians, mostly women and children, among those crying out against Israel’s invasion were prominent Jewish scholars and opinion leaders. Similarly, they joined the masses in condemning Israel’s destructive blockade of Gaza, which has long nurtured instability in the region and paralyzed the so-called peace process between Israelis and Palestinians. Again, most recently, when the Israeli commandos attacked the humanitarian aid flotilla headed to Gaza, Jews -- in Turkey, the US, Europe and elsewhere -- were among the first to condemn Israel. They too joined the masses in front of Israel’s embassies to protest Israeli piracy and banditry in international waters.

On the other hand, the very same Jews around the world and in the United States have long been victimized by the common antipathy rapidly growing against Jews due to successive Israeli governments’ constant breach of international laws and norms, complete heedlessness of international public opinion and continued violence unleashed upon Palestinian civilians. This phenomenon in a way resembles the pitiful case of Muslims around the world who are reduced to potential suspects allegedly sympathizing with such terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban. However just as the terrorist nature and activities of al-Qaeda and the Taliban should not define Muslims in general, those of the Israeli government should not determine the common public perception of Jews, wherever they may be.

It is questionable, though, to what extent it is possible under the current circumstances for an ordinary man on the street to distinguish between hawkish and dovish Jews. Either hawkish or dovish, and regardless of their nationality/citizenry, all Jews seem to be staunch supporters of the state of Israel (though not necessarily its every policy), although Israel is simply another state/country other than their own. Imagine a Country X whose senators, congressmen, ministers and ordinary parliamentarians do not shy away from publicly prioritizing the interests of Israel over those of Country X. Imagine a Country X where those in charge make substantial cutbacks in funding to educational, scientific and social programs that benefit their very Country Xians while they either cannot or do not even think about slightly holding back Country X’s monetary, military and all other forms of assistance to Israel. And imagine a Country X where politicians categorically reject any policy proposal, even if it greatly serves the interests of Country X, unless they serve those of Israel, let alone considering conflict against them. Or imagine a Country X where the non-Jewish Country Xians are scared to death to say anything negative about Israel due to their fear of losing their public, private or academic positions on the grounds of allegedly being anti-Semitic. It is quite difficult to distinguish between those extremists that condone every act of aggression and terrorism for the sake of the so-called Jewish state from those extremists like the al-Qaeda and Taliban bandits who perpetrate every kind of aggression and terrorism in the name of the so-called Islamic state. What is the difference? One blows up a hotel with hundreds of innocent civilians in it just to punish those officials who oppose the establishment of the so-called Jewish state and the other blows up a bus full of innocent civilians in order to spread the sense of fear among those who oppose the establishment of a so-called Islamic state.

It is equally difficult to discern where the real loyalty of Country X’s Jews lie, when some of them rush to suffocate Country X’s relationship with its allies every time the latter encounters a problem with Israel, even if doing so would be detrimental to the interests of Country X. In such cases, a propaganda machine starts to run at full force. The latest crisis between Turkey and Israel is just one example of this. All of a sudden, so-called op-ed pieces by so-called Turkey experts from so-called prominent think tanks started to appear in the so-called foreign policy journals, reminding Country Xians of the “Islamist” roots of the Turkish government and seeking to sow seeds of discord among Turkish leaders by seemingly praising one while smearing the other. Similarly, so-called prominent columnists of so-called newspapers of record started to propagate the false argument that Turkey is a more dangerous enemy to Country X and Israel than Hamas is.

So, the situation has always been quite complicated for non-Israeli Jews. As such, it becomes an ever more critical question as to whether Israel should have a foreign minister and what kind of foreign minister Israel should have, because he or she is in a position to determine what kind of impact that complicated situation would have on public opinion not only about Israel, but also about the non-Israeli Jews around the world.

The kind of foreign minister Israel needs

Given the unchecked and abundant political, military and financial support it is receiving from states such as Country X, one may be tempted to conclude that Israel does not really need a foreign minister that has to explain Israel’s actions to and foster friendships within the international community. Moreover, recalling the example of the former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who reportedly once told his Syrian counterpart seeking US intervention to stop the so-called Six-Day war between Israel and Egypt-Jordan-Syria that “we do not have any problem with the war going on, so long as Israel is the one winning it,” some may actually suggest that Israel already has more than one foreign minister.

However, given the magnitude of the troubles the consecutive Israeli governments have been creating not only for the Palestinians, but also for Jews around the world and for the international community in general, Israel needs not a foreign minister, but perhaps a group of foreign ministers. A group of foreign ministers whose sole responsibility would be to foster constructive relations with Israel’s immediate neighbors in particular and with the international community in general. A group of foreign ministers who would formulate long-term constructive foreign policies that would help Israel be accepted as an ordinary and legitimate member of the international community. Again, a group of foreign ministers who would earn Israel’s right to exist through gaining the consent of other countries, not through squandering the political and economic resources of a few countries such as Country X.

It is only obvious toward that end that Lieberman is completely useless as foreign minister of Israel. As a matter of fact, Lieberman as a foreign minister is quite detrimental to the interests of Israel as well as of the non-Israeli Jews who feel somehow connected to the state of Israel. Perhaps Prime Minister Netanyahu too subscribes to the idea that Israel does not really need a foreign minister and that is why he left an otherwise very important post in his cabinet to Mr. Lieberman.

[Choosing the Lesser Evil] Nuclear Balance of Power vs. Perpetual Conflict in the Middle East

2010-06-05T13:38:00.003-04:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, May 24-25, 2010

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Brazilian President Lula da Silva have finally managed to convince their Iranian counterpart, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to agree on the UN-brokered nuclear swap deal.

Thanks to the unwavering efforts of their respective foreign ministers, Ahmet Davutoğlu and Celso Amorim, and days of negotiations, Tehran agreed to abide by the agreement, according to which Iran will ship its low-enriched uranium to a third country (Turkey) in exchange for enriched uranium. This deal would prevent Iran from enriching its uranium to a high level, but at the same time, Iran would be able to use the enriched nuclear fuel it receives to produce medical isotopes for civilian purposes. The agreement with Iran was apparently the easiest part of the task in defusing the escalation over Iran’s controversial nuclear program.

What seems to be more difficult, perhaps even unlikely, is convincing the US-led Western troika (US-UK-France) within the UN Security Council to heed that agreement. Although the agreement is exactly what was proposed by the United Nations to Iran some seven months ago, the Obama administration was quick to view, and hence dismiss, it as Iran’s opportunism to avoid a fourth round of UN sanctions without making any real concessions on its nuclear program. The US secretary of state had already suggested earlier that Brazil and Turkey’s efforts to find a diplomatic solution would fail anyway.

On the other hand, Russia has not yet commented on the deal. Russian diplomats say it is too early to do so before knowing the details of the agreement. However, another UN Security Council member, China, which is capable of vetoing any sanction resolution, has welcomed the agreement as a positive development paving the way to further interaction between the international community and Iran for a sustainable solution. Going even further, Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu voiced the opinion that there was no longer a need for the UN sanctions against Iran, given that Tehran has already accepted the UN-proposed nuclear swap agreement.

Yet, the latest announcement by US Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton only two days after the Brazil-Turkey-Iran agreement indicates that the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program is far, if not farther than before, from being resolved. Testifying to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Clinton said: “We have reached agreement on a strong draft [on the fourth round of UN sanctions against Iran] with the cooperation of both Russia and China. … I think this announcement is as convincing an answer to the efforts undertaken in Tehran over the last few days as we could provide.” The announcement is certainly a blow to Ankara and Brasilia’s efforts. Or more figuratively, it is a big fat slap in the faces of both the Turkish and Brazilian leaders for daring to oppose the P5+1 engineered sanctions against Iran.

As the case now stands, it is unclear whether the Brazil-Turkey-Iran agreement will even be implemented. What is crystal clear though is that the way the US handles the issue will certainly polarize the international community over the sanctions against Iran and tilt the global public opinion in favor of Iran. In addition, Washington’s apparent obsession with the sanctions will further strengthen the widely held belief that the US administration is simply pursuing Israel’s agenda against Iran, as it did almost a decade ago against Iraq. Ironically, it seems, the US is pressuring Iran, a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory, on its alleged attempts to acquire nuclear weapons, while it is providing nuclear assistance to Israel, a nuclear weapons possessor and a non-NPT signatory. The irony is not the US’ pressure on Iran, but its silence on Israel’s apparent nuclear arsenal, and even worse, its continuing nuclear assistance to Israel while the latter continues its absolute defiance of the NPT.

The looming feud over Iran’s controversial nuclear program between the P5+1 and basically the rest of the international community may actually be the starkest indication of the necessity of revising the global security doctrine, which has been embodied within the nuclear non-proliferation principle. Where nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is not verifiably possible and when the nuclear weapons states are not keen on giving up their entire nuclear arsenal, the very possession of nuclear weapons may actually be more useful to ensure their non-use by any of the nuclear weapons states. After all, the idea of the world free of nuclear weapons is nothing but a dream, a dream that may possibly engender nightmares.

The Obama administration recently announced its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which underlines that even if the US substantially reduces its nuclear arsenal over time, it would never give up its nuclear weapons entirely unless the world is cleared of all nuclear weapons.

The US’ caution over total nuclear disarmament may be understandable given its superpower and balancing role within the international system. Similarly, French President Nicolas Sarkozy recently declared that France would “never” give up its nuclear weapons and make France vulnerable to external security threats. The nuclear arsenals of Russia, China and the UK are not likely to be eliminated either.

While even France and the UK are not willing to give up their military nuclear capabilities despite the fact that they are not only in the middle of the so-called prosperous and peaceful European Union zone, but also somewhat at the helm of the EU’s security structure, would Iran ever be willing to give up its nuclear military capabilities if it acquires or has already them? Would Israel ever want to lose its military superiority and hence dominance over its perceived arch enemies in the Middle East? Would Israelis ever risk total annihilation in the face of their perceived nuclear threat? How about Iran? Would Iran’s guardians of the so-called Islamic Revolution ever want to risk a military invasion or a substantial military attack? Iran’s president, Ahmadinejad, argues that what America has given to Iranians is two wars and instability on both sides of Iran, in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Would Iran risk suffering the same military offensives, while those who got the US to attack Iraq look even more obsessed about getting the US, as well as the entire international community, to attack Iran? Neither Israel nor Iran would be interested in giving up their military nuclear capabilities or arsenals.

There are really only two options left to the international community -- and these two differ only by the level of evil in their natures. One is a perpetual conflict in the Middle East, which would sooner or later be triggered by Israel, and which would certainly drag the United States in with its nuclear arsenal. The other is the deliberate establishment of a balance of nuclear power in the region. Pursing the second option would inevitably strain the nerves, but eventually ensure non-aggression to a great extent among the regional powers, because the mutually assured destruction capability that nuclear weapons give each state would at the same time inhibit them from using those weapons against other regional states.

Nuclear Middle East may actually be the solution

It would be desirable if nuclear weapons had never existed, if Iran were not suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons possession and if it were possible to eliminate all the nuclear weapons on earth with verifiable certainty. However much it is desired, implementing it is practically impossible. So long as nuclear weapons technology exists in one way or another, in the hands of one country or another, so will the possibility of state or non-state actors acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. This is actually why the US’ NPR underlines that the US would retain its nuclear weapons arsenal until all the nuclear weapons on earth are definitely eliminated. It means that the US would never give up its nuclear arms entirely, neither would the others. Nor would the non-nuclear weapons states stop aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons or the capability to build them. Unfortunately, this is the cold reality that one has to reconcile. One has to perceive the nuclear threat as it is, not as it should be.

Then, more specifically, what is the sustainable and reliable mechanism to prevent possible nuclear aggression in the Middle East? What could be more reassuring than the mere wish for nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful use only? Crippling economic and political sanctions against Iran, as the P5+1 seek? Pre-emptive military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as Israel has long been lobbying for? A diplomatic solution, which Turkey and Brazil hope to achieve? None is likely to provide as reliable a solution as a nuclear balance of power would.

The most vivid illustration of a security guarantee ensured by the balance of nuclear power is the fact that never in history has a nuclear weapons state attacked with or without nuclear weapons another nuclear weapons state, but a nuclear weapons state has attacked a non-nuclear weapons state with nuclear weapons. There is no need to mention that nuclear weapons states keep attacking non-nuclear weapons states as they wish, though not with nuclear weapons. Of course, under such an arrangement in the Middle East, tiny but mighty Israel will no longer be the only nuclear weapons state in the region and hence will be forced to restrict its recklessness under international and regional agreements. However, the heightened prospects for peaceful survival and prosperity should be a good enough reward for Israel in exchange for its nuclear monopoly in the region.

[Armenian Irredentism] The Real Obstacle to Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement

2010-05-10T12:25:00.007-04:00

Op-ed by Mehmet Kalyoncu

Today's Zaman, April 26-27, 2010

Yerevan’s unilateral decision, as Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu describes it, to put the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement on hold should have had a cold shower effect on those who had long been fed up with the overcooked so-called Armenian genocide debate.

On April 22, Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan signed a decree suspending the ratification of the “Protocol on Establishing Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey” and “Protocol on Opening the Border between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey.”

In his televised address to his fellow Armenians, Sarksyan said, “Our political objective for normalizing relations between Armenia and Turkey remains valid, and we shall consider moving forward when we are convinced that there is the proper environment in Turkey and the leadership in Ankara is ready to reengage in the normalization process.” Referring to Ankara’s demand for Armenia to end its occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan before Parliament ratifies the protocols, the Armenian president charged Ankara with causing the breakup in the normalization process by making the end of Armenian occupation a precondition to the ratification.

While Ankara repeatedly reiterated its wish to continue the normalization of relations with Yerevan, on April 24 Armenian demonstrators burned Turkish flags as well as posters of Turkish President Abdullah Gül, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Davutoğlu during the so-called Armenian genocide commemoration ceremonies attended by President Sarksyan and other Armenian officials.

Like the Armenian officials, some inside and outside Turkey have criticized Ankara for pushing the end of Armenian occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh as a precondition to the ratification of the protocols. Some even argued that there was no relationship between the occupation and the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations and that Azerbaijan stood as an obstacle to normalization.

As a matter of fact, the real obstacle to Turkish-Armenian rapprochement is Armenia’s irredentist attitude toward its neighbors. As such, Armenia’s irredentism not only constitutes a national security threat to Turkey, but also is the major obstacle to any step toward sustainable security and stability in the South Caucasus. So long as Yerevan does not irreversibly change this attitude, it is unlikely to achieve any sustainable relationship between Turkey and Armenia.

Armenia is an irredentist country. That is, it is a country with aspirations on a part of another country’s land, over which it claims to have the political right to control. Article 11 of the Armenian Declaration of Independence reads, “The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia,” referring to contemporary eastern Turkey as Western Armenia. Article 12 reads, “This declaration serves as the basis for the development of the constitution of the Republic of Armenia and, until such time as the new constitution is approved, as the basis for the introduction of amendments to the current constitution; and for the operation of state authorities and the development of new legislation for the republic.” So obviously, the crux of the Armenian Constitution and of the guideline for the state authorities is Yerevan’s unrelenting aspirations to seize eastern Turkey as well as other possible monetary and political reparations.

Yerevan has proven its characteristic as such by invading and occupying 20 percent of a neighboring country -- Azerbaijan. Consequently, another neighboring country, Turkey, which has long been the main target of Yerevan’s irredentist aspirations, closed its common border with Armenia. Although Turkey and Azerbaijan do have deep cultural, ethnic, social, economic and political ties and as such Turkey’s closure of the border may seem and has long been portrayed as an emotional response to Armenia’s invasion of Azerbaijan’s territories, Turkey’s response to the invasion is purely a rational one.

It is only normal for a country to seal its common border with an irredentist neighbor to maintain its national security and territorial integrity.

It is more so given that Armenia has never officially recognized and acknowledged its common border with Turkey, constitutionally considers part of Turkey’s lands as its own and worse, has for almost two decades been occupying 20 percent of another neighboring country. So, the reason Turkey shut its border with Armenia and why Turkey should keep it as such is not simply Turkey’s affinity with Azerbaijan, but Armenia’s irredentist nature and the security threat that it clearly poses to its neighbors. The fact that Armenia cannot dare to confront Turkey militarily neither ceases its aspirations on Turkish territories nor changes its malignant nature that has long obstructed progress toward security and stability in the South Caucasus.

Moreover, the impunity Armenia has long enjoyed despite its continuous violations of international law, humanitarian law, Geneva conventions and United Nations Security Council resolutions during and after its invasion of Azerbaijani territory makes Yerevan even more reckless about paralyzing its peace talks with Turkey and Azerbaijan. On April 30, 1993, the UN Security Council adopted resolution S/RES/822 (1993), “noting with alarm the escalation in armed hostilities and, in particular, the latest invasion of the Kelbadjar district of the Republic of Azerbaijan by local Armenian forces, Expressing grave concern at the displacement of a large number of civilians and the humanitarian emergency in the region, Reaffirming also the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory, [and demanding] the immediate cessation of all hostilities and hostile acts with a view to establishing a durable cease-fire, as well as immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces from the Kelbadjar district and other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan.”

This resolution came after Yerevan-backed local Armenian forces killed 613 Azerbaijani civilians, including 106 women and 83 children, in the town of Khojali on Feb. 25-26, 1992. Instead of ceasing their attacks, the Armenian forces expanded their killing campaign to beyond the Nagorno-Karabakh region into surrounding districts such as Lachin, Kubatly, Jebrail, Zangelan, Aghdam and Fizuli. As Armenian forces continued to invade these districts, the UN Security Council adopted resolutions 853, 874 and 884 in the same year demanding a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories.

To this day, however, these districts, totaling 8.9 percent of Azerbaijani territory, as well as the Nagorno-Karabakh region remain under the control of Armenia. The way Sarksyan recalls the Khojali massacres is quite telling: “We don’t speak loudly about these things. But I think the main point is something different. … Before Khojali, the Azerbaijanis thought that they were joking with us, they thought that the Armenians were people who could not raise their hand against the civilian population. We were able to break that [stereotype]. And that is what happened.” (Thomas de Waal, “Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War,” NYU Press 2004, p.172) By that, President Sarksyan also implies what they aspire to do so long as the circumstances permit.

The way forward

In the final analysis, the current leadership in Yerevan does not seem to be ready to acknowledge its past transgressions, let alone make due reparations to their victims. Yet it can start by revisiting Armenia’s irredentist characteristic and finding ways to get rid of it instead of asking Ankara to give up its precondition to the ratification of the protocols.

In the meantime, Ankara should recognize that the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations is directly contingent to not one but two preconditions: First, Armenia must end its occupation of the Azerbaijani territories in the Nagorno-Karabakh region as well as the surrounding districts, and second, it must remove from its constitution the articles that describe eastern Turkey as “Western Armenia.” In the absence of the other, satisfying one of these conditions is not enough, because while one literally certifies Yerevan’s irredentist aspirations toward Turkey, the other practically illustrates that Yerevan would seek to fulfill those aspirations once the circumstances permit. Until then, Turkey’s common border with Armenia should remain sealed.